
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
Compassion: a Tibetan Analysis

A Buddhist Monastic Textbook

Guy Newland



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One of the distinguishing features of the study of Buddhist philosophy in the great monasteries of the past two thousand years has been the use of analysis and debate. Clear conceptual understanding is a crucial step in the process of gaining inner realization of the subjects studied, specifically emptiness and compassion, the two principal aspects of the path to enlightenment.

This system was exemplified in such magnificent Indian monasteries as Nalanda, where at its peak ten thousand monks lived and studied, and has been kept alive for a thousand years in the great monasteries of Tibet.

The texts used by students over the centuries have been commentaries of earlier scholars and meditators written to clarify the teachings originally expounded in the sutras of Buddha.

In *Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis*, Guy Newland has translated and clarified the first part of a text entitled *Ornament Adorning the Throats of the Fortunate*, written in the sixteenth century by Jay-dzun Chö-gyi Gyel-tsen, a scholar of the Jay College of Sera Monastery. This text is still used today at Sera-Jay, where it is one of the five required textbooks on Madhyamika.

Its subject — the development of compassion as expounded by sixth century Indian pandit, Chandrakirti, and elucidated by Dzong-ka-ba, the fourteenth century founder of the Tibetan Ge-luk-ba tradition — is dealt with in the highly technical language of debate. Using only the first part of the text, which comments upon Chandrakirti's opening verses of praise to compassion, Newland has expertly extracted Jay-dzun-ba's major ideas and presented them so that they are comprehensible, relevant and accessible.

This book will be welcomed by all students of Madhyamika Buddhism. Equally, it is an invaluable addition to the growing fund of authoritative literature written by Western Buddhist scholars for Western readers.

Cover: Avalokiteshvara, the embodiment of compassion. From a painting by contemporary Tibetan artist, A-la Rig-ta. *Photos:* Front Cover: Trisha Donnelly; back cover: Deborah Watkins.

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Guy Newland received a B.A. in Religious Studies from the University of Virginia in 1977. He continued into graduate work at the same institution, entering the Buddhist Studies program under Professor Jeffrey Hopkins, and was awarded an M.A. in 1983. He has served as Instructor of Tibetan Language at the University of Virginia and Outreach Instructor to James Madison University; he is currently Instructor of Asian Religion at Mary Washington College. Guy Newland's forthcoming doctoral dissertation examines the doctrine of the two truths as it is presented in the monastic textbooks of the Ḡe-luk-b̄a tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.

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Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis

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A Buddhist Monastic Textbook

Guy Newland

An exposition and translation of a section of the text by Jay-d̄zun Chö-ḡyi-gyel-tsen entitled *A Good Explanation Adorning the Throats of the Fortunate: A General Meaning Commentary Clarifying Difficult Points in (D̄zong-ka-b̄a's) "Illumination of the Thought: An Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"'"*

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Contents

Preface

This translated section from *A Good Explanation Adorning the Throats of the Fortunate: A General Meaning Commentary Clarifying Difficult Points in (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Illumination of the Thought: An Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"'"* by Jay-dzun Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen (*rJe-btsun Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan*) (1469–1546) is important because it brings to light the continuity of theoretical concern for issues other than emptiness (*shūnyatā, stong pa nyid*) among the Mādhyamika philosophers of India and Tibet. Most modern studies of Mādhyamika focus on the problem of interpreting the concept of emptiness. In large part this is because Nāgārjuna (second century A.D.) devoted his most influential work, *Treatise on the Middle Way,* primarily to the explication of emptiness and related concepts. Because it strikes them as strangely familiar, emptiness often fascinates those trained in the skeptical ontologies of contemporary philosophy. Consider the following: "Mind and matter alike, I should say, are only convenient symbols in discourse, not actually existing things."[1] Bertrand Russell made this statement, but a Mādhyamika thinker might easily have chosen the same words to express his view. Such resonances, together with the shared method of persistent logical analysis, point to common ground between modern philosophy and Mādhyamika.

Often overlooked, and sometimes denied, is the fact that Mādhyamika, unlike the Western philosophical systems with which it is sometimes compared, is a *religious* tenet system. It seeks not only to describe the nature of the universe, but also to prescribe a system of moral attitudes and spiritual practices culminating in the ideal state – Buddhahood. These practices prominently include meditation on emptiness, an internal process aimed at eventually eradicating the subtle and innate reifying misconceptions that are the root of suffering. However, cultivation of compassion, giving, ethics, patience, and so forth is just as necessary if Buddhahood is to be attained.

In writing his *Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way,"* Chandrakīrti (seventh century A.D.) sought to show just how Mādhyamika teachings on emptiness interact with apparently unrelated ethical practices within the framework of a "path structure" of progressively more enlightened consciousnesses. Through compassion and so forth, Bodhisattvas amass the collection of merit; through meditation on emptiness, they amass the collection of wisdom. When a Bodhisattva completes these two collections, he becomes a Buddha. The situation differs from that of a person required to obtain a fortune in gold and a separate fortune in jewels because compassion and wisdom are mutually influential consciousnesses. Each augments, activates, and sets the tone for the other at every stage of the path.

In the expression of worship that begins his *Supplement* Chandrakīrti states that compassion is important in the beginning, middle, and at the end of the path. Of the three initial causes of Bodhisattvas – compassion, non-dual wisdom, and an altruistic mind of enlightenment – compassion is the original root because it is the motivation for developing the other two. In the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika system, Foe Destroyers (*arhat, dgra bcom pa*) and Bodhisattvas realize the same type of emptiness, yet only Bodhisattvas, with minds empowered by countless aeons of practice motivated by great compassion, are able to overcome the obstructions to omnisicence and thereby achieve Buddhahood. In the final analysis, every wisdom realizing emptiness relies, directly or indirectly, on a Buddha's compassion-motivated

teachings. Conversely, Chandrakīrti's presentation of three types of compassion shows how compassionate consciousnesses are colored by the degree of wisdom present in the awarenesses preceding them.

The importance of cause and effect relationships is a conspicuous theme in the expression of worship and accompanying *Auto-Commentary* of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*. Hīnayānists rely on Buddhas, Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas, Bodhisattvas develop through the strength of compassion – Chandrakīrti invites us to examine the path structure in causal terms. This prepares us for the remainder of the book, in which each successive chapter corresponds in sequence to one of the ten Bodhisattva grounds. Also, Chandrakīrti reminds us at the outset that the achievement of spiritual aims in the future requires the cultivation of their causes in the present.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's *Ornament Adorning the Throats of the Fortunate* is one of five required textbooks on Mādhyamika in the Jay (*Byes*) College of S̄e-ra Monastery. The section translated here deals only with the expression of worship of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's reading of Chandrakīrti is based on the seminal commentary, *Illumination of the Thought* by D̄zong-ka-b̄a (1357–1419). D̄zong-ka-b̄a brings Chandrakīrti's text into sharper focus, delineating its meaning more exactly and taking issue with the earlier interpretations of Jayānanda. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's textbook takes this process one step further, debating details of the doctrines and refining their verbal expression.

Buddhists say that there are three trainings in religious doctrine: hearing, thinking, and meditating. If one gets the right words in the right order at the hearing stage, one will be less prone to error in one's thinking. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's painstaking attention to the formulation of precise terminology must be understood in this light. The significance of terminological concerns should be neither exaggerated nor underestimated. On the one hand, it is a mistake to hold that certain phrasings are intrinsically correct while all variants are utterly wrong. Often, opposing scholars agree on the meaning but disagree regarding the most accurate and helpful manner of expressing it. On the other hand,

to underestimate the importance of terminological distinctions is to ignore the vast power of language to generate correct or incorrect consciousnesses in those who hear it. An apparently trivial change in phrasing may drastically alter the meaning grasped by the listener. Certainly language is not an end in itself; but, as with any strong tool, proper use is imperative and mishandling perilous.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a stresses that it is senseless to discuss Chandrakīrti's expression of worship without actually practicing compassion:

> Those who strive to train in great compassion through cherishing sentient beings and reflecting on the ways in which these beings are tortured in cyclic existence make meaningful Chandrakīrti's uncommon expression of worship. Those who otherwise claim to be skilled in this are like prattling parrots.[2]

In spite of this the Ḡe-luk-b̄a sect of Tibetan Buddhism – of which Jay-d̄zun-b̄a was a member and D̄zong-ka-b̄a was the founder – is sometimes faulted for arid scholasticism. The Ḡe-luk-b̄a prediliction for technical debate is rooted in the premise that direct realization of emptiness – the only real antidote to all suffering – must evolve from preceding inferential realizations. The discipline of reasoning on any topic prepares the mind for the subtle analyses that culminate in the inferential realization of emptiness.

Although Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's style can be justified on these grounds, his extensive use of a debate format built on syllogisms and contradictory consequences (*reductio ad absurdum* type arguments) makes his text difficult to read in translation. Therefore, in my exposition I have extracted Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's major ideas from the debates. There is a wealth of doctrinal data embedded in the long formal arguments of Tibetan monastic textbooks. I have sought to demonstrate this by recasting a portion of it in a more accessible form.

As I have noted, most previous works on Mādhyamika treat mainly emptiness, neglecting compassion. Two notable exceptions are Jeffrey Hopkins's *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, which

contains a partial translation of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought,* and Louis de La Vallee Poussin's translation of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*. I have gratefully relied upon both these sources.

For the convenience of those who do not have access to the New Delhi edition of Jay-ḏzun-ḇa's work, a concordance to the *Ser byes* edition has been appended.

Guy Newland
June, 1984
Richmond, Virginia

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Note on Transliteration

Herein Tibetan words have been transliterated in accordance with the system devised by Turrell Wylie.[3] Wylie's system has been modified only in that the first pronounced letter in the names of persons and texts is capitalized. Transliterations of Tibetan words are underlined in the text and notes but are not underscored in the bibliography or glossary. In addition, a system of phonetic transcription devised by Jeffrey Hopkins is used so that those who do not know Tibetan may read the text more easily.

The conversion table from transliteration to phoneticization is as follows, with the transliteration on the left of each column and the phonetic form on the right. Lines above letters indicate a high or sharp tone:

ka : ḡa	kha : ka	ga : ga	nga : nga
ca : j̄a	cha : cha	ja : ja	nya : nya
ta : d̄a	tha : ta	da : da	na : na
pa : b̄a	pha : pa	ba : ba	ma : ma
tsa : d̄za	tsha : tsa	dza : dza	wa : wa
zha : sha	za : sa	'a : a	ya : ya
ra : ra	la : la	sha : s̄ha	sa : s̄a
ha : ha	a : a		

The phonetic system is obtained by using the columns above and

substituting *k* for *g* and *p* for *b* in the suffix position; *n̄ga, n̄ya, n̄a, m̄a,* and *la* are used when these letters appear after a prefix or under a superscription; *dbyang* is rendered as *ȳang* and *dbang* as *wang*.

The transliteration of Sanskrit equivalents uses *sh* for *ś*, *ṣh* for *ṣ*, *ch* for *c*, and *chh* for *ch* for the sake of easier pronunciation. Where available, the Sanskrit original accompanies the first mention of each Indian title.

Part I
Exposition

1 *Birth from the Kings of Subduers*

Traditionally, Tibetan Buddhists recognize four systems of Buddhist tenets: Vaibhāṣhika, Sautrāntika, Chittamātra, and Mādhyamika.[4] Study of Mādhyamika (especially Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika), considered to be the most profound, is based to a large degree on Chandrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra,* translated here as *Supplement to the Middle Way.*[5] In Sanskrit *madhya* means "middle"; *madhyama* means "very middle." Since *ka* is from the verb *kai,* meaning "to proclaim," *madhyamaka* may signify a book, person, or tenet system that proclaims a middle way.[6] One Indian scholar, Jayānanda, asserts that the "proclaimer of a middle way" (*madhyamaka*) that is supplemented by Chandrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* is Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakashāstra*) "and so forth." Ge-luk-ba scholars such as Dzong-ka-ba and Jay-dzun-ba object to the phrase "and so forth." They argue that the one and only proclaimer of a middle way that is supplemented by Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to the Middle Way* is Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way.* Other books, persons, and tenet systems may be called *madhyamaka,* but they are not supplemented in this context.

Although Chandrakīrti wrote a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise,* his *Clear Words* (*Prasannapadā*), it was also necessary for him to add a supplement for two reasons. In the first place, Chan-

drakīrti sought to show that Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* was not to be interpreted according to the Chittamātra or Svātantrika-Mādhyamika – tenet systems that appeared after Nāgārjuna's composition of the *Treatise*. Second, Chandrakīrti sought to demonstrate that those who follow Nāgārjuna and use the reasonings of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* to realize emptiness (*shūnyatā, stong pa nyid*) should not fall into nihilism. Rather, they should generate great compassion (*mahākaruṇā, snying rje chen po*) and an altruistic mind of enlightenment, practice the Bodhisattva deeds, and ascend the ten grounds (levels of development) in order to become Buddhas.[7]

Because Chandrakīrti wishes to emphasize that Mādhyamikas accord high importance to compassion and other practices of method, he begins the *Supplement* with four stanzas of praise for compassion:

> Hearers and Middling Realizers
> Are born from the Kings of Subduers.
> Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas.
> The mind of compassion, non-dual awareness,
> And the altruistic mind of enlightenment
> Are the causes of the Children of Conquerors.
>
> Mercy alone is seen as the seed
> Of a Conqueror's rich harvest,
> As water for development, and as
> Ripening in a state of long enjoyment.
> Therefore at the start I praise compassion.
>
> Homage to that compassion for migrators,
> Who are powerless, like a bucket travelling in a well,
> Initially adhering to a self, an "I,"
> And then generating attachment to things, "This is mine."
>
> [Homage to those compassions for] migrators,
> Seen as evanescent and empty of inherent existence,
> Like a moon in rippling water.[8]

BIRTH FROM KINGS OF SUBDUERS

Victorious Great Compassion
(Translation: pp. 73–76)

According to Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (1.5–11), the purpose of the first two of these stanzas is to show that it is suitable for him to praise "victorious great compassion – the initial marvellous cause of Buddhahood –" rather than opening his *Supplement* with an obeisance to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.[9] Jayānanda takes this passage from the *Auto-Commentary* (*Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣhya*) to mean that great compassion is the only initial cause of Buddhahood. Jay-dzun-ba argues that this interpretation contradicts a statement from Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* (*Ratnāvalī*) (174c–175).

> If you and the world wish to gain the highest
> enlightenment,
> Its roots are an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment
> That is as firm as the king of mountains,
> Compassion reaching in all directions,
> And a wisdom consciousness not relying on duality.[10]

Since Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation of aspiration in this passage specifically indicates that the word "root" (*rtsa ba*) (*Comp.* 111) means "initial" (*thog ma*), Jay-dzun-ba maintains that there are three initial causes of enlightenment: great compassion, the altruistic mind of enlightenment, and non-dual wisdom.

Why does Chandrakīrti refer to great compassion as "victorious great compassion"? Jayānanda writes that it is because great compassion "destroys the enemy, hatred." Jay-dzun-ba disagrees, quoting Dzong-ka-ba's opinion (*Comp.* 101–102) that the designation of great compassion as "victorious" (*bhagavatī, bcom ldan 'das*) is a case of calling a cause – compassion – by the name of its effect – the Supramundane Victor, Buddha.

Causes and Effects
(Translation: pp. 76–78)

The importance of the causal relationship between great compas-

sion and Buddha Superiors (*Āryabuddha, Sangs rgyas 'phags pa*) was clearly present in Chandrakīrti's mind, for he justifies his omission of any explicit praise for Buddhas by saying, "an expression of worship to the cause implies worship to the effect." In Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* (*Abhisamayālaṃkāra*), for example, an expression of worship is explicitly made to the Hīnayāna knower of bases (*vastujñāna, gzhi shes*).[11] Since the Hīnayāna knower of bases is the main cause of Hearer (*Shrāvaka, Nyan thos*) and Solitary Realizer (*Pratyekajina, Rang rgyal*) Foe Destroyers (*Arhan, dGra bcom pa*), Maitreya implicitly expresses worship to Fo̥e Destroyers. However, this does not imply that *Ornament for Clear Realization* is a Hīnayāna text. In order to refute the idea that Hearers and Solitary Realizers are praised only in Hīnayāna texts, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a quotes another example of an expression of worship to Hearers in a Mahāyāna text.[12] In the case of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*, an explicit expression of worship to great compassion implies an expression of worship to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's position is that Chandrakīrti does not offer an *explicit* expression of worship to Bodhisattvas and Buddhas.

There is, however, a problem with saying that Buddha is the effect of great compassion. Each of the four Buddha Bodies – Emanation Body, Pure Enjoyment Body, Wisdom Truth Body, and Nature Truth Body – is Buddha. The Nature Truth Body is the emptiness of a Buddha Superior's wisdom consciousness; as an emptiness, it is necessarily permanent. Any general category that includes permanent and impermanent phenomena is itself permanent. Thus, since a Nature Truth Body – a permanent phenomenon – is Buddha, Buddha is permanent. Being permanent, it cannot be an effect because causes and effects are necessarily impermanent phenomena. Why, then, does Chandrakīrti say "Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas"? Also, if Buddhas are not effects of great compassion, how can worship to Buddhas be implicit in an expression of worship for great compassion?

One way of dealing with these problems is to say that Chandrakīrti used the word "Buddha" to refer to Buddha Superiors (*Āryabuddha, Sangs rgyas 'phags pa*). A Buddha Superior is a *person*

who has attained Buddhahood. Thus, he has a Nature Truth Body in his continuum. However, one cannot say that a Nature Truth Body *is* a Buddha Superior because a Nature Truth Body is not a person. A Buddha Superior, being a person, must be impermanent and, therefore, can be posited as the effect of great compassion.

Jay-dzun-ba does not offer this line of reasoning. He argues instead that a few permanent phenomena, such as Buddha, may be discussed as if they had causes. True cessations, for example, are sometimes called "effects that are states of separation," even though they are not actually effects. Since Buddha and true cessation are not actual effects, they do not actually have causes. However, in order to describe the path, it is important to be able to talk about what types of consciousnesses must occur in a person's continuum before Buddha or true cessation can occur in his continuum. Apparently Jay-dzun-ba is willing to assert that great compassion is a cause of Buddhas despite the fact that it cannot be an *actual* cause of Buddhas. This is because it is a critical precursor to the existence of Buddhas.

The Meaning of Terms in the Root Text
(Translation: pp. 78–83)

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* opens with the lines, "Hearers and Middling Realizers Are Born from the Kings of Subduers." Hearers and Solitary Realizers are sometimes called "Subduers" (*Muni*) because they subdue the afflictions. Buddha Superiors are called *Kings* of Subduers (*Munīndra*) because they alone have supreme lordship in the realm of doctrine. The teachings of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas depend upon Buddha's teachings. Dzong-ka-ba states (*Comp.* 105): "The term 'Subduer' is indeed used for Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers, but since they are not *Kings* of Subduers, only Buddhas are so called."[13]

Hearers (*Shrāvaka, Nyan thos*) are so called because, as a result of hearing and practicing the doctrine, they achieve a Hearer's enlightenment and thereupon cause others to hear of their attain-

ment. Hearers are also called "Hearer-Proclaimers" (*Thos grogs*). Jayānanda claims that this is because they hear teachings on Buddhahood but proclaim only paths leading to Hearer Foe Destroyership. However, Chandrakīrti, D̄zong-ka-b̄a, and Jay-d̄zun-b̄a hold that Hearers are called Hearer-Proclaimers because, having heard about Buddhahood and the Bodhisattva paths, they proclaim these Mahāyāna paths to others – even though they themselves do not practice these paths.

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (4.1–5) explains that Solitary Realizers (*Pratyekajina* or *Pratyekabuddha, Rang rgyal*) are called Middling Realizers (*Sangs rgyas 'bring*) because they are superior to Hearers "in the feature of a higher increase of merit and exalted wisdom," and inferior to Buddhas in that they lack "the collections of merit and wisdom, great compassion, an exalted knower of all aspects, and so forth." What is the feature of a higher increase of wisdom by which Solitary Realizers surpass Hearers? Jayānanda explains that "Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers abandon the conception of external objects, whereas Hearer Foe Destroyers do not abandon that." Yogāchāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas such as Shāntirakṣhita and Haribhadra assert that Hearers cultivate mainly realization of the person's emptiness of being a self-sufficient or substantially existent self; Solitary Realizers eliminate coarse obstructions to omniscience by also realizing that subject and object are empty of being different entities. Only Bodhisattvas take emptiness of true existence as their main object of meditation.

However, Jayānanda iṣ a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas assert that Hearers, Solitary Realizers and Bodhisattvas all take emptiness of true existence as their object of meditation. Jayānanda makes this assertion later in his text.[14] Thus, he contradicts himself by holding a Prāsangika tenet while using Svātantrika tenets to interpret a passage from the work of another Prāsaṅgika, Chandrakīrti.

Having pointed out this contradiction, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a presents his own interpretation (trans. p. 83):

> Solitary Realizers are greater than Hearers because Solitary Realizers are able to extend cultivation of the

> path for one hundred great aeons, whereas Hearers are unable to extend cultivation on the path for one hundred great aeons.... Solitary Realizers are inferior to complete Buddhas because Solitary Realizers do not have a completed cultivation of the two collections of merit and wisdom, great compassion that operates with respect to all sentient beings at all times, an exalted knower of all aspects, and so forth.

Jay-dzun-b̄a emphasizes that Chandrakīrti (4.3–5) and Dzong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 104) say that Solitary Realizers are middling because they are inferior to Buddhas, not because they are inferior to Bodhisattvas.[15]

Features of Solitary Realizers

Solitary Realizers are distinguished from Hearers by six features: (1) lineage (*rigs*), (2) mode of progressing on the path (*lam bgrod tshul*), (3) mode of actualizing the effect (*'bras bu mngon du byed tshul*), (4) mode of amassing the collections (*tshogs bsags tshul*), (5) abiding (*gnas*), and (6) movement (*rgyu ba*). Solitary Realizers are superior to Hearers by way of lineage because their faculties are sharper than Hearers' faculties.[16]

Solitary Realizers progress on the path in three distinct ways. Rhinoceros-like (*Khaḍgaviṣhāṇa, bSe ru lta bu*) Solitary Realizers spend one hundred great aeons accumulating merit and wisdom in the presence of a Buddha's Supreme Emanation Body without passing beyond the middling level of the path of accumulation. Lesser Congregating (*Vargachārin, Tshogs spyod*) Solitary Realizers depend upon Buddhas' Supreme Emanation Bodies, Hearers, and so forth in order to progress through the forebearance level of the path of preparation, but not beyond. Greater Congregating Solitary Realizers rely upon Supreme Emanation Bodies, Hearers, and other teachers for the generation of the paths of accumulation, preparation, and seeing, but not for the generation of the paths of meditation and no more learning. All three types of Solitary Realizer actualize the effect – Foe Destroyership – in the same way: in their last lifetime they achieve Foe Destroyership

without relying upon Supreme Emanation Bodies, Hearers, or other teachers. In contrast, Hearers progress upon the path and actualize Foe Destroyership in the presence of a Supreme Emanation Body or other teachers.

The Solitary Realizer's features of "abiding" and "movement" refer to attributes of a Solitary Realizer in his last lifetime. On the basis of the prayer petitions, "May I be reborn in a land where there are no Buddhas or Hearers," Solitary Realizers *abide* in such a land during their last lifetime and are able to teach their disciples without speaking, but through the *movements* of their bodies.

Solitary Realizers' Collections
(Translation: pp. 83–85)

With regard to the feature of amassing the collections, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa (*Comp*. 104) says:

> Solitary Realizers are intent on cultivating merit and wisdom over one hundred aeons; thus, unlike the Hearers, they are able to continue cultivating the path for a long time.

and (*Comp*. 105):

> Because Solitary Realizers' progress in merit and wisdom greatly exceeds that of Hearers, they are able to generate the wisdom of a Foe Destroyer during their final lifetime in the Desire Realm without depending on another master's teaching.

Jay-ḏzun-ḇa takes this to mean that all types of Solitary Realizer must amass collections of merit and wisdom for one hundred great aeons. Yet Ḏzong-ka-ḇa does not use the word "collection" (*saṃbhāra*, *tshogs pa*) in either of these passages. Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (4.3–5) says that Solitary Realizers do not amass collections of merit and wisdom; they do, however, have *imputed* or *secondary* collections of merit and wisdom. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa (*Comp*. 104–105) remarks, "The mere term 'collection' is indeed used for merit and wisdom in general, but it applies mainly to fully qualified merit and wisdom." It seems that Ḏzong-ka-ḇa

is making two implications: (1) the primary and proper referent of the term "collection" is a *Buddha's* collections of merit and wisdom, and (2) a Solitary Realizer's merit and wisdom may be referred to as "collections" in a secondary sense, but such collections are not fully qualified.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a feels that to conclude that there are no fully qualified collections in the continuums of Hīnayānists is to take D̄zong-ka-b̄a and Chandrakīrti too literally. Downplaying the importance of the phrase "fully qualified," Jay-d̄zun-b̄a stresses that Solitary Realizers do amass collections. He quotes the *Repaying the Kindness Sutra* to support his position: "Solitary Realizers complete the collections in one hundred great aeons."[17] He further argues that Solitary Realizers amass collections because D̄zong-ka-b̄a has implied that they amass collections in a secondary sense. In order to reconcile this interpretation with Chandrakīrti's statement, "[Solitary Realizers] are middling because they are inferior to perfect and complete Buddhas due to not having collections of merit and wisdom ..." Jay-d̄zun-b̄a construes the word "collections" in this passage to mean "a *completed cultivation* of the two collections" (emphasis added). Only a Buddha has a completed cultivation of the collections.

Generally, it is said that the collection of merit establishes the imprint of a Buddha's Form Body because it is that collection which mainly causes a Buddha's Form Body to arise at the moment Buddhahood is attained. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a avoids the unwanted consequence that a Solitary Realizer's collection of merit would be the main establisher of the imprint of a Buddha's Form Body by pointing out that a Buddha's Form Body is mentioned only in the context of a discussion of the Mahāyāna collections.

Change of Vehicles

(Translation: pp. 85–87)

Some scholars hold that Hearers who have the simultaneous mode of abandonment – passing through the path of meditation in nine stages and abandoning nine objects of abandonment at each stage instead of in eighty-one stages with one object of abandonment at each stage – can become Solitary Realizers if, in their

last lifetime, they are born in a land without a Buddha. Asaṅga's *Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya)* (see trans. p. 86), a Chittamātra text, says, "If there are no Buddhas, [that Hearer] becomes a Solitary Realizer." Gyel-tsap's *Ornament of the Essence,* a text written primarily from the viewpoint of the Svātantrika tenet system, states that Congregating Solitary Realizers are former Hearers who have switched into the Solitary Realizer vehicle. Thus, Congregating Solitary Realizers do not have the ability to extend cultivation of the path for one hundred great aeons.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a disagrees with this interpretation. He holds that Asaṅga's positing of a switch from Hearer lineage to Solitary Realizer lineage cannot be carried over from Chittamātra and Svātantrika to Prāsaṅgika. In the Prāsaṅgika system, the main object of realization is the same for all three vehicles. A hypothetical Congregating Solitary Realizer who formerly had the realization of a Hearer would not be superior to a Hearer by way of motivation because both are Hīnayānists. He would also not be superior to a Hearer by way of ability to extend cultivation of the path since neither has a prolonged practice of amassing merit and wisdom. He would not be superior to a Hearer by way of subtlety of object of realization since, in the Prāsaṅgika system, the main object of all three vehicles is emptiness of inherent existence. Without a feature of superiority to Hearers, such a hypothetical Congregating Solitary Realizer could not be posited as a "Middling Realizer." Since this contradicts Chandrakīrti's explanation that the phrase "Middling Realizer" refers to Solitary Realizers, the only solution is that there are no Hearers who switch into the Solitary Realizer lineage. Having reached this conclusion, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a must assert that Gyel-tsap's statement that Congregating Solitary Realizers are former Hearers is an explanation of non-Prāsaṅgika tenets.[18]

Maitreya's *Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sutras* (*Mahāyānasūtrālam kārakārika*) (11.55) says:

> Indefinite Hearers are of two types: those who see the object of their vehicle [i.e., the ultimate truth] and those who do not see it. Those who see the object are either free from desire [Non-Returners] or not free

> from desire [Once Returners and Stream Enterers. Both of] these are inferior [because they are slower to enter the Mahāyāna than those who have not entered a path].

This statement supports the view that some Hearer Superiors, who are of indefinite lineage may become Solitary Realizers. However, since the *Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sutras* presents a Chittamātra viewpoint, Jay-dzun-ba, as a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, is not bound to accept this evidence. Instead, citing an analogy with a Tantric system of paths, he asserts that Hearers on the paths of seeing and meditation are definite in the Hearer lineage in that they are certain to become Hearer Foe Destroyers. Hearer Foe Destroyers do not enter the Solitary Realizer Vehicle, but will eventually enter the Bodhisattva Vehicle. Jay-dzun-ba leaves open the possibility that Hearers who have not reached the path of seeing may switch to the Bodhisattva Vehicle before reaching the Hearer path of seeing. In the case of Solitary Realizers, however, Jay-dzun-ba insists that "whoever is a Solitary Realizer on the path of accumulation will necessarily manifest the fruit of Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer."[19]

Mode of Birth from Kings of Subduers
(Translation: pp. 88–92)

"Hearers and Solitary Realizers/Are born from Kings of Subduers" means that Hearers and Solitary Realizers achieve the Foe Destroyership of their respective lineages in dependence upon a Buddha teaching them the doctrine of dependent-arising. Through hearing, thinking, and meditating on dependent-arising, Hearers and Solitary Realizers come to realize that phenomena are empty of inherent existence; they thereby progress toward their respective enlightenments.

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (2.11–3.3) presents and replies to an objection to his explanation of birth from Kings of Subduers:

> *Objection:* Although some have become skilled in realization of the ultimate just through hearing the teaching of dependent-arising, they do not attain nir-

vana in just this present lifetime.

Reply: Nevertheless, like an action the effect of which is definite to mature, practitioners of what has been taught will definitely attain in another life the fruition of the effect that they very much desire. Āryadeva says [in his *Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas* (8.22)]:

> Although one who knows suchness does not achieve
> Nirvana here, in another birth
> He will definitely attain it
> Without striving, as in the case of actions.

Therefore, Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (18.12) says:

> When complete Buddhas do not arise
> And Hearers are also not present,
> The exalted wisdom of Solitary Realizers
> Thoroughly arises without the support [of a teacher].

Chandrakīrti gives this explanation without specifically saying whether or not he is referring to only Solitary Realizers. Jay-dzun-b̄a follows D̄zong-ka-b̄a's interpretation: Chandrakīrti is dealing with an objection concerning the way in which Solitary Realizers are born from Buddhas. Since Solitary Realizers actualize enlightenment in a land where there is no Buddha, how can it be said that their enlightenment depends upon a Buddha? Chandrakīrti replies that the Solitary Realizers' attainment of Foe Destroyership in a land without a Buddha definitely depends upon their having heard a Buddha's teaching on dependent-arising in previous lifetimes.

Jayānanda and an unidentified Tibetan scholar hold that Chandrakīrti is answering an objection concerning *both* Hearers and Solitary Realizers. Hearers do not necessarily achieve Foe Destroyership immediately upon practicing meditation on dependent-arising, nor do Hearers necessarily achieve Foe Destroyership in the lifetime during which they first hear a Buddha's teachings on dependent-arising. Thus, these other scholars say

that the objection should be taken to include qualms about the way in which *Hearers* are born from Buddhas. Since Chandrakīrti has been discussing how "Hearers and so forth" are born from Buddhas and does not specifically eliminate the possibility that Hearers are among those to whom the objection refers, they conclude that Chandrakīrti was answering an objection concerning both Hearers and Solitary Realizers.

D̄zong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 102) and Jay-d̄zun-b̄a argue that there are greater qualms about how Solitary Realizers could be born from Buddhas than there are about how Hearers are born from Buddhas because Solitary Realizers achieve enlightenment in a land without a Buddha or other teachers. Thus, Chandrakīrti's passage should be interpreted as singling out and refuting these qualms about Solitary Realizers. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a offers the further argument that Chandrakīrti would not have quoted the passage from Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* concerning the arising of Solitary Realizers if he had intended to refute an objection concerning Hearers. Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (18.12) states:

> When complete Buddhas do not arise
> And Hearers are also not present,
> The exalted wisdom of Solitary Realizers
> Thoroughly arises without the support [of a teacher].

According to Kensur Lekden (*Comp.* 257), this passage refers to the way in which Hearers who have a simultaneous mode of abandonment can become Solitary Realizers if, in their final lifetime, they are born in a land without a Buddha or other Hearers. However, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a, as we have seen, rejects the assertion that there are Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers who formerly had the realization of Hearers. He considers Nāgārjuna's stanza a simple description of the way in which those who are definite in the Solitary Realizer lineage take their final rebirth in a land without Buddhas or Hearers. He goes on to explain that the stanza does not imply that Solitary Realizers arise *only* in lands without Buddhas. Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers, for example, spend one hundred great aeons in the presence of a Supreme Emanation Body. It is only in their *final lifetime* that Solitary Realizers definitely are born in a land without a Buddha.

2 *Buddhas Are Born from Bodhisattvas*

Objection and Reply
(Translation: pp. 93–99)

In his *Auto-Commentary* (4.12–6.6) Chandrakīrti presents and responds to an objection regarding the line from his *Supplement*, "Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas." The objector feels that it is contradictory for Chandrakīrti to refer to Bodhisattvas as "Children of Conquerors" (*rGyal ba'i sras*), while also claiming that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas. If Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas, Bodhisattvas cannot be born from Buddhas. The objector feels that Bodhisattvas must be born from Buddhas because Bodhisattvas are called "Children of Buddhas" and "Children of Conquerors."

In Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's explanation of Chandrakīrti's reply he asserts that Bodhisattvas are called Children of Conquerors because they are born from the teaching of *certain* Buddhas. A person first becomes a Bodhisattva in dependence upon hearing the speech of a Buddha. That particular Buddha is the "father" of that Bodhisattva; that Bodhisattva is a "child" of that one Buddha. Thus, every Bodhisattva is the child of a specific Buddha. Of course, a Bodhisattva cannot be the child of the Buddha that he will become, for

that Buddha does not exist when the Bodhisattva is entering the path.

In general, Jay-dzun-ba continues, one cannot say that Bodhisattvas are born from Buddhas or that Bodhisattvas are born from Conquerors because to do so would contradict Chandrakīrti's authoritative statement that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas. Chandrakīrti explains that Bodhisattvas are causes of Buddhas through the "feature of state" and through the "feature of causing to hold." The feature of state means that each Buddha is born from the practice of the Mahāyāna paths by the Bodhisattva in his own personal continuum. Each person reaches the state of a Buddha Superior by way of the state of a Bodhisattva. Each Bodhisattva is the substantial cause (*upādāna*, *nyer len*) of the Buddha he will become.

The feature of causing to hold means that certain Bodhisattvas serve as guides to other Bodhisattvas who are just entering the path. They cause these beginning Bodhisattvas to maintain their altruistic aspiration to enlightenment. When a Bodhisattva, having been made to hold on to this mind or aspiration toward enlightenment (*chittotpāda*, *sems. bskyed*), eventually becomes a Buddha, the Bodhisattva who made him hold that mind at the beginning is said to be a cause of that Buddha through the feature of causing to hold. This is a case of certain Bodhisattvas serving as cooperative conditions (*sahakāripratyaya*, *lhan cig byed rkyen*) for the attainment of Buddhahood by certain other persons.

Other Interpretations
(Translation: pp. 93–99)

Jay-dzun-ba refutes two other scholars' interpretations of Chandrakīrti's reply to the objection that it is contradictory to say that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas while calling Bodhisattvas "Conqueror Children" ((*Jinaputra*, *rGyal sras*) or "Children of Conquerors." One scholar asserts that the terms "Conqueror Child" and "cause of Conqueror" have completely different referents. Jay-dzun-ba argues that this is incorrect because Bodhisattvas are both Conqueror Children and causes of Conquerors.

They must be causes of Conquerors because otherwise, Conquerors (Buddha Superiors) would absurdly be causeless. The *Pile of Jewels Sutra* (*Ratnakūta*) says, "Tathāgatas arise from Bodhisattvas." Although Bodhisattvas are causes of Conquerors, Chandrakīrti repeatedly uses the term "Conqueror Children" to refer to Bodhisattvas at various levels of the path.

Another scholar claims that Chandrakīrti means Bodhisattvas are Conqueror Children (*Jinaputra, rGyal sras*), but not Children of Conquerors (*rGyal ba'i sras*). He allows that they can be called Conqueror Children because they are the children of certain Conquerors; he refuses to call them Children of Conquerors on the grounds that they are not born from Conquerors in general. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a agrees that Bodhisattvas are not born from Conquerors, but still says that they are Children of Conquerors as well as Conqueror Children. He considers these two terms to be equivalent. One becomes a Bodhisattva in dependence upon hearing the teaching of a particular Buddha. Therefore, Bodhisattvas are *called* Children of Conquerors or Conqueror Children. Nevertheless, Children of Conquerors are not born from Conquerors because Conquerors are born from them. Similarly, Bodhisattvas are called "Children of Buddhas" despite the fact that they are not born from Buddhas. Buddhas, being permanent, cannot serve as their causes.

Scriptural Confirmation
(Translation: pp. 99–101)

Chandrakīrti also quotes scripture to support his assertion that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas. The *Pile of Jewels Sutra* says:

> Kāshyapa, it is like this: People pay homage to the waxing crescent moon, not to the full moon. Similarly, Kāshyapa, those who have strong faith in me should pay homage to Bodhisattvas rather than to Tathāgatas. Why? Because Tathāgatas arise from Bodhisattvas. All Hearers and Solitary Realizers arise from Tathāgatas.

In addition to providing explicit scriptural confirmation of the assertion that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas, this passage also suggests one of the central ideas of the opening stanzas of the *Supplement*: Worship to the cause implies worship to the effect.

Taking this idea one step farther, Chandrakīrti praises compassion because it is one of the main causes of Bodhisattvas. Chandrakīrti does not explicitly express worship to Hearers, Solitary Realizers, Buddhas, or Bodhisattvas but does teach the cause and effect relationships that exist among them. Thus, when he explicitly praises compassion, he implicitly praises the effect of which compassion is the ultimate root cause – Buddhahood.

In the sutra passage, Buddha praises Bodhisattvas by teaching that others should praise them. Following Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation of Chandrakīrti's remarks, Jay-dzun-ba enumerates four reasons for Buddha's praising Bodhisattvas:

> Buddha praised Bodhisattvas (1) so that people will realize that Bodhisattvas are the main causes of Buddhas; (2) because by expressing worship to the main cause of Buddhas – Bodhisattvas – worship to the effect – Buddha – becomes expressed; (3) in order to make known that, just as those who seek the trunk of a medicinal tree should value the shoot of that tree, those who respect and seek perfect Buddhahood should value and respect the shoot of a Conqueror, a beginning Bodhisattva; (4) in order to cause sentient beings who had come into his circle at that time and who were set in the paths of the three vehicles definitely to join just the Mahāyāna.

The tree metaphor is parallel to the moon metaphor in the sutra quote. A shoot is the stalk or stem of a young plant. The shoot and waxing crescent moon represent a novice Bodhisattva who has just entered the Mahāyāna path of accumulation. The full moon and the fully developed tree symbolize Buddhahood.

Chandrakīrti (5.13) describes those whom Buddhas seek to join to the Mahāyāna as "set in the three vehicles." In explaining this passage Dzong-ka-ba repeats the same phrase and cites

Jayānanda, who takes "set in the three Vehicles" to mean "set in the Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattvas paths." Jay-d̄zun-b̄a also uses the word "paths" in his explanation, suggesting that he agrees with Jayānanda's interpretation. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a himself points out that this seems to contradict his own earlier assertion that once one enters the Solitary Realizer path of accumulation one must reach Foe Destroyership before becoming a Bodhisattva. For, if Buddha praised Bodhisattvas in order to influence Solitary Realizers, among others, to enter the Mahāyāna, then it must be possible for Solitary Realizers to switch vehicles.

Birth From Kings of Subduers
(Translation: pp. 101–102)

D̄zong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 105–106) and Jay-d̄zun-b̄a both explain that Hearers and Solitary Realizers are born from Kings of Subduers because they each attain the fruit of their vehicles in dependence upon hearing a Buddha's teachings and subsequently thinking about and meditating on those teachings. Bodhisattvas also attain the fruit of their vehicles in dependence upon hearing, thinking, and meditating on a Buddha's teachings. Should they not likewise be called "born from Kings of Subduers"? D̄zong-ka-b̄a says (*Comp.* 109):

> Though Bodhisattvas are born from the teaching of Buddhas, Chandrakīrti does not need to explain this as he did for Hearers and Solitary Realizers when he said that they are born from Subduer Kings.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a says, "...it is not necessary to explain, as with Hearers and Solitary Realizers, how Bodhisattvas are born from Subduer Kings...." Despite what these passages seem to suggest, we should not conclude that Bodhisattvas are born from Subduer Kings in general. Rather, each is born from the specific Subduer Kings who are their respective causes. Subduer King and Conqueror are equivalent epithets of Buddha Superiors, and these scholars have already asserted that, in general, Bodhisattvas are not born from Conquerors.

3 *The Three Practices*

The first stanza of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* ends with the lines (1.14–15):

> The mind of compassion, non-dual awareness,
> And the altruistic mind of enlightenment
> Are the causes of Bodhisattvas.

Also, Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says (174cd–175):

> If you and the world wish to gain the highest
> enlightenment,
> Its roots are an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment,
> As firm as the king of mountains,
> Compassion reaching in all directions,
> And a wisdom consciousness that does not rely upon
> duality.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a explains that Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti are indicating that a mind of compassion, non-dual awareness, and a mind of enlightenment are prerequisites for becoming a *novice* Bodhisattva. Thus, all three of these minds must be generated *before* one can become a Bodhisattva. According to Jay-d̄zun-b̄a "the mind of compassion" (*snying rje'i sems*) in this context refers to great compassion. Great compassion observes *all* sentient

beings and has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. In order to generate such compassion for all sentient beings it is necessary both to feel a sense of closeness or intimacy with all sentient beings and to be aware of their suffering.

The Seven Instructions

Atīsha taught seven instructions of cause and effect for the generation of an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment; the fifth stage in this meditation process is great compassion.[20] In preparation for the first step, the meditator generates equanimity toward all beings. This is done by realizing that all sentient beings have been in every possible relationship to him. Within one lifetime they may appear only as benefactors or only as enemies, but during the course of beginningless rebirths all have done him both service and harm.

Then, in the first step, the meditator gradually builds up a strong sense of intimacy with all sentient beings by considering how each has at some time been his mother. The second step is for the meditator to become mindful of the great kindness of other sentient beings, especially such kindness as they have shown him in the role of mother. In each lifetime one is dependent upon one's mother from the time of conception. A mother undergoes great suffering on her child's behalf; without her efforts, the child would die or live an animal-like existence. Therefore, in the third step, the meditator forms a strong intention to repay all sentient beings for these acts of kindness.

Seeing the torment of sentient beings in the six realms of cyclic existence and understanding that they want happiness and do not want suffering, the meditator cultivates love – the fourth stage – and compassion – the fifth stage – for all sentient beings. The meditator aspires to repay sentient beings for their kindness in the best possible way: freeing them from suffering and establishing them in the final happiness of Buddhahood. Considering first friends, then neutral persons, and finally enemies, he thinks, "Wouldn't it be nice if this person could have happiness and the causes of happiness." He then cultivates a stronger form of love,

thinking, "May this person have happiness and the cause of happiness." The strongest form of love is cultivated last: "May I be the cause of this person's having happiness and its causes."

The fifth stage is the practice of great compassion. This is developed in three steps: "Wouldn't it be nice if this person could be free from suffering and its causes," "May this person be free from suffering and its causes," and "May I be the cause of this person becoming free from suffering and its causes." When extended to all sentient beings, each of these three thoughts is an example of a mind of great compassion.

The strongest forms of love and compassion, "May I alone be the cause of all sentient beings having happiness and its causes" and "May I alone be the cause of all sentient beings becoming free from suffering and its causes," are brought together as the sixth precept, the unusual attitude. The unusual attitude is an altruistic willingness to do whatever is necessary to save all beings by oneself. Although in fact no one can liberate all beings, the meditator entertains this exaggeration without misconceiving his own capabilities. His resolve is such that if it were possible for him to liberate all sentient beings, he would be prepared to take on that burden.

Next the meditator considers the advantages of Buddhahood. Since a Buddha is omniscient, he knows the best way to help each sentient being toward final liberation. Also, since a Buddha has innumerable Emanation Bodies, he can teach a vast number of beings simultaneously. However, before he will vow to seek Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings, the sharp meditator must be sure that it is possible to achieve such a state. Buddhahood is a state in which the mind has been purified of all obstructions and afflictions. Through understanding that the nature of the mind is pure emptiness, the meditator realizes that obstructions and afflictions are not intrinsic to the mind; when these afflictions and obstructions are eradicated, enlightened consciousness will emerge. Therefore, seeing that it is necessary to achieve Buddhahood in order to be best able to help sentient beings and seeing that it is possible to attain Buddhahood, the meditator trains his mind in the aspiration to achieve Buddha-

hood for the sake of all sentient beings. When a non-artificial, or uncontrived, form of this aspiration – referred to as a "mind of enlightenment" or "conventional mind generation" – spontaneously arises, the meditator simultaneously becomes a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation.

Novice Bodhisattvas
(Translation: pp. 111–112, 115–118)

Jay-dzun-ba's interpretations of the three practices described by Chandrakīrti as "causes of Bodhisattvas" – a mind of compassion, a non-dual awareness, and an altruistic mind of enlightenment – hinge upon establishing that these include practices in dependence upon which one initially becomes a Bodhisattva and enters the Mahāyāna path of accumulation. As we have seen, Jay-dzun-ba considers both Chandrakīrti's reference to the "shoot of a great medicinal tree" and the sutra reference to a "waxing crescent moon" to be metaphors for a novice Bodhisattva who has just entered the path of accumulation. Although Chandrakīrti uses these metaphors only in the context of his explanation of the line, "Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas," Jay-dzun-ba feels that they also apply to the Bodhisattvas (here referred to as the Children of Conquerors) in the succeeding lines, "The mind of compassion, non-dualistic awareness,/And the altruistic mind of enlightenment/Are the causes of the Children of Conquerors." The argument that "Bodhisattvas" in "Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas" and Children of Conquerors in "Are the causes of the Children of Conquerors" must have the same referent is supported by the way in which Chandrakīrti in his *Auto-Commentary* makes the transition between his explanations of the earlier and later lines. He says (6.6), "Of what are these Bodhisattvas the effect? The mind of compassion, non-dual awareness,/And the altruistic mind of enlightenment ...." The phrase "these Bodhisattvas" certainly seems to refer back to "Bodhisattvas" in the preceding "Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas." Thus, Jay-dzun-ba is justified in his conclusion that the Bodhisattvas for whom Chandrakīrti posits the three practices as causes include the Bodhisattvas for whom "shoot of the medicin-

al tree" and "waxing crescent moon" have been used as metaphors.

If Jay-d̄zun-b̄a is also correct in concluding that these metaphors refer to novice Bodhisattvas who have just entered the path of accumulation, then the lowest of the Bodhisattvas for whom the three practices are posited as causes must be these novice Bodhisattvas. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a reproduces three arguments offered by a scholar opposing D̄zong-ka-b̄a's system (*Comp.* 109) of interpreting the metaphors in this way. The first argument by the opponent is that such an interpretation of the "waxing crescent moon" metaphor contradicts a passage in Nāgārjuna's *Praise for the Element of Reality* (*Dharmadhātustotra*), in which a first ground Bodhisattva's perception of the Truth Body is compared to a perception of a waxing crescent moon. The opponent argues that since Nāgārjuna compares a first ground Bodhisattva to a waxing crescent moon, the Bodhisattva whom Buddha compares to a waxing crescent moon in the sutra passage quoted by Chandrakīrti is also a first ground Bodhisattva on the path of seeing, and not a novice Bodhisattva who has just entered the path of accumulation. In his heated reply Jay-d̄zun-b̄a points out that a careful reading of the passage from *Praise for the Element of Reality* reveals that what Nāgārjuna compares to a waxing crescent moon is a *Truth Body*, albeit an imputed Truth Body, in the continuum of a first ground Bodhisattva.[21] Since the sutra passage clearly compares a *Bodhisattva* to a waxing crescent moon, it is impossible to insist that the metaphor has the same referent in both passages.

The second argument by the scholar opposing D̄zong-ka-b̄a's interpretation is that Maitreya, in his *Sublime Science* (*Mahāyānottaratantrashāstra*), clearly employs "sprout" or "shoot" as a metaphor for the path of seeing. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's reply stresses the distinction between a path – which (with minor exceptions) is necessarily a consciousness – and the person in whose continuum a path exists – who is a non-associated compositional factor, and therefore, is necessarily not a consciousness.[22] The path of accumulation has three levels – small, middling and great. According to Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* (*Abhisamayālaṃkāra*), the altruistic mind generation in the continuum of a Bodhisattva

on the great path of accumulation is a mind generation like a waxing crescent moon.[23] Thus, if the scholar who opposes Dzong-ka-ba, in order to establish that a Bodhisattva on the path of seeing is a Bodhisattva like a shoot, insists that any metaphor used for a path must also apply to persons who have that path, he will be forced to say that a Bodhisattva on the great path of accumulation is a Bodhisattva like a waxing crescent moon. This contradicts the opposing scholar's earlier assertion, in the first argument, that a Bodhisattva like a waxing crescent moon is a Bodhisattva on the path of seeing. Thus, Jay-dzun-ba holds that metaphors for paths should not be confused with metaphors for persons; although Maitreya compares the path of seeing to a shoot, this does not imply that a Bodhisattva on the path of seeing is a Bodhisattva like a shoot.

The opposing scholar's third argument is based on Dzong-ka-ba's explanation (*Comp.* 144) that two metaphors in the *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra* (*Maitreyavimokṣha*) – the newborn son of an emperor and the offspring of a king of eagles – refer to a Bodhisattva on the first ground. Since Dzong-ka-ba's opponent fails to demonstrate any contradiction between this explanation and the explanation that waxing crescent moon and shoot of a medicinal tree are metaphors for a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation, Jay-dzun-ba dismisses this challenge without comment.

Non-dual Awareness

(Translation: pp. 106–108)

Having established that the lowest of Bodhisattvas for whom the three practices are posited as causes are Bodhisattvas like a waxing crescent moon and Bodhisattvas like the shoot of a medicinal tree and that these metaphors refer only to novice Bodhisattvas who have just entered the path of accumulation, Jay-dzun-ba concludes that the three practices must be causes of novice Bodhisattvas who have just entered the path of accumulation. This conclusion is reflected in his explanations of the three practices themselves. For example, he immediately rejects Jayānanda's assertion that the non-dual awareness is an ultimate mind generation because the term "ultimate mind generation" refers to a Bodhisatt-

va's *direct* realization of emptiness on the paths of seeing and those paths above it. Thus, it is not a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva.

Another unidentified scholar states that, in the context of Chandrakīrti's stanza, "non-dual awareness" refers to "non-duality of apprehended and apprehender," while mind generation refers to an ultimate mind generation. When a Bodhisattva on the path of seeing or above directly realizes emptiness, the subject – the mind directly realizing emptiness – and the object – emptiness – appear entirely fused. All consciousnesses prior to the path of seeing have some factor of dualistic appearance. If "non-duality of apprehended and apprehender" means "absence of dualistic appearance," then, according to this scholar's interpretation, a Bodhisattva attains non-dual awareness the moment he directly realizes emptiness. However, this scholar has also said that "mind generation" in the context of Chandrakīrti's stanza refers to an ultimate mind generation. Thus one mind – a Bodhisattva's direct realization of emptiness – is being posited as two of the causes of Bodhisattvas.

This redundancy can be avoided by taking "non-duality of apprehended and apprehender" to mean the non-existence of subject and object as different entities. However, within the Prāsaṅgika tenet system, it is said that subject and object *are* different entities. This statement is made within the context of an understanding that neither subject nor object inherently exist and that external objects are merely posited through the force of thought. Thus, a statement by Kay-drup that apprehended and apprehender that are different substantial entities do not exist must mean that no object is a different substantial entity from a subject *by way of its own nature.* Jay-d̄zun-b̄a thereby concludes that the fault in positing an awareness that realizes the non-existence of subject and object that are different substantial entities as one of the causes of Bodhisattvas is not that this contradicts the Prāsaṅgika tenet system, but that such an awareness is not a prerequisite for becoming a novice Bodhisattva.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a bases his own interpretation of "non-dual awareness" on Chandrakīrti's explanation in his *Auto-Commentary* (6.12–13):

> A non-dual awareness is a wisdom consciousness that is free from the extremes of [inherent] existence and [utter] non-existence.

Thus the word "dual" in "non-dual awareness" does *not* refer to subject/object duality. Rather, it refers to the two extreme views: permanence and annihilation. The extreme of permanence in this context refers to conception that reifies phenomena, superimposing upon them a natural or inherent existence that they do not possess. The extreme of annihilation is the view that phenomena do not exist at all, like the horns of a rabbit. A wisdom consciousness realizing emptiness discerns the final nature of phenomena – without superimposing inherent existence or denying mere conventional existence. Thus, since a wisdom consciousness realizing emptiness is a view free from the two extremes, it is called a "non-dual awareness." The non-dual awareness referred to here must be a conceptual, inferential realization of emptiness since it is a cause of a novice Bodhisattva and emptiness is not realized directly until the path of seeing.

Sharp and Dull Faculties
(Translation: pp. 112–115)

One scholar objects to this explanation, claiming that one must first generate an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment and then, as a Bodhisattva on the Mahāyāna path of accumulation, initially realize emptiness. Therefore, realization of emptiness is not a cause of novice Bodhisattvas and should not be posited as the meaning of the "non-dual awareness" that Chandrakīrti sets forth as a cause of Bodhisattvas. Dzong-ka-ba (*Comp*.113) replies:

> A bearer of the Bodhisattva lineage with sharp faculties first seeks the view of suchness and then generates an [altruistic] mind of enlightenment.

As explained earlier (p. 37), a realization of emptiness assists one seeking to generate a conventional mind of enlightenment by allowing him to establish that it is possible to attain Buddhahood.

Those of sharp faculties *must* realize emptiness inferentially be-

fore they can generate an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment because they will not promise to achieve Buddhahood until they are certain that it is a promise they can keep. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a reports that most of those who have dull faculties also realize emptiness before entering the Mahāyāna path of accumulation. However, some dull Bodhisattvas on the lowest level of the path of accumulation have not yet realized emptiness. Such a Bodhisattva has vowed to achieve perfect enlightenment for the sake of others on the basis of his faith in the validity of Buddha's teachings.

Although D̄zong-ka-b̄a in his reply above mentions only sharp Bodhisattvas, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a argues that D̄zong-ka-b̄a did not intend to imply that Chandrakīrti explains the three practices as causes of Bodhisattvas only in terms of those of sharp faculties. Later (in the context of explaining how the wisdom realizing emptiness and the altruistic mind of enlightenment are both rooted in great compassion) Chandrakīrti (8.5–12) and D̄zong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 114 and 115) describe a procedure in which the practitioner first generates the mind of enlightenment – thus becoming a novice Bodhisattva – and then seeks to penetrate the view. Since this clearly refers to dull Bodhisattvas, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a concludes that Chandrakīrti in general is presenting the three practices as causes of Bodhisattvas of both sharp and dull faculties. Since only a small minority of dull Bodhisattvas do not realize emptiness – that is, attain a non-dual awareness – before entering the path, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a argues that, in general, the three practices are causes of novice Bodhisattvas of both sharp and dull faculties.

Mind Generation

(Translation: pp. 108–112)

As with non-dual awareness, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's interpretation of the mind generation among the three practices relies upon his assertion that the lowest of the Bodhisattvas for whom the three practices are posited as causes is a novice Bodhisattva who has just entered the path of accumulation. The attainment of a fully qualified conventional mind generation is always simultaneous with

the first moment of the Mahāyāna path of accumulation. A cause and its effect cannot occur simultaneously; the cause must precede the effect. Therefore, the mind generation that is one of the three practices, if it is to be a cause of a Bodhisattva in the first moment of the path of accumulation, cannot be a fully qualified mind generation. Dzong-ka-ba explains (*Comp.* 112):

> The "mind generation that is a prerequisite for a Bodhisattva" refers to the time of cultivating a mind generation; it is not an actual mind generation that has been produced through cultivation.... Because the mere thought, "I will attain Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings" is just verbal understanding ... it is *called* an altruistic mind generation but it is not.

Thus, Jay-dzun-ba says that the mind generation that is a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva is an *imputed* mind generation, in that it is not an actual non-artificial experience but merely the occasion of cultivation. This imputed mind generation and the fully qualified mind generation in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation are both examples of mind generations that are causes of Bodhisattvas in this context. This is because a novice Bodhisattva who has just entered the path is only the *lowest* of the Bodhisattvas for whom Chandrakīrti is stating mind generation as a cause. For all other developing Bodhisattvas, fully qualified mind generations are posited as the mind generations that are their causes. However, since the mind generations that are causes of Bodhisattvas in this context do include imputed mind generations, Jay-dzun-ba states that the general term "mind generation in this context" is an imputed mind generation. Whatever is a mind generation in this context is not necessarily an imputed mind generation because the mind generation in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation is both a mind generation in this context and a fully qualified mind generation.

Regarding the thought of an altruistic mind of enlightenment, Chandrakīrti (6.13–20) cites the *Recitation of Doctrine Sutra*:

> The mind that is generated in a Bodhisattva thinking,

> "I will cause sentient beings to understand reality in this way" is called a Bodhisattva's mind of enlightenment.[24]

D̄zong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 110) remarks, "Since this observes only a portion of the objects of intent of a mind generation, it does not fulfil the definition." According to one scholar, D̄zong-ka-b̄a means that *all sentient beings* are the objects of intent of a fully qualified mind generation; thus, since the sutra omits the word "all," it is not referring to a fully qualified mind generation. While Jay-d̄zun-b̄a agrees that it is necessary for a Mahāyāna mind generation to seek the welfare of *all* sentient beings, he finds it absurd to posit all sentient beings as the objects of intent of a mind generation. According to Jay-d̄zun-b̄a, Mahāyāna mind generation has two objects of intent: the welfare of others and one's own enlightenment. One does not seek sentient beings, one seeks their welfare. In order to be best able to accomplish their welfare, one also seeks one's own complete enlightenment. Since the sutra passage indicates a mind seeking the welfare of others but fails to refer to an intention to pursue their welfare by attaining Buddhahood, it is not a complete description of even the imputed mind generation that is one of the three practices in this context.

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (8.7–10) offers another description of a mind generation:

> One definitely generates an altruistic mind thinking,
> "I will relieve all these worldly beings from suffering
> and will definitely join them to Buddhahood."

D̄zong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 111) states that this is incomplete because it does not mention "taking cognizance of the object of attainment, one's own enlightenment." According to Jay-d̄zun-b̄a, D̄zong-ka-b̄a finds this description and the description in the *Recitation of Doctrine Sutra* limited in the same way: they omit any reference to one's own enlightenment. Although D̄zong-ka-b̄a refers to one's own enlightenment as the object of attainment rather than as the object of intent, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a feels that the object of attainment, enlightenment, is one of the two objects of intent. D̄zong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 111) asserts that the complete definition of

an altruistic mind generation is "the wish to attain highest enlightenment – the object of attainment – for the sake of all sentient beings – the objects of intent." The apparent contrast between object of attainment and objects of intent makes Jay-dzun-ba's interpretation slightly awkward. However, since Dzong-ka-ba never specifically says that the object of attainment is not an object of intent, it seems he does not directly contradict Jay-dzun-ba's interpretation.

To reiterate Jay-dzun-ba's position: an altruistic mind of enlightenment has two objects of intent – the welfare of others and one's own enlightenment. Of these two, the latter is also the altruistic mind's object of attainment.[25]

The Logical Relationships Between the Various Compassions
(Translation: pp. 103–106, 118–119)

In order to appreciate several of the points Jay-dzun-ba makes with regard to the mind of compassion it is necessary to grasp the importance of the distinction between what can be said of a term and what can be said of instances of the meaning signified by that term. For example, among men there are short men, tall men, rich men, poor men, and so forth. Each of these men is a man, but man is not a rich man. Although the general category "man" is posited in dependence upon particular instances of men, when stripped of these instances and considered as an isolate factor "man" is quite distinct from its instances.

The "mind of compassion" that is presented by Chandrakīrti as one of the three causes of Bodhisattvas (referred to hereafter as "compassion in this context") is great compassion, the wish that all sentient beings be free from suffering. It is also suitable to reverse the order of subject and predicate: great compassion is the compassion indicated in this context. Whatever is a compassion in this context is necessarily great compassion. However, whatever is a great compassion is not necessarily a compassion indicated in this context. For example, the compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is a great compassion, but it is not a compassion indicated in this context because "this context" is

Chandrakīrti's discussion of prerequisite causes of novice Bodhisattvas (see chart, p. 51).[26]

Among great compassions there are those in the continuums of Buddha Superiors, those in the continuums of Bodhisattvas, and those in the continuums of persons who have not entered the path. Compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is synonymous with compassion at the time of the effect; compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva is synonymous with compassion at the time of the path; and compassion in the continuum of a person who has not entered in path is synonymous with compassion at the time of the base. Neither great compassion nor compassion indicated in this context is any of these six compassions.

Compassions indicated in this context include the isolate "great compassion," compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the path of preparation, compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation, and compassion in the continuum of a person who has not entered the path. The compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattvaa Superior and the compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior are not compassions indicated in this context. Chandrakīrti discusses the qualities of Mahāyāna Superiors at length in the *Supplement*, but here, in the context of the three causes of Bodhisattvas, the focus is on the qualities of ordinary beings.[27] Nevertheless, the boundaries of compassion indicated in this context are from before entering the path up to and including the Buddha ground because great compassion, which is the compassion indicated in this context, exists at all of those levels. Also, the compassion that is indicated in this context, being great compassion, exists in the continuum of a Buddha Superior.

Great compassion is a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva; compassion indicated in this context is also a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva. Thus, great compassion and compassion in this context do exist in the continuums of persons who have not entered the path. However, great compassion is not a great compassion in the continuum of a person who has not entered the path because the broad category "great compassion" is neither a com-

passion in the continuum of any specified person, nor a compassion that exists at any specified time. The same applies to the compassion in this context.

Although the compassion indicated in this context exists in the continuum of a Buddha Superior, there is no common locus of the compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior and the compassion indicated in this context. Great compassion cannot be posited as a common locus of those two because it is not a compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior. The great compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is not a common locus of those two because it is not a compassion indicated in this context.

There are four possibilities between compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva and compassion in this context. The great compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation is both. Great compassion and great compassion in the continuum of a person who has not entered the path are two examples of something that is the compassion indicated in this context but is not a compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva. The compassion in the continuum of a first ground Bodhisattva Superior is a compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva but not a compassion indicated in this context. The great compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is neither.

Compassion That Will Be Explained
(Translation: pp. 103–104, 108)

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (6.10–11) explains that the compassion indicated in this context of the three practices is "compassion that will be explained." An unidentified scholar takes this to mean that the compassion that Chandrakīrti praises as a cause of Bodhisattvas in the first stanza is the compassion he praises in the second stanza as being important as the beginning, middle, and end. However, great compassion is described as important at the end because of its influence on Buddha Superiors. Since the compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is not among the compassions that are described as causes of Bodhisattvas in this

context, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a takes "compassion that will be explained" to mean "compassion that will be explained in the third and fourth stanzas." Regarding the three compassions presented in the third and fourth stanzas, Dzong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 123) says:

> The compassion to which Chandrakīrti offers worship is mainly compassion at the beginning, but it is also the other compassions of Bodhisattvas.

Neither Chandrakīrti nor D̄zong-ka-b̄a mention Buddha Superiors in connection with the three compassions presented in the third and fourth stanzas. Thus, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a considers these three compassions to be Chandrakīrti's elaboration of the mind of compassion that is a cause of Bodhisattvas. However, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's own discussion of the three compassions of the third and fourth stanza does extend to Buddha Superiors

4 *The Importance of Compassion*

(Translation: pp. 120–121, 123–124)

The second stanza of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to the Middle Way* (7.17–20) states:

> Mercy alone is seen as the seed
> Of a Conqueror's rich harvest,
> As water for development, and as
> Fruition in a state of long enjoyment.
> Therefore at the start I praise compassion.

Mercy refers to great compassion. Because great compassion is important at the beginning, when one first sets out, it is like a seed. Because it is important in the middle, while one is on the Bodhisattva paths, great compassion is like "water for development." Because great compassion is important at the end, when one has become a Buddha, it is called "fruition-like compassion." Great compassion is compassion that is important at the beginning, middle, and end because it plays a critical role at each of the three times. However, great compassion is not a compassion at any of the three times. This point may be clarified by an example: Sunlight is important in the morning, at midday, and in the afternoon. However, sunlight is not "sunlight in the morning," sunlight is not "sunlight at midday," and sunlight is not "sunlight in the afternoon."

SUBJECTS / PREDICATES	compassion in this context	great compassion	compassion like fruition	compassion like water	compassion like a seed	compassion that is important at the end	compassion that is important in the middle	compassion that is important at the beginning	compassion that is a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva	comp. in the continuum of a Buddha or at time of effect	comp. in the continuum of a Bodhisattva or at time of path	comp. in continuum of one who has not entered the path or at time of the basis
compassion indicated in this context	is	is	is not	is	is	is not	is	is	is	is not	is not	is not
great compassion	is	is	is	is	is	is	is	is	is	is not	is not	is not
compassion like fruition	is not	is	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is not	is	is not	is not
compassion like water	is	is	is not	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is not	is	is not
compassion like a seed	is	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is	is	is not	is not	is
compassion that is important at the end	is not	is	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is not	is	is not	is not
compassion that is important in middle	is	is	is not	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is not	is	is not
compassion that is important in beginning	is	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is	is	is not	is not	is
compassion that is a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva	is	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is	is	is not*	is not	is
compassion in the continuum of a Buddha or at time of effect	is not	is	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is not	is	is not	is not
compassion in the continuum of Bodhisattva or at time of the path	is	is	is not	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is not	is	is not
great compassion in continuum of one who has not entered the path or at time of basis	is	is	is not	is not	is	is not	is not	is	is	is not	is not	is

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa explains that Chandrakīrti's phrase "mercy *alone*" indicates that unlike the three examples of compassion's importance – seed at the beginning, water in the middle, and fruition at the end – only compassion is important at all three times. Although great compassion is a compassion that is important at the end, whatever is a great compassion is not necessarily important at the end. For example, the great compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva is great compassion but not a compassion that is important at the end. Similarly, whatever is great compassion is not necessarily a compassion that is important in the middle and whatever is a great compassion is not necessarily a compassion that is important at the beginning.

Great compassion is important at the end – in the state of Buddhahood – because it is through great compassion that a Buddha is moved to use his vast powers to relieve the suffering of sentient beings. Chandrakīrti (8.20–9.4) and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa (*Comp.* 115) explain that the importance of compassion at the end is compared to the fruition of a harvest because, hypothetically, if a Buddha lacked the ripened state of great compassion, he would not continue to be a source of benefit and enjoyment for sentient beings. Also, if Buddhas did not have great compassion, they would not be moved to teach the doctrine, and the transmission of the Buddhist teachings on emptiness and so forth would weaken and die out. In the absence of these teachings the "great collection of Superior fruits" – that is, the states of Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva Superior – would no longer be attained.

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa explains (*Comp.* 115) that Chandrakīrti uses water as a metaphor for the importance of compassion in the middle, on the Bodhisattva paths, because:

> ...although the seed of compassion initially grows into the shoot of an altruistic mind of enlightenment, if later it is not moistened again and again with the water of compassion, one will not amass the two extensive collections that serve as the causes of the fruit, Buddhahood. In that case, one will actualize the nirvana of either a Hearer or Solitary Realizer. However, if the shoot of an altruistic mind of enlightenment is

> moistened again and again with the water of compassion, that will not happen; [one will actualize the enlightenment of a Buddha].

The "seed of compassion" is the great compassion in the continuum of someone who has not entered the path. Chandrakīrti (8.12–13) and Ḏzong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 114) both state that great compassion is important at the beginning because "the seed of all Buddha qualities is great compassion." As explained earlier, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a maintains that there are three "initial causes of enlightenment": great compassion, the altruistic mind of enlightenment and non-dual wisdom. He criticizes Jayānanda's view that only compassion is the initial cause of enlightenment, citing Nāgārjuna's statement that all three practices are roots of enlightenment. However, this does not prevent Jay-d̄zun-b̄a from saying that the root of the other two practices, which are also roots of enlightenment, can be traced back to great compassion.

The Root of the Three Practices Originates in Great Compassion
(Translation: pp. 121–124)

In the context of explaining how great compassion is important at the beginning, Chandrakīrti first describes how the Bodhisattva's generation of an altruistic mind of enlightenment depends upon great compassion. He then adds (8.10–12), "Since one who forsakes the non-dual wisdom cannot fulfil this promise, he also definitely engages in the non-dual wisdom." Jay-d̄zun-b̄a states that this passage explicitly indicates how the root of the other two practices originates in great compassion for those of dull faculties and implicitly or indirectly indicates how those two practices originate in great compassion for those of sharp faculties.

In the two passages (*Comp.* 114 and 115) where Ḏzong-ka-b̄a comments upon this section from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* he describes a procedure, followed only by certain dull Bodhisattvas, in which the initial realization of emptiness is subsequent to the generation of a mind of enlightenment. However, in an earlier discussion of the three practices Ḏzong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 113) says:

> A bearer of the Bodhisattva lineage with sharp faculties first seeks the view of suchness and then generates an altruistic mind of enlightenment.

Thus, while Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's commentary on the first stanza mentions only those of sharp faculties, his commentary on the second stanza describes a procedure for dull Bodhisattvas. Jay-ḏzun-ḇa asserts that both stanzas refer to both those of sharp and those of dull faculties. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa clearly explains (*Comp*. 123–124) the third and fourth stanzas in terms of both types of practitioners.

5 *The Three Compassions*

(Translation: pp. 125, 141)

The third stanza and the first half of the fourth stanza of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (9.7–10, 10.12–13) conclude the expression of worship:

> Homage to that compassion for migrators,
> Who are as powerless as a bucket travelling in a well,
> Initially adhering to a self, an "I,"
> And then generating attachment to things, "This is mine."
>
> [Homage to those compassions for] migrators,
> Seen as evanescent and empty of inherent existence,
> Like a moon in rippling water.

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (11.13–14) explains that these lines pay homage to three types of compassion: (1) compassion observing sentient beings (*sattvālambanā karuṇā, sems can la dmigs pa'i snying rje*); (2) compassion observing phenomena (*dharmālambanā karuṇā, chos la dmigs pa'i snying rje*); and (3) compassion observing the unapprehendable (*anālambanā karuṇā, dmigs med la dmigs pa'i snying rje*). These three are great compassions – that is, each observes *all* sentient beings and has a subjective aspect of wishing that these beings be free from sufferings. D̄zong-ka-b̄a

(*Comp.* 123) explains:

> No matter which of the three objects of observation these three compassions observe, each compassion has the aspect of wishing to protect all sentient beings from all suffering. Therefore, they differ greatly from the compassion generated by Hearers and Solitary Realizers.

Although Hearers and Solitary Realizers generate compassion observing a limitless number of sentient beings and wishing them free from suffering, they neither have compassion observing *all* sentient beings nor develop the unusual attitude form of compassion, the willingness to take on themselves the burden of protecting sentient beings.

According to Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 116–117), the third stanza of the *Supplement* expresses Chandrakīrti's homage to the first compassion, compassion observing sentient beings. Each worldly being is bound in cyclic existence by afflicted ignorances that conceive the person designated in dependence upon the transitory collection of mental and physical aggregates in his continuum to be a real, inherently existent "I" and a real, inherently existent "mine." Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 116) states:

> The view of the transitory apprehending a real "I" thinks that the self, which does not inherently exist, does so. Subsequently, the view of the transitory apprehending real "mine" generates attachment for the truth of the "mine" thinking, "This is mine," with respect to phenomena other than the "I," such as forms and eyes.

Adherence to a truly existent "I" and "mine" leads worldly beings into other afflictions, such as desire and anger, which serve as the basis for contaminated actions.

Just as a bucket is bound in a well by a rope, limitless sentient beings are bound in cyclic existence by afflictions and contaminated actions. Just as a bucket naturally plunges downward in a

well but must be drawn upward with great exertion, worldly beings are automatically drawn into bad migrations as hell beings, hungry ghosts, and animals but achieve the causes of a happy rebirth only through great effort. Wandering in the well of beginningless cyclic existence, sentient beings are battered by suffering just as a bucket is battered against the stone walls of a well.[28]

In the opening lines of the fourth stanza of the *Supplement* (10.12–13), Chandrakīrti concludes his expression of worship, offering homage to compassion observing phenomena and compassion observing the unapprehendable:

> [Homage to those compassions for] migrators,
> Seen as evanescent and empty of inherent existence,
> Like a moon in rippling water.[29]

D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 120) explains how these lines indicate homage to the second and third compassions:

> Chandrakīrti's homage to compassion observing phenomena is: Homage to compassion viewing migrators as evanecent or momentarily disintegrating, like a moon in water stirred by a breeze. His homage to compassion observing the unapprehendable is: Homage to compassion viewing migrators as empty of inherent existence, though they appear to exist inherently, like the reflection of the moon in water.

According to the Buddhist theory of momentary impermanence, sentient beings are not permanent, unitary, and independent phenomena. Rather, they are imputed in dependence upon collections of impermanent aggregates, which arise, abide, and disintegrate moment by moment. When one determines that sentient beings disintegrate moment by moment, one simultaneously realizes implicitly that they are empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent. Later, in dependence upon having thus refuted the existence of a permanent, unitary, and independent person, one ascertains that sentient beings lack substantial existence – that is, that they are not self-sufficient entities that are different from their

mental and physical aggregates but are merely designated in dependence upon the collection of impermanent aggregates. Thus, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a explains that the name of the second compassion, compassion observing phenomena, is a contraction of "compassion observing sentient beings who are imputed in dependence upon mere phenomena such as the aggregates." When a mind of great compassion is explicitly affected either by an earlier realization of sentient beings as empty of being permanent, unitary, and independent or by an earlier realization of sentient beings as lacking substantial existence, the sentient beings whom that mind of compassion wishes to free from suffering appear to it as flickering or "rippling" with momentary impermanence, like the reflection of a moon in water stirred by a slight breeze.

Just as a reflection of the moon in water appears to be the moon but is not, conventional phenomena such as sentient beings appear to exist inherently, but do not. Just as an ordinary, intelligent person does not consider a reflection of the moon to be the moon, one who realizes subtle selflessness – the emptiness of inherent existence – does not assent to the deceptive appearance of phenomena as inherently, naturally, or truly existing. The self is not one of the aggregates that serve as its basis of designation, is not the composite of those aggregates, and does not exist apart from those aggregates. Nevertheless, it does have mere nominal existence as an imputation by thought and within that context is able to perform functions such as taking rebirth. Great compassion that is explicitly affected by a previous realization of emptiness of inherent existence observes sentient beings qualified with truthlessness and has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. This third type of compassion is called "compassion observing the unapprehendable." "Apprehendable" is an abbreviation for "apprehendable as truly existent," which means "truly existent"; "unapprehendable" thus means "not truly existent." Jay-d̄zun-b̄a explains that "compassion observing the unapprehendable" is a shortened form of "compassion observing sentient beings who lack true existence."[30]

Objects of Observation and Subjective Aspects
(Translation: pp. 129–130, 132, 134–135, 139–141)

Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 121) states that the subjective aspect of all three compassions is the wish to free sentient beings from suffering and that all three compassions observe sentient beings. Dzong-ka-ba continues (*Comp.* 121):

> Since compassion observing phenomena does not observe mere sentient beings but sentient beings who disintegrate moment by moment, it observes sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence.

Similarly, the objects of observation of the third compassion are sentient beings qualified by a lack of true existence.

With regard to the objects of observation of the first compassion, Dzong-ka-ba says (*Comp.* 122):

> In both the basic text and the commentary, Chandrakīrti explains that the latter two compassions observe sentient beings qualified by the qualities explained above, and says that mere sentient beings – who are not so qualified – are the objects of observation of the first compassion. Therefore, thinking this, [Chandrakīrti] gave [the first compassion] the name "compassion observing sentient beings" as a convenient contraction.

Also, Dzong-ka-ba states (*Comp.* 122):

> Compassion observing the unapprehendable also does not observe sentient beings. It observes a special object: sentient beings who are empty of inherent existence.

On the basis of these two passages and the one above in which Dzong-ka-ba contrasts the observation of "mere sentient beings" with the observation of "sentient beings who disintegrate moment by moment," Jay-dzun-ba concludes that the first compassion must observe "mere sentient beings" who appear tormented by suffering but necessarily do not appear qualified with impermanence or selflessness. Thus, there can be no common locus of the first compassion, to which sentient beings appear only as tormented by suffering, and either of the other two compassions.

Whatever is a compassion in the continuum of a Buddha is necessarily a common locus of the second and third compassions, and is necessarily *not* a first compassion. Although the first compassion is called "compassion observing sentient beings," this is just a name given to compassion observing *mere* sentient beings. Whatever is a great compassion observing sentient beings is not necessarily a first compassion because the compassion in the continuum of a Buddha is a great compassion observing sentient beings but is not a first compassion. In fact, anything that is either the second or third compassion is necessarily a compassion observing sentient beings and necessarily not a first compassion. Jay-dzun-ba asserts (trans. p. 135) that in the full name of the first compassion – compassion observing mere sentient beings – the word mere "eliminates that which, having observed sentient beings qualified by impermanence or truthlessness, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering."

With regard to the generation of the second and third compassions, Dzong-ka-ba (*Comp.* 122) says:

> ...before a person can have these two in his mental continuum, he must ascertain that sentient beings are momentary and do not inherently exist. Then, in dependence upon his previous ascertainment, the aspects of these two qualities must appear to his mind. However, it is not necessary that these compassions *apprehend* sentient beings as impermanent or not inherently existent. [Emphasis added]

The objects of observation of a mind realizing that sentient beings are impermanent are sentient beings; the subjective aspect or mode of apprehension of that mind is the realization of impermanence. Subsequently, in dependence upon that, one may generate the second compassion. The object of observation of the second compassion is sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence; the subjective aspect is the wish that those sentient beings be free from suffering. No consciousness in the continuum of a sentient being – that is, a person other than a Buddha Superior – can have two discordant subjective aspects. Since the

subjective aspect of compassion is the wish to free from suffering, it is impossible for a compassion in the continuum of a sentient being to realize or ascertain impermanence or emptiness. On the other hand, the minds in the continuum of a Buddha Superior – who is not a sentient being – have innumerable subjective aspects. Whatever is a compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior necessarily directly realizes coarse selflessness and subtle selflessness and simultaneously has the aspect of wishing to free all sentient beings from suffering.

Debate on Phraseology
(Translation: pp. 136, 138–139, 142)

An unidentified scholar argues that, when positing the objects of observation of the second and third compassions, one must refer to sentient beings "who have been qualified" (*khyad par du byas nas*) with the attributes of impermanence and selflessness in order to indicate that a particular person has realized them as being so qualified. He holds that it is incorrect to say that the objects of observation are sentient beings "who are qualified" (*khyad par du byas pa'i*) by those attributes. The opponent continues that all sentient beings are impermanent and selfless; therefore, whoever is a sentient being is necessarily a sentient being who is qualified with those two attributes. From this, one might want to conclude that whatever is a great compassion observing sentient beings is necessarily a great compassion observing sentient beings who are qualified by truthlessness.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a disagrees, pointing out that D̄zong-ka-b̄a repeatedly uses the phrase "who are" to describe the sentient beings who are the objects of observation of the second and third compassions. Although all sentient beings are sentient beings *who are* selfless (*bdag med du gyur pa'i sems can*), and all sentient beings are sentient beings *who are* qualified by selflessness (*bdag med khyad par du byas pa'i sems can*), whatever is a compassion observing sentient beings is not necessarily a compassion observing sentient beings who are selfless or sentient beings who are qualified by selflessness. For example, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a says, one who propounds inhe-

rent existence can have a compassion observing sentient beings, but cannot have a compassion observing sentient beings who are qualified with truthlessness. The phrase "sentient beings who are qualified with truthlessness" indicates the object of observation *as it appears to the compassion being described* and not just the qualities of sentient beings in general.

Ḏzong-ka-ḇa and Jay-ḏzun-ḇa often use the phrases "who lack true existence" and "who are momentary" to refer specifically to the objects of observation of the second and third compassion. They do not insist on the "who are qualified with" or "who have been qualified with" constructions. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa (*Comp.* 122) says:

> [The third compassion] observes a special object: sentient beings *who are empty* of inherent existence. [Emphasis added]

Also, (*Comp.* 121):

> Sentient beings *who are designated* to the mere phenomena of the aggregates and so forth serve as the objects of observation [of the second compassion]. [Emphasis added]

Also, (*Comp.* 121):

> Giving the name "observation of phenomena" to observation of sentient beings *who are designated* to mere phenomena is a [contraction] omitting intervening words. [Emphasis added]

Although Jay-ḏzun-ḇa includes the word "qualified" in one of his sets of definitions (trans. p. 140) of the three compassions, he omits it in other passages (trans. p. 142):

> ...the third compassion is called compassion observing the unapprehendable by forming [a contraction] omitting the words "sentient beings" from the phrase "observing sentient beings *who lack true existence.*" (Emphasis added)

In general, whatever has a certain attribute is necessarily qualified by that attribute because of being qualified by that attribute for a Buddha's consciousnesses.[31] Since all sentient beings are empty of true existence, in general sentient beings are sentient beings qualified by a lack of true existence. However, the object of observation of the first compassion cannot be posited as "sentient beings who lack true existence" or any similar expression. This is because even though it does observe sentient beings, and all sentient beings lack true existence, sentient beings do not appear to a first compassion as lacking true or inherent existence.

Boundaries and Definitions
(Translation: pp. 130–140, 142)

Although the second compassion can exist only in the continuum of a person who has previously realized a coarse selflessness, whatever is a great compassion in such a person's continuum is not necessarily a second compassion. Among great compassions in the continuum of a person who has formerly had a realization of a coarse selflessness there are cases of all three types of compassion. If the person who has realized a coarse selflessness has also realized a subtle selflessness, then the great compassion in his continuum could be a third compassion – but again, there are cases of all three compassions D̄zong-ka-b̄a (*Comp.* 123) explains:

> Also, in the continuums of those who have found the view of the common [that is, coarse] selflessness or the view of suchness there are many instances of compassions observing sentient beings without qualifying them with either of the two features mentioned above [i.e., common selflessness and suchness]. For example, even one who understands that pot is impermanent, having rooted out the referent object of the conception of pot as permanent, may often observe a pot without observing a pot that is qualified by impermanence. Also, even one who has not understood impermanence does not observe a pot as qualified by permanence every time he observes a pot.

Even in the continuums of those who have had the realizations that are prerequisites for the second and third compassions there are many instances of great compassion observing mere sentient beings. Present experience is not always explicitly affected by past realization.

Jay-d̄zun-b̄a defines the three compassions (trans. pp. 179–180):

> The definition of the first compassion is: that which (1) is a compassion; and (2) is observed as a consciousness that is explicitly affected by neither a wisdom realizing sentient beings as impermanent nor a wisdom realizing sentient beings as lacking true existence
>
> The definition of the second compassion is: that which (1) is a compassion; and (2) is explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing sentient beings as impermanent.
>
> The definition of the third compassion is: that which (1) is a compassion, and (2) is explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing sentient beings as lacking true existence.

If a meditator turns his mind to compassion after a session of meditation during which he mainly realized the emptiness of sentient beings, then the great compassion he generates will be explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing sentient beings to be truthless. At that time, his object of observation is not mere sentient beings but sentient beings qualified with truthlessness. At a later time, however, when his mind is no longer explicitly affected by the realization of the emptiness of sentient beings, he may generate compassions observing mere sentient beings and compassions observing sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence.

The Meaning of "Explicitly Affected"
(Translation: pp. 129–133, 137–138, 143)

The phrase "explicitly affected" (*dngos su zin pa*) is the crux of

Jay-dzun-ba's interpretation. It does not mean that second and third compassions must be immediately subsequent to the wisdoms by which they are explicitly affected. Jay-dzun-ba holds that the second and third compassions both exist in the first moment of Buddhahood. If "explicitly affected by" meant "immediately subsequent to," then a Bodhisattva, in the last moment before he became a Buddha, would have to realize simultaneously both the coarse and the subtle selflessnesses of persons. However, this is impossible because a mental consciousness in the continuum of a sentient being cannot have two discordant modes of apprehension. For this same reason, a compassion and the wisdom consciousness by which it is explicitly affected cannot be manifest simultaneously.

It is clear, however, that a consciousness "explicitly affected" by a preceding realization is strongly influenced by and dependent upon the force of that realization. Jay-dzun-ba states (trans. p. 143):

> ...in order for a compassion thinking, "I will free from suffering these sentient beings who adhere to [true existence] despite the fact that [persons and phenomena] are empty of true existence," to arise manifestly, it must be explicitly affected by an awareness thinking that sentient beings lack true existence.

Such an instance of the third compassion does not actually realize that sentient beings lack true existence but is deeply embedded in the context of such realization.

Another implication of the phrase "explicitly affected" is illuminated by Jay-dzun-ba's statement and refutation of an objection to his assertion that the boundaries of the first compassion extend through the end of the continuum as a sentient being. Since Bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and above have necessarily abandoned afflictive ignorance, the objector argues (trans. p. 143):

> It follows that on the eighth ground and above compassion observing mere sentient beings does not exist because whatever is a compassion on the eighth

> ground or above is necessarily a compassion observing the unapprehendable. The reason is so because on the eighth ground and above any realization of a phenomenon is necessarily a realization of it as being empty of true existence, like an illusion.

However, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's position is that whenever the third compassion exists it must exist manifestly because of always being *explicitly* affected by a realization of selflessness. According to Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's system, a subliminal or non-manifest consciousness cannot be called explicitly affected. Also, a sentient being cannot simultaneously have a manifest mind of compassion and a manifest realization of selflessness. Thus, if (as the objector argues) only the third compassion existed on the eighth ground and above, it would be impossible for a Bodhisattva on the eighth ground and above to have both compassion and manifest wisdom in his continuum simultaneously. For any time he generated compassion, he would have a third compassion, and therefore a manifest compassion, and thus could not simultaneously have a manifest realization of selflessness. However, great compassion must exist in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum in order to serve as the direct substantial cause of the great compassion in the continuum of one who has just become a Buddha. The manifest awareness in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum is a wisdom directly realizing truthlessness. Since the second and third compassions are explicitly affected by preceding realizations, they must exist manifestly; and since the subjective aspect of a great compassion – the wish to free sentient beings from suffering – is discordant with the subjective aspect of realization of emptiness, a great compassion cannot manifestly exist in the continuum of a sentient being manifestly realizing emptiness. Of the three compassions, only the first compassion is not explicitly affected by a preceding realization; thus only the first compassion can exist non-manifestly. Jay-d̄zun-b̄a states (trans. p. 138):

> ...since great compassion does exist in the [mental]

> continuum of one on the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum [as a sentient being] nothing other than compassion observing mere sentient beings is suitable [to be that great compassion].

From the objector's assertion that any realization of a phenomenon in the continuum of one on the eighth ground and above is necessarily a realization of that phenomenon as truthless, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a draws the absurd consequence that a Bodhisattva on the eighth ground would have always to have a manifest realization of emptiness in his continuum. Although Foe Destroyers and Bodhisattvas on the pure grounds – the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds – have completely eradicated the conception of true existence, they do not constantly ascertain each phenomenon with the thought, "This is without true existence." However, this refutation of the objector's position relies upon Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's assumption that any realization of a phenomenon as lacking true existence is necessarily a *manifest* realization. Taken together with his statement that a conventional mind generation cannot exist in the continuum of a Bodhisattva directly realizing emptiness on the uninterrupted path of seeing (trans. pp. 168–69), this seems to suggest that Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's general rule is that all realizations must be manifest. The only exception to this rule specifically mentioned by Jay-d̄zun-b̄a is the first compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva at the end of the continuum as a sentient being.

Part Two

Translation

From *A Good Explanation Adorning the Throats of the Fortunate: A General Meaning Commentary Clarifying Difficult Points in (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Illumination of the Thought: An Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"'"* by Jay-dzun-ba Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen (*rJe-btsun Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan*) as published in the Madhyamika Text Series (New Delhi: *lHa mkhar yongs 'dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan*, 1973)

Contents

1 *Birth From Kings of Subduers*

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to Nāgārjuna's "Treatise on the Middle Way"* (*Madhyamakāvatāra*) (1.12) begins:

> Hearers and Middling Realizers
> Are born from the Kings of Subduers...

Regarding this passage there are two sections: (1) the general meaning and (2) the meaning of the text.[32] The former has two parts: (1) an explanation of the meaning of the transitional statement [in Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary*] and (2) an explanation of the meaning of the root text.

EXPLANATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL STATEMENT

Chandrakīrti's[33] *Auto-Commentary* (*Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣhya*) (1.15–11) says:

> To indicate that it is suitable for one who wishes to compose the *Supplement to the Middle Way* in order to supplement Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakashāstra*) initially to praise, instead of complete and perfect Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, the victorious great compassion – the initial marvellous cause of Buddhahood, which has the character of

thoroughly protecting, without exception, the innumerable protectorless sentient beings bound in the prison of cyclic existence – two stanzas are set forth:

Hearers and Middling Realizers
Are born from the Kings of Subduers.
Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas.
The mind of compassion, non-dual awareness,
And the altruistic mind of enlightenment
Are the causes of the Children of Conquerors.

Mercy alone is seen as the seed
Of a Conqueror's rich harvest,
As water for development, and as
Ripening in a state of long enjoyment;
Therefore at the start I praise compassion.

With regard to the meaning of this, the learned author of the *Commentarial Explanation* (*Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*) [Jayānanda] says:

> There is a middle way which is what is supplemented by this treatise (Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] [30][34] because the middle way treatises such as the *Fundamental Text Called Wisdom* (*Prajñāmūla*) are the middle ways that it supplements.

Also:

> There is a reason for calling great compassion "victorious": It is called this because it destroys the enemy, hatred. There is a reason for calling great compassion "the initial marvellous cause of Buddhahood": although the two, the altruistic mind of enlightenment and the wisdom realizing emptiness, are causes of complete enlightenment, great compassion is called the initial cause since it is the initial root of these.

According to D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought*, these positions are clearly incorrect. It follows that it is incorrect to state the word "such as" in the phrase "the middle way treatises such as

the *Fundamental Text Called Wisdom* are the middle ways that it supplements" because, whereas the *Fundamental Text Called Wisdom* is the middle way which [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] supplements, one must assert, as already proved above [in an earlier part not translated here], that [texts] such as Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* (*Ratnāvalī*) are not middle ways supplemented by [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*].

Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the explanation in the *Precious Garland* (174c–175) – If you and the world wish to gain the highest enlightenment,/Its roots are an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment/That is as firm as the King of mountains,/Compassion reaching all quarters,/And a wisdom consciousness not relying on duality" – is incorrect because [according to Jayānanda] the two, an altruistic mind of enlightenment and a wisdom realizing emptiness, are not initial causes of complete enlightenment. The reason entails the consequence because in the phrase "its roots are an [altruistic] aspiration to enlightenment" it is proper to explain the meaning of "root" as "initial." Also, similarly, [31] D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp*. 111) says:

> This passage indicates that [these three] are the roots of enlightenment but does not explicitly show that [these] are the roots of a Bodhisattva; however, since root means "initial," [Nāgārjuna] is teaching the three main causes at the time of [beginning], and thus it can be known from the context that these are the main causes of Bodhisattvas.

It seems that [Jayānanda's] etymology of *bhagavatī* [victorious] is also incorrect.[35] This will be explained [next] in the section [presenting] our own system.

Presentation of *Our Own System*: In order to explain the meaning of the transitional statement in Chandrakīrti's commentary, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp*. 101–102) says:

> The honorable Chandrakīrti, having assumed the task of making a supplement to Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*, does not state as his object of worship the

> Hearers and Solitary Realizers who ae taken as objects of worship in other books. Furthermore, he indicates that, rather than praising Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, it is suitable to praise great compassion – the initial marvellous cause of Buddhahood, having the nature of thoroughly protecting all vulnerable sentient beings bound in the prison of cyclic existence; it is also the main cause called by the name of its effect, the Victor *(bhagavan, bcom ldan 'das).* For this purpose he sets forth two stanzas, "Hearers...."

The meaning of this: The person, Chandrakīrti, wishing to compose the *Supplement to the Middle Way* in order to supplement the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, the *Fundamental Text Called Wisdom*, not only does not state as objects of obeisance the two, Hearers and Solitary Realizers, who are taken as objects of obeisance in other texts such as Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* (*Abhisamayālaṃkāra*), but also does not explicitly state Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as objects of obeisance. Rather, at the beginning of the composition of this treatise he praises great compassion, the initial marvellous cause of Buddhahood, which has the character of thoroughly protecting all sentient beings – that is, of wishing to separate them from suffering – and which is [called] victorious (*bhagavatī*) in the sense of designating the main cause with the name of the effect [the Victor, Buddha]. [32] To make known that it is suitable [to praise compassion in this way] two stanzas are set forth beginning with "Hearers and Middling Realizers/ Are born from the Kings of Subduers." This is an uncommon explanation of Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought*.

First Debate

Incorrect position: It follows that Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* is a Hīnayāna treatise because in the *Ornament for Clear Realization* there is an expression of worship made to the two, Hearers and Solitary Realizers.[36]

Correct position: The reason does not entail the consequence. [Your reason is correct, for] it follows that in the *Ornament for Clear Realization* an expression of worship is made to the two,

Hearers and Solitary Realizers, because in the *Ornament for Clear Realization* an expression of worship is made to the Hīnayāna knowers of bases, the main cause of Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers. The reason entails the point because Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (5.8–9) says, "The thought is that an expression of worship to the cause implies worship to the effect."

Second Debate

Incorrect position based on the mere words of Chandrakīrti's Auto-Commentary: In the *Supplement to the Middle Way* no expression of worship is made to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

Correct position: It follows that in the *Supplement to the Middle Way* an expression of worship is made to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas because in the *Supplement to the Middle Way* an expression of worship is explicitly made to great compassion, the main cause of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The reason entails that point because the *Auto-Commentary* says, "an expression of worship to the cause [implies worship to the effect]."

Incorrect position: The meaning of that [passage from the *Auto-Commentary*] is that an expression of worship to the causes, Bodhisattvas, serves as an expression of worship to the effects, Buddhas.

Correct position: It follows that having expressed worship to the cause, great compassion, serves as having expressed worship to the effects, Buddhas, [33] because [according to you] your thesis [that an expression of worship to the causes, Bodhisattvas, serves as an expression of worship to the effects, Buddhas], is correct. If you accept the consequence, then there are the three spheres [of self-contradiction].[37] Therefore, the meaning of the commentary is that in the *Supplement to the Middle Way* an expression of worship is not explicitly made to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

Third Debate

Incorrect position: The meaning of the statement in Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 101) that "[Chandrakīrti] does not state as his object of worship the Hearer and Solitary Realizers who are taken as objects of worship in other books.

Furthermore ..." is that [Chandrakīrti] does not state as objects of worship the two, Hearer and Solitary Realizers, who are stated as objects of worship in other texts which are Hīnayāna scriptural collections.

Correct position: This is not correct, for [otherwise] it would [absurdly] follow with respect to the subject, that which is to be known [on this occasion], that it would be correct to make the distinction that in the Mahāyāna scriptural collections expressions of worship are not made to Hearers and Solitary Realizers and that in the Hīnayāna scriptural collections expressions of worship are made to Hearers and Solitary Realizers because [according to you, your] way of explaining the meaning of that passage is correct. If you accept the consequence [that this distinction is correct], look at this statement:

> Obeisance to all the Buddhas
> Obeisance to the sages,
> The Bodhisattvas having the divine eye
> And also to Hearers.[38]

Such are limitless.

Fourth Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that great compassion is a cause of Buddhas because [according to you] your way of explaining the meaning of the commentary is correct.[39] You cannot accept [that great compassion is a cause of Buddhas] because a cause of Buddhas does not exist. [The reason is established] because Buddha is permanent.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that an effect which is a [state of] separation does not exist because a [state of] separation is a permanent phenomenon. [34] There are the three spheres [of self-contradiction].[40]

EXPLANATION OF THE ROOT TEXT

This section has five parts: (1) an explanation of the meaning of "King of Subduers," (2) an explanation of the meaning of "Hearer," (3) an explanation of the meaning of "Middling Realizer of

Suchness," (4) an indication that Hearers and Solitary Realizers are born from the Kings of Subduers, and (5) a dispelling of objections with respect to the mode of birth of Solitary Realizers.

EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF KING OF SUBDUERS

With respect to the subject, the Supramundane Victor, the Subduer Buddha, he is called *Munīndra* [King of Subduers] because he possesses a marvellous lordship of doctrine that no Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva surpasses, and it is through his word that Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas have dominion in the realm of doctrine.

EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF HEARER

This section has two parts: (1) the actual [explanation of the meaning of Hearer] and (2) ancillarily, an explanation of the meaning of Hearer Proclaimer.

Actual Explanation of the Meaning of Hearer

With respect to the subject, Hīnayāna Foe Destroyers, there is a reason for calling them Hearers (*Shrāvaka*) because, when as the effect of having heard from others right instructions and having cultivated them they attain the enlightenment of a Hearer, they cause others to hear that fact. The mode of causing others to hear [about it] is: "I have thus done that to be done. I will not know another life."

Ancillary Explanation of the Meaning of Hearer Proclaimer

The *White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sūtra* (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*) says:

> O Protector, today we have become Hearers.
> We proclaim the excellent enlightenment.
> We speak the words of enlightenment.
> Thus we are like formidable Hearers.[41]

With respect to the meaning of this [passage] the author of the *Commentarial Explanation* [Jayānanda] says:

> There is a reason for calling Hearer Foe Destroyers [35] "Hearer Proclaimers" (*Thos sgrogs*). They are called that since they hear from others about the excellent enlightenment that is the complete and perfect enlightenment and teach to others the Hearer enlightenment that has the character of knowing the extinction [of the afflictions] and the non-production [again of the afflictions]. Therefore, the former enlightenment is a Mahāyāna enlightenment and the latter is a Hearer enlightenment.

Similarly, Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation* states:

> Since [in the *White Lotus*] "of enlightenment" here refers to a Hearer enlightenment that has the character of knowing the extinction [of the afflictions] and the non-production [again of the afflictions] the term "excellent" is not stated [as it was in the second line].

To refute that, Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 103) says:

> Someone [Jayānanda] says that because the term "excellent" is absent in the third line [of the quote from the *White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine Sutra*] the former enlightenment is the Mahāyāna enlightenment and the latter is the Hearer enlightenment. However, the thought of Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* is that the first refers to the Mahāyāna enlightenment.

With regard to Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's meaning, it follows that the interpretation of Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation* is incorrect because it is correct that the former enlightenment refers to the Mahāyāna enlightenment and the second refers to the path leading to that enlightenment. It follows that the reason is so because Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (3.5–13) says:

> Or they are [called] Hearers since, having heard about

> the supreme fruit or the path [proceeding] to highest, perfect, and complete Buddhahood from Tathāgatas, they proclaim it to those seeking that [enlightenment]. [36] This is because the *White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine* says: "O Protector, today we have become hearers...."

EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF MIDDLING REALIZER

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (4.1–5) says:

> Those [Solitary Realizers] are middling because of being superior [to Hearers] in the feature of a higher increase of merit and exalted wisdom, and inferior to complete and perfect Buddhas since they are without the collections of merit and wisdom, great compassion, an exalted knower of all aspects, and so forth.

With respect to the meaning of this passage there are two parts: (1) a refutation of the system of Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation* and (2) the presentation of our own system.

Refutation of the System of Jayānanda's Commentarial Explanation

The author of the *Commentarial Explanation* says:

> There is a reason for calling Solitary Realizers "Middling Realizers," for they are greater than Hearers and inferior to Buddhas. They are greater than Hearers because Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers abandon the conception of objects [and subjects as different entities], whereas Hearer Foe Destroyers do not abandon that.

In the same way, Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation* explains:

> In [Chandrakīrti's] phrase "by the feature of a higher increase of merit and exalted wisdom" the feature of a higher increase of exalted wisdom is that Solitary

> Realizers abandon the conception of objects but Hearers do not abandon it. The feature of a higher increase of merit is to be known from their having the feature of a higher increase in exalted wisdom.

To refute this Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 104) says: [37]

> Someone [Jayānandal] propounds that the meaning of [Solitary Realizers] surpassing Hearers in terms of wisdom should be understood in accordance with [Maitreya's statement in his *Ornament for Clear Realization*]: "They abandon the conception of objects [by realizing that object and subject are not different entities]." This is not correct because in this [Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika] system it is said that both Hearers and Solitary Realizers realize that all phenomena do not inherently exist. [Jayānanda] himself asserts this tenet.

With regard to the meaning of this, it follows that Hearer Foe Destroyers abandon the conception of objects [as truly existent] because they abandon the conception of true existence. The reason is so because the conception of true existence is an afflictive obstruction. This reason is so because whoever is a Superior necessarily directly realizes all phenomena to be non-inherently existent. [Jayānanda's] is an explicit [self-] contradiction because the *Commentarial Explanation* later explains:

> Hearers understand the selflessness of persons, but how do they know dependent-arisings as non-inherently existent? Answer: Inasmuch as Hearers have knowledge of the selflessness of phenomena, [Chandrakīrti] indicates here (19.1) that "[a Bodhisattva's] intelligence is also superior" on the Gone-Afar [the seventh of the ten Bodhisattva grounds].[42]

Presentation of Our Own System

There is a reason for calling Solitary Realizers "Middling Realiz-

ers of Suchness," for Solitary Realizers are superior to Hearers and inferior to complete Buddhas. Solitary Realizers are greater than Hearers because Solitary Realizers are able to extend cultivation on the path for one hundred great aeons, whereas Hearers are unable to extend cultivation on the path for one hundred great aeons. [38] This is the meaning of the passage from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* that says "through the feature of a greater increase of merit and wisdom."

Solitary Realizers are inferior to complete Buddhas because Solitary Realizers do not have a completed cultivation of the two collections of merit and wisdom, great compassion, that operates with respect to all sentient beings at all times, an exalted knower of all aspects, and so forth.

First Debate

Incorrect position: The meaning of Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* is that Solitary Realizers are persons of the middling vehicle because of surpassing Hearers and being inferior to Bodhisattvas, the latter reason being established because Solitary Realizers do not have the two powerful collections [of merit and wisdom], great compassion, which operates with respect to all sentient beings at all times, or an exalted knower of all aspects attained on their own path in dependence upon these.

Correct position: To say this is to propound in an unconsidered way, without fine analysis of even the mere words of those two [texts]. This is because both Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* say that [Solitary Realizers] are middling because they are inferior to complete Buddhas; neither says that it is because they are inferior to Bodhisattvas. This is to be known in detail from their words.

Second Debate

Incorrect position based upon the mere words of Chandrakīrti's Auto-Commentary and Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's Illumination of the Thought: There are no fully qualified collections in the continuums of Hīnayānists.

Correct position: With regard to the subject, that which is to be known [on this occasion], it [absurdly] follows that the statement in the *Repaying the Kindness Sutra*, "Self-Realizers complete the collections in one hundred great aeons," [39] is incorrect because [according to you] it is not necessary to amass the collections for one hundred great aeons in order to attain the fruit of Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer. If you say that the reason is not established, then it follows that there are collections of merit and wisdom in the continuums of learner Solitary Realizers because [you said that] the reason is not established. You have asserted the reason and [thus are forced to accept] the consequence. Furthermore, it follows that there are collections of merit and wisdom in the continuums of Hīnayānists because there are secondary forms of those collections in their continuums. The reason is established because Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 105) says, "The two [collections of merit and wisdom] that do not fulfil that qualification are secondary collections."[43]

Third Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that the explanation in Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* that, "[Solitary Realizers] are middling because they are inferior to perfect and complete Buddhas due to not having collections of merit and wisdom, great compassion, an exalted knower of all aspects, and so forth" is incorrect because [according to you] there are collections of merit and wisdom in the continuums of Solitary Realizer Superiors.

Correct position: The reason does not entail the consequence because that [passage in the *Auto-Commentary*] means that Solitary Realizers do not have a completed cultivation of the two collections. The reason is so because that [passage] is an occasion of explaining the reason why Solitary Realizers are inferior to complete Buddhas.

Fourth Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a collec-

tion of merit in the continuum of a Solitary Realizer, is the main establisher of the imprint that is a [Buddha's] Form Body because of being a collection of merit in the continuum of a sentient being. [40] The reason entails the consequence because [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] says "These are also the collection of merit, the cause of a Buddha Body the nature of which is form."[44]

Correct position: The reason [i.e., this passage] does not entail the probandum [that whatever is a collection is the continuum of a sentient being is necessarily the main establisher of the imprint that is a Buddha's Form Body] because that [passage] is [stated on] an occasion of analyzing the two Mahāyāna collections.

Fifth Debate

Incorrect position: Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers amass the collections for one hundred great aeons; Congregating Solitary Realizers amass the collections for an indefinite period.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows with regard to the subject, that which is to be known [on this occasion], that it is not necessary to amass the collections for one hundred great aeons in order to attain the fruit of Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer because [according to you] your thesis is correct.

Incorrect position: I accept [the consequence].

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that it is not suitable to explain that the ability to extend cultivation of the path to one hundred aeons is the feature of superiority by which Solitary Realizers surpass Hearers because it is not necessary to train on the path for one hundred aeons in order to attain the fruit of Congregating Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer. You have asserted the reason. If you accept the consequence, you contradict D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought*.[45]

Sixth Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that manifestation of the fruit of Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer in the next lifetime by [a Hearer] Stream Enterer who [abandons] the objects of abandonment simultaneously does not occur because [according to you] it is necessary to amass the collections for one hundred great aeons

in order to attain that fruit. If you accept the consequence, it follows that the statement in Asaṅga's *Compendium of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmasamuchchaya*), "If there are no Buddhas, [that Hearer] becomes a Solitary Realizer," is incorrect because you accepted [the original consequence].[46]

Correct position: There is no fault [in accepting the original consequence] because here [in Prāsaṅgika] a presentation of Hearer Superiors entering the Solitary Realizer path and so forth is not asserted. [41] If it were otherwise, it would [absurdly] follow that the main objects of abandonment of the Hearer and Solitary Realizer paths differ in ease of abandonment because Hearer Superiors would enter the Solitary Realizer path. You cannot accept the consequence because both [Hearers and Solitary Realizers] take the conception of true existence as their main object of abandonment.

Seventh Debate

Incorrect position: With respect to what has been said, it [absurdly] follows that the statement in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sutras* (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārakārikā*) "(11.55) – Indefinite Hearers are of two types: those who see the object [i.e., the ultimate truth] of the vehicle and those who do not see it. Those who see the object are either free from desire [i.e., Non-returners] or not free from desire [i.e., Once-Returners and Stream Enterers]. [Both of] these are inferior [because they are slower to enter the Mahāyāna than those who are not Hearers]" – is incorrect because [according to you] entry of Hearer Superiors into the Solitary Realizer path does not occur.

Correction position: The reason does not entail the consequence because when one attains the path of seeing of any of the three vehicles one attains definiteness of lineage in one's own path. For example, according to the Mantra [system] when the first ground is attained [on the Sutra path], a definiteness of lineage in the path of the Perfection Vehicle itself is attained, due to which a Bodhisattva does not enter the Mantra path once having attained the first ground and until attaining the tenth ground.

Eighth Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that Congregating Solitary Realizers do not exist because [according to you] Solitary Realizers who formerly had the realization of a Hearer do not exist. The reason is so because [according to you] Solitary Realizers who formerly had the realization of a Hearer Superior do not exist.

Correct position: The root reason does not entail its consequence. [However, the reason is correct] for it follows that Solitary Realizers who formerly had the realization of a Hearer do not exist because whoever is a Solitary Realizer on the path of accumulation necessarily has a definiteness of lineage as a Solitary Realizer from the beginning. The reason is established because there is a purpose in Chandrakīrti's [*Supplement* (Stanza 24ab)] saying "those whose nature is definite [in self-enlightenment]" with respect to Solitary Realizers in the passsage "common beings, those born from the word [that is, Hearers] and those whose nature is definite in self-enlightenment."[47] [42] Therefore, the statements in Gyeltsap's *Ornament of the Essence* (1) that Congregating Solitary Realizers formerly have the realization of Hearers, and (2) that the features of the collections of the three types of Solitary Realizers are not the same, and so forth, are the system of the Svātantrikas and below, but are not to be asserted in the context [of Prāsaṅgika]. Moreover, it follows that whoever is a Solitary Realizer on the path of accumulation is necessarily of definite lineage as a Solitary Realizer from the beginning because whoever is a Solitary Realizer on the path of accumulation is necessarily temporarily of definite lineage as a Solitary Realizer. The reason is so because whoever is a Solitary Realizer on the path of accumulation will necessarily manifest the fruit of Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer; this is so because Āryadeva's *Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas* (*Chatuḥshatakashāstrakārikā*) (8.22) says:

> Although one who knows suchness may not achieve
> Nirvana here, in another birth
> He will definitely attain it
> Without striving, as in the case of actions.

HOW HEARERS AND SOLITARY REALIZERS ARE BORN FROM THE KINGS OF SUBDUERS

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (2.7-11) says:

> When Buddhas arise, it is for the sake of teaching the non-mistaken dependent-arising; Hearers and so forth, through the stages of hearing, thinking, and meditating, are fulfilled in accordance with whatever they have interest in.

The meaning of this is: Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers are born from the speech of the Kings of Subduers because those who have definite lineage as Hearers or Solitary Realizers [43] fulfil their respective wishes through practicing the profound doctrine of dependent-arising taught by the Kings of Subduers.

DISPELLING AN OBJECTION CONCERNING THE MODE OF BIRTH OF SOLITARY REALIZERS

CHANDRAKĪRTI'S PRESENTATION OF AN OBJECTION AND A REPLY

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (2.11-19) says:

> [*Objection*:] Although some have become skilled in realization of the ultimate just through hearing the teaching of dependent-arising, they do not attain nirvana in just this present lifetime.
>
> [*Reply*:] Nevertheless, like an action the effect of which is definite to mature, practitioners of what has been taught will definitely attain in another life the fruition of the effect which they very much desire. Āryadeva says [in his *Four Hundred* 8.22]:
>
> > Although one who knows suchness does not
> > achieve
> > Nirvana here, in another birth
> > He will definitely attain it
> > Without striving, as in the case of actions.

For the same reason, Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle* (18.12) says:

When complete Buddhas do not arise
And Hearers are also not present,
The exalted wisdom of Solitary Realizers
Thoroughly arises without the support [of a teacher].

EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF THIS

With respect to the meaning of this there are three parts: (1) elimination of qualms with respect to the system of the *Commentarial Explanation*, (2) refutation of the system of an earlier Tibetan, and (3) presentation of our own system.

ELIMINATION OF QUALMS WITH RESPECT TO THE SYSTEM OF THE COMMENTARIAL EXPLANATION

[The interpretation of] Jayānanda, the author of the *Commentarial Explanation* is [in paraphrase]:

> With respect to the meaning of this there are two parts: an objection and an answer. The objection is: [44] "It follows that the explanation that those having the lineage of Hearers and Solitary Realizers fulfil their respective wishes through practicing the doctrine of the profound dependent-arising taught by the Kings of the Subduers is incorrect because there are cases of those having the lineage of Hearers and Solitary Realizers not attaining the fruit of Foe Destroyer in that very lifetime in which they hear the doctrine of profound dependent-arising from a King of Subduers." The passage from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* that was just explained appeared in order to give an answer to that.

In this way, his *Commentarial Explanation* says:

> Someone says, "Since it appears that, although dependent-arising has been taught, some do not achieve the

> ranks of Hearer and so forth, why do you say that Hearers and so forth are fulfilled through the teaching of non-mistaken dependent-arising?" In order to indicate an answer to this, [Chandrakīrti] says, "Although some...."

This is incorrect because (1) since in this context there are great qualms about the way in which Solitary Realizers are produced by Kings of Subduers, they should be singled out and eliminated, but [according to Jayānanda, Chandrakīrti] did not eliminate them, and (2) if this passage did not eliminate qualms about Solitary Realizers by singling them out, Chandrakīrti's citation of the passage [from Nāgārjuna], "The exalted wisdom of Solitary Realizers..." would be irrelevant.

REFUTATION OF THE SYSTEM OF AN EARLIER TIBETAN

An earlier Tibetan says that this commentary [by Chandrakīrti] appears in order to indicate an answer to someone saying, "It follows that the explanation that those having the lineage of Hearers and Solitary Realizers fulfil their respective wishes by practicing the doctrine of profound dependent-arising taught by the Kings of Subduers is incorrect [45] because in that case it would be suitable for those having the lineage of Hearers and Solitary Realizers to attain the fruit of Foe Destroyer immediately upon practicing the meaning of dependent-arising and non-production, whereas they do not attain it."

This is incorrect because, as explained earlier, this passage occurs in the context of eliminating qualms about the mode of generation of Solitary Realizers by Kings of Subduers; it does not eliminate qualms about how Hearers are generated by them.

PRESENTATION OF OUR OWN SYSTEM

This section has two parts: objection and answer.

Objection: Someone says, "It follows that the explanation that those having the lineage of Hearers and Solitary Realizers fulfil

their respective wishes through practicing the doctrine of profound dependent-arising taught by the Kings of Subduers is incorrect because, although [those] having the Hearer lineage actualize enlightenment only in a lifetime in which they hear the doctrine from a Buddha, those who have the Solitary Realizer lineage do not do so."

Answer: In order to indicate an answer to that, Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (2.11–19) says, "Although some..." The meaning of this answer is: The fallacy of this objection does not exist because, although Solitary Realizer practitioners who are taught the doctrine of the profound dependent-arising by a Buddha do not attain nirvana in that life, they will definitely attain the nirvana of a Solitary Realizer in another lifetime within up to one hundred great aeons – like, for example, an action [the effect of which] will definitely be experienced [in another lifetime]. This is the good explanation of the Foremost D̄zong-ka-b̄a.[48]

First Debate

Let us investigate qualms concerning these points. [46]

Incorrect position: There are no Solitary Realizers in the retinue of a Supreme Emanation Body.

Correct position: It follows that there are Solitary Realizers in the retinue of a Supreme Emanation Body because there is a common locus of a person in the retinue of a Supreme Emanation Body and a person who possesses in his continuum the practice of a Solitary Realizer. [If you deny this reason], it [absurdly] follows that the statements from [Chandrakīrti's] *Auto-Commentary* (2.14–17), "Nevertheless,... practitioners of what has been taught..." and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 106), "Solitary Realizer practitioners who have been taught dependent-arising by a Buddha..." and, from the same (*Comp.* 109), "In order to definitely join to the Mahāyāna those at that time nearby in his retinue and those set in the three vehicles..." would be incorrect because [according to you] there are not persons of all three vehicles in the retinue of a Supreme Emanation Body. You have accepted the reason.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the explanation in

Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*, "When complete Buddhas do not arise and Hearers are also not present, the exalted wisdom of Solitary Realizers thoroughly arises without the support [of a teacher]," is incorrect because [according to you] there are Solitary Realizers in the retinue of a Supreme Emanation Body.

Correct position: The reason does not entail the consequence because the meaning of that passage is that in their last lifetime Solitary Realizers arise in a land where there are no Buddhas or Hearers. If this were not the case, it would [absurdly] follow that the explanation that Rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizers serve Buddhas appearing over one hundred aeons would be incorrect because there would be no Solitary Realizers in the retinues of Supreme Emanation Bodies.

The meaning of the text can be understood through the above[49] explanation of the way in which [Hearers and Solitary Realizers] are born [from Kings of Subduers].

2 *Buddhas are Born from Bodhisattvas*

With respect to the line from Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (1.13) "Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas," [47] there are two parts: (1) a statement of the passage to be explained and (2) an explanation of the meaning of the passage.

STATEMENT OF THE PASSAGE TO BE EXPLAINED

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (4.12–5.6) says:

> You may wonder, "Are Bodhisattvas not called Children of Conquerors because they are born from the teaching of Tathāgatas? How then are the Victorious Buddhas born from Bodhisattvas?" This is true, but for two reasons Bodhisattvas are causes of Victorious Buddhas: because of the feature of state and because of [the feature of] causing them to thoroughly hold. With respect to those, Bodhisattvas are causes of Buddhas through the feature of state because the state of a Tathāgata is just that which has as its cause the state of a Bodhisattva. With respect to Bodhisattvas being causes of Buddhas through [the feature of] causing them to thoroughly hold, it is asserted that the Super-

> ior Mañjushrī, as a Bodhisattva, caused the Supramundane Victor Shākyamuni and other Tathāgatas to thoroughly hold the mind of enlightenment at just the very beginning. Therefore, based on Bodhisattvas being the main cause of the final fruit, Tathāgatas are shown to be born from Bodhisattvas.

Therefore, since they are greatly excellent marvellous causes, [48] and intending worship of the cause to imply worship of the effect as well, Buddhas give praise to Bodhisattvas in order to indicate that they should be carefully sustained, as when, at a time when the leaves are soft, one sees the shoot and so forth of a great medicinal tree that will bear countless fine fruits; and in order to cause the groups of sentient beings who are near them at that time and are set in the three vehicles to definitely join just the Mahāyāna. The *Pile of Jewels Sutra* (*Ratnakūṭa*) says:

> Kāshyapa, it is like this: People pay homage to the waxing crescent moon and not to the full moon. Similarly, Kāshyapa, those who have strong faith in me should pay homage to Bodhisattvas rather than to Tathāgatas. Why? Because Tathāgatas arise from Bodhisattvas. All Hearers and Solitary Realizers arise from Tathāgatas.

Thus, reasoning and scripture prove that "Tathāgatas are born from Bodhisattvas."

EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF THE PASSAGE

[49] This section has three parts: (1) a statement of the qualm, (2) an explanation of the answer to that qualm, [and (3) an explanation of Chandrakīrti's purpose in not explicitly expressing worship to Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas on this occasion].[50]

STATEMENT OF THE QUALM

Someone says, "It follows that it is incorrect that the Victorious

Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas because Bodhisattvas are born from Buddhas. The reason is so because Bodhisattvas are Children of Conquerors. This reason is so because they are Conqueror Children." This is the meaning of [the passage in Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary*] (4.12–14). "You may wonder, 'Are Bodhisattvas not called Children of Conquerors because they are born from the teachings of Tathāgatas? How then are the Victorious Buddhas born from Bodhisattvas?' "

EXPLANATION OF THE ANSWER TO THE QUALM

[The answer] is explained by [Chandrakīrti's passage], "This is true, but...." With regard to the meaning of that, there are two parts: (1) refutation [of interpretations by other scholars] and (2) presentation [of our own system].

Refutation of Interpretations by Other Scholars

A certain scholar says, "In brief, the meaning of Chandrakīrti's commentary at the point of the answer is that he replies that the fault of the qualm is not incurred because the two – that which is posited as a Conqueror Child and that which is posited as the cause of a Conqueror – are different bases."

One scholar says, "One must answer that 'whatever is a Conqueror Child is not necessarily a child of a Conqueror' because although Bodhisattvas are Conqueror Children since they are children of certain Conquerors, they are not Children of Conquerors because they are not born from Conquerors. For example, although a lotus grown from dry ground is [called] 'lake-grown,' it is not grown from a lake. Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 108) says, 'That Bodhisattvas are Children of certain Conquerors is the meaning of Chandrakīrti's statement, "This is true, but...." ' "

Of those two positions, let us initially analyze the first: [50]

First Debate

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that whoever is a Child of

a Conqueror is necessarily born from Conqueror because [according to you] a Bodhisattva is not a Child of a Conqueror. If you say that the reason is not established, it follows that the subject, a Bodhisattva, is a Conqueror Child because [you said that] the reason is not established. If you accept the consequence, it follows that the two – that which is posited as a Conqueror Child and that which is posited as the cause of a Conqueror – are not different bases because a Bodhisattva is a Conqueror Child and is a cause of a Conqueror. You have explicitly accepted the first [part of this reason].

Incorrect position: The second [part of the reason] is not established.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the cause of a Conqueror is non-existent because [according to you] the reason [i.e., that a Bodhisattva is a cause of a Conqueror] is not established. You have asserted this reason.

Incorrect position: I accept the original consequence [that whoever is a child of a Conqueror is necessarily born from Conqueror].

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a first ground Bodhisattva, is born from Conqueror because of being a Child of a Conqueror.

Incorrect position: The reason is not established.

Correct position: It absurdly follows that the explanations from Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*, (11.17, 31.17), "The mind of a Child of a Conqueror..." and "Abiding thus in the mind of a Child of a Conqueror..." are incorrect because you said that the reason is not established.[51]

Incorrect position: I accept the original consequence, [that a first ground Bodhisattva is born from Conqueror].

Correct position: It follows with respect to the subject, a first ground Bodhisattva, that he is not born from Conqueror because he is not born from Buddha Superior. It follows that the reason is so because Buddha Superiors are born from him. This reason is so because the statement from Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*, "Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas" is commonly established for all of us.

Furthermore, with regard to the statement made by both the former and latter systems that a Bodhisattva is not a Child of a Conqueror, [51] it [absurdly] follows that there are no Children of Conquerors because a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation is not that, a Bodhisattva on the path of preparation is not that, and Bodhisattvas from the first through tenth grounds are also not that. If a proponent of either the former or the latter system says that the reason is not established, he has an internal contradiction.

Furthermore, [with regard to the second system] it is incorrect that whoever is a Child of Conqueror must be born from a Conqueror. For it follows that a tenth ground Child of a Conqueror is a cause of a Buddha Superior because a tenth ground Bodhisattva is a cause of a Buddha Superior. If this is accepted, it [absurdly] follows with regard to the subject [tenth ground Bodhisattva] that he is not a cause of [Buddha Superior] because he is born from Buddha Superior. It follows [that he is born from a Buddha Superior] because he is born from Conqueror. [This reason is so] because he is a Child of a Conqueror. The three spheres of self-contradiction [exist for a proponent of the second system]. If someone were to say that the original reason [that a tenth ground Bodhisattva is a cause of a Buddha Superior] does not entail its point [that a tenth ground Child of a Conqueror is a cause of a Buddha Superior], [their position] would be senseless because they would [absurdly] have to say that the tenth ground Child of a Conqueror is not a cause of a Buddha Superior, but that a tenth grounder is a cause of a Buddha Superior.

Second Debate

Incorrect position: It follows that whoever is a Child of a Conqueror is necessarily born from a Conqueror because whatever is the mother of a Buddha Superior must be the producer of a Buddha Superior.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a first ground Child of a Conqueror, is born from Buddha because of being a Child of a Buddha. In fact, you have explicitly accepted that the reason entails the consequence.

Incorrect position: The reason is not established.

Correct position: It follows that a first ground Child of a Conqueror is a Child of a Buddha because of being a Child of a Conqueror. [The reason is so] because [a first ground child of a Conqueror] exists. You cannot accept the original consequence [that a first ground Child of a Conqueror is born from Buddha] because production from Buddha [52] does not exist. This reason is so because Buddha is permanent.

Presentation of Our Own System

In order to explain the meaning of the commentary giving the answer, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 108) says:

> It is true that Bodhisattvas are the Children of certain Conquerors, but... if one had intelligence, how could one not realize, in dependence upon the answer given in the commentary that the objector has not distinguished the two modes?

When these statements are expressed so that they may be easily understood, there are two parts: (1) a proof through reasoning that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas, and (2) a proof through scripture that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas.

Proof through reasoning that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas

This section has two parts: (1) the exposition of the actual answer and (2) the statement of the proof.

Exposition of the Actual Answer. It is not contradictory to posit that Buddha Superiors are born from Bodhisattvas and that Bodhisattvas are the Children of Conquerors. There are two reasons for this: (1) A Bodhisattva is posited as a Child of a Conqueror since he is newly born as a Bodhisattva from his empowering condition,[52] the speech of a Buddha who is already established in the continuum of another person, while the meaning of a Buddha's being born from a Bodhisattva is that a Buddha is born

from the practice of the path by a Bodhisattva who is in the same continuum with him and (2) that a Buddha Superior is born from the practice of the path by the Bodhisattva who is in the same continuum with him and that a Bodhisattva [53] is born from his empowering condition, a Buddha who is already established in the continuum of another [person] are not contradictory. Therefore, although Bodhisattvas are Children of Conquerors, it is not necessary that they be born from the mere general category "Conqueror," just as, for example, Bodhisattvas are Children of Buddhas but need not be born from the mere general category "Buddha."

Statement of the proof. If it is asked, "how is it that Bodhisattvas become causes of Buddhas?" the reply is that Bodhisattvas become causes of Buddhas through the feature of state and through the feature of causing [potential Buddha Superiors] to thoroughly hold [the altruistic mind of enlightenment]. This is so because the feature of state is that Buddha Superiors are born from the practice of the path by Bodhisattvas who are of the same continuum that they are and who are their substantial causes; and because the feature of "causing to thoroughly hold" is that Buddha Superiors are born through having been made to thoroughly hold [the altruistic mind of enlightenment] by other Bodhisattvas who are their cooperative conditions.[53] For example, our Teacher, the Blessed Shākyamuni, was born from the practice of the path by Bodhisattvas of the same continuum[54] as he, such as Uttara, the Brahmin's son and Jyoti [pāla], the potter's son and so forth; and was born from the teaching of doctrine by the Bodhisattva Mañjushrī, who is of a different continuum than he and who acted as his guide. [54]

Proof through scripture that Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas

This section has two parts: (1) the actual explanation and (2) an explanation of the purpose in praising Bodhisattvas.

Actual Explanation. Scripture establishes that Buddhas are born

from Bodhisattvas because the *Pile of Jewels Sutra (Ratnakūṭasūtra)* says:

> Kāshyapa, it is like this: People pay homage to the waxing crescent moon, not to the full moon. Similarly, Kāshyapa, those who have strong faith in me should pay homage to Bodhisattvas rather than to Tathāgatas. Why? Because Tathāgatas arise from Bodhisattvas. All Hearers and Solitary Realizers arise from Tathāgatas.

Explanation of the Purpose for Praising Bodhisattvas. Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* says:

> Therefore, since they are greatly excellent marvellous causes, and intending worship of the cause to imply worship of the effect as well, Buddhas give praise to Bodhisattvas in order to indicate that they should be carefully sustained, as when, at a time when the leaves are soft, one sees the shoot and so forth of a great medicinal tree that will bear countless fine fruits; and in order to cause the groups of sentient beings who are near them at that time and are set in the three vehicles to definitely join just the Mahāyāna.

The meaning of this passage is that there are four purposes for [Buddha's] praising Bodhisattvas through the passage, "Similarly, Kāshyapa, those who have strong faith in me should pay homage to Bodhisattvas rather than to Tathāgatas. Why?..." Buddha praised Bodhisattvas (1) so that people will realize that Bodhisattvas are the main causes of Buddhas; (2) because by expressing worship to the main cause of Buddhas – Bodhisattvas – worship of the effect – Buddhas – becomes expressed [55]; (3) in order to make known that, just as those who seek the trunk of a medicinal tree should value the shoot of that tree, those who respect and seek perfect Buddhahood should value and respect the shoot of a Conqueror, a beginning Bodhisattva; and (4) in order to cause sentient beings who had come into his circle at the time and who were set in the paths of the three vehicles definitely to

join just the Mahāyāna.

According to the *Commentarial Explanation*, Chandrakīrti's phrase "those set in the three vehicles" refers to those set in the paths of the three vehicles. The *Commentarial Explanation* says, "The groups of sentient beings who are set in the three vehicles are the collections of sentient beings who are set in the Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva paths." Here it should be analyzed whether it is being taught that whoever is a Solitary Realizer on the path of accumulation need not be of temporarily definite lineage as a Solitary Realizer.

Explanation of Chandrakīrti's Purpose in Not Explicitly Expressing Worship to Hearers, Solitary Realizer and Bodhisattvas on this Occasion. Question: What is the purpose in [Chandrakīrti's] not explicitly expressing worship to Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas on this occasion, but indicating in "Hearers and Middling Realizers of Suchness/Are born from the Kings of Subduers;/Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas" that Hearers and Solitary Realizers are born from Subduer Kings and Subduer Kings [56] are born from Bodhisattvas?

Answer: There is a reason for not explicitly offering worship on this occasion to the Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas – who are renowned as objects of expressions of worship in most other scriptures – because [Chandrakīrti] wished to express worship to great compassion, their ultimate root cause. Therefore, the "other" mentioned above in "stated as the objects of expressions of worship in other [scriptures]" refers mostly to inner [i.e., Buddhist] treatises such as the [Maitreya's] treatise *Ornament for Clear Realization*. There is a purpose in teaching Hearers, Solitary Realizers, Buddha Superiors, and Bodhisattvas as causes and effects: it is for the sake of identifying their ultimate root cause.

First Debate

Incorrect position: It follows that Chandrakīrti should have explained, in the context of "[Hearers and Middling Realizers]/Are born from the Kings of Subduers," how *Bodhisattvas* are born

from Subduer Kings because Bodhisattvas are born from the doctrine taught by the Buddhas who are their fathers [just as Hearers and Solitary Realizers are].

Correct position: The reason does not entail the point. In the context of "Are born from the Kings of Subduers" it is not necessary to explain, as with Hearers and Solitary Realizers, how Bodhisattvas are born from Subduer Kings because, whereas the purpose for teaching here that Hearers and Solitary Realizers are born from the Kings of Subduers is to indicate that the root of these two is based in great compassion, the way in which the root of Bodhisattvas is based in compassion is indicated separately by [the later passage] (7.17–19):

> Mercy alone is seen as the seed
> Of a Conqueror's rich harvest,
> As water for development, and as
> Fruition in a state of long enjoyment.
> Therefore at the start I praise compassion.

This syllogism is easy to understand.

3 *The Three Practices*

The concluding lines of the first stanza of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* are:

> The mind of compassion, [57] non-dual awareness,
> And the altruistic mind of enlightenment
> Are the causes of Conqueror Children.

With regard to this, there are three sections: (1) identification of the three practices taught here, (2) an indication that the three practices are causes of Bodhisattvas, and (3) dispelling qualms with respect to these.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE THREE PRACTICES TAUGHT HERE

This section has two parts: (1) refutation [of incorrect positions] and (2) presentation [of our own system].

REFUTATION OF INCORRECT POSITION

First Debate

Incorrect position: Compassion at the time of the effect is among the compassions [referred to] in the context [of this stanza] because in both Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* and Ḏzong-ka-

b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* compassion in this context is described as the compassion that [Chandrakīrti] is about to explain, and among the compassions that are about to be explained there is compassion at the time of the effect. The reason is so because the compassion that is important at the end, indicated in [Chandrakīrti's stanza] "Since mercy...", refers to compassion at the time of the effect.

Correct position: This is incorrect, for it [absurdly] follows that it is unsuitable for the compassion indicated in this context to refer to compassion that is a prerequisite for novice Bodhisattvas because [according to your assertions] there is a common locus of compassion that is indicated in this context and compassion at the time of the effect.

Incorrect position: I accept the consequence.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the explanation in Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (6.6–8), "Of what are these Bodhisattvas the effect? The mind of compassion, non-dual awareness, and..." is unsuitable because [you have] accepted [that consequence].

Second Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that it is suitable for compassion in this context to refer to compassion in the continuum of a person who has not entered the path because according to you it is suitable for compassion in this context to refer to compassion that serves as a prerequisite for novice Bodhisattvas. If you accept the consequence, it [absurdly] follows that there is no Buddha Superior who possesses in his continuum the compassion that is indicated in this context. [58] If you accept the consequence, it [absurdly] follows that the compassion that is indicated in this context is not important at the beginning, middle, and end for the production of a Conqueror's rich harvest because you have accepted that consequence. If you accept this consequence, it [absurdly] follows that the meaning of Chandrakīrti's stanza "Since mercy alone..." is not established because you accepted that consequence.

Correct position: The original reason [that it is suitable for com-

passion in this context to refer to compassion that serves as a prerequisite for novice Bodhisattvas] does not entail its consequence [that it is suitable for compassion in this context to refer to compassion in the continuum of one who has not entered the path] for it would [absurdly] follow that whatever is a compassion that is a prerequisite for a novice[55] Bodhisattva must be a compassion in the continuum of one who has not entered the path if [as you claim] the original reason entails its consequence.

Incorrect position: I accept the consequence.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, great compassion, is a compassion in the continuum of one who has not entered the path because of being the compassion which is a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva. The reason is established because great compassion is a prerequisite for an altruistic mind of enlightenment. The reason is so because the presentation of the seven instructions of cause and effect is correct. If you accept the consequence, it is easy [to refute you].

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion that is important at the end for the production of a Conqueror's rich harvest must be a compassion at the time of the effect because [you assert that] it is suitable for compassion indicated in the context [of Chandrakīrti's stanza) "Since just mercy ..." to refer to compassion at the time of the effect.

Incorrect position: I accept the consequence.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, great compassion, is a compassion at the time of the effect because of being a compassion that is important at the end for the production of a Conqueror's rich harvest.

Incorrect position: The reason is not established.

Correct position: It [absurdly] follows that the glorious Chandrakīrti did not praise great compassion at the outset of his composition of his treatise for the reason[56] that mercy – that is, great compassion – is important for the production of a Conqueror's rich harvest at the three – beginning, middle, and end – because [according to you] it is not established [that great compassion is a compassion that is important at the end for the production of a Conqueror's rich harvest].

Third Debate

Incorrect position: It follows that there is a common locus of compassion in this context and compassion at the time of the effect [59] because there is a common locus of compassion in this context and fruition-like compassion. This is because D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp*. 115) says:

> The importance of compassion at the end is like fruition, for if one were to attain the rank of a Conqueror, but lack the fruition of compassion, one would not be a source of enjoyment for sentient beings until the end of cyclic existence...

Correct position: The root reason does not entail its point. The root reason, that there is a common locus of compassion in this context and fruition-like compassion, is established because great compassion is fruition-like great compassion. This is because great compassion is described as fruition-like compassion since, just as it is suitable to thoroughly enjoy a harvest when it has ripened, trainees enjoy the marvellous harvest of a Conqueror when the Buddha turns the wheel of doctrine through the power of great compassion.

Question: What does "non-dual awareness" refer to in this context?

Answer: With regard to this, an earlier Tibetan said:

> The non-dual awareness in this context refers to an awareness of the non-duality of apprehended [object] and apprehender, and mind generation in this context refers to an ultimate mind generation.[57]

With regard to the refutation of this [position], a scholar says:

> To what does the word "duality" in the phrase "non-duality of apprehended [object] and apprehender" refer? Does it refer to an apprehended [object] and an apprehender that are different substantial entities, or to a dualistic appearance? The first interpretation is

> incorrect because an apprehended [object] and an apprehender that are different substantial entities do exist. This is because external objects exist. If it is taken according to the second interpretation, [60] it follows that there is the fault of being redundant with the explanation of mind generation in this context as an ultimate mind generation because [according to that position] the thesis [that duality in this context refers to dualistic appearance] is correct.

However, Kay-drup (*mKhas-grub*) explains that apprehended [object] and apprehender that are [inherently] different substantial entities do not exist.

The refutation [of the earlier Tibetan's position] within our own system: It is incorrect that the non-dual awareness in this context refers to an awareness of the non-duality of apprehended [object] and apprehender because that awareness of the non-duality of apprehended [object] and apprehender is not a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva. Also, in his *Auto-Commentary* Chandrakīrti explains that the non-dual awareness in this context is a wisdom consciousness that is free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation.

The author of the *Commentarial Explanation* [Jayānanda] says that the non-dual awareness in this context refers to an ultimate mind generation that is an awareness of the non-duality of apprehended [object] and apprehender and that the mind generation in this context refers to a coarse mind generation arisen from language. Thus, Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation* states:

> With respect to those Bodhisattvas, the mind possessing compassion, the non-dual awareness having the nature of an ultimate generation of the mind of enlightenment, and a mind of enlightenment arisen from language are their causes.

It is incorrect that non-dual awareness refers to an ultimate mind generation because an ultimate mind generation is not a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva.

Fourth Debate

Incorrect position: The mind generation indicated in this context is a fully qualified mind generation.

Correct position: This is incorrect, for it [absurdly] follows that the mind generation indicated in this context that is a prerequisite for a novice Bodhisattva is a fully qualified mind generation [61] because [according to you] your thesis is correct. If you accept the consequence, you contradict Dzong-ka-ba's statement in the *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp*. 112) that:

> The "mind generation that is a prerequisite for a Bodhisattva" refers to the time of cultivating a mind generation; it is not an actual mind generation that has been produced through cultivation.

Also, the consequence that there would be a mind generation in the continuum of a person who has not entered the path is unavoidable.

PRESENTATION OF OUR OWN SYSTEM

Compassion in this context refers to the compassion that will be explained by [the third stanza of] Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (9.7–10):

> Homage to that compassion for migrators
> Who are powerless, like a bucket travelling in a well,
> Initially adhering to a self, an "I,"
> And then generating attachment to things, "This is mine."

This is because Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (6.10–11) says:

> With respect to that, compassion is mercy. It possesses an aspect and entity which will be explained in just this [work].

It is suitable for non-dual awareness in this context to refer to a wisdom consciousness realizing emptiness, which is free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. This is because Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (6.11–13) says, "A non-dual awareness is a wisdom consciousness that is free from the extremes of [inherent] existence and [utter] non-existence."

With respect to the mind of enlightenment in this context, Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (6.18–20) cites the *Recitation of Doctrine Sutra*:

> The mind which is generated in a Bodhisattva thinking, "I will cause sentient beings to understand reality in this way," is called a Bodhisattva's mind of enlightenment.

The mind generation that is described as thinking, "Having realized reality, [62] I will cause sentient beings to understand reality" is not a complete mind generation. This is because although it observes the welfare of others, which is an object of intent of a Mahāyāna mind generation, it does not observe enlightenment, which is also an object of intent of a Mahāyāna mind generation. Also, on this point, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 110) says, "Since this observes only a portion of the objects of intent of a mind generation, it does not fulfil the definition."

Someone who does not understand the meaning of this says:

> The meaning of the immediately preceding explanation from D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* is that a mind generation thinking, "Having realized all phenomena, I will cause sentient beings to understand reality" does not fulfil the definition of mind generation because it does not observe the objects of intent, all sentient beings, but only observes that portion of sentient beings who have not realized emptiness.

This explanation of the meaning [of that passage] is a source of great amazement. What is more amazing than positing all sentient beings as the objects of intent of a Mahāyāna mind generation?

Also, Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (8.7–10), in the context of the second stanza, "Mercy alone,..." says:

> One definitely generates an altruistic mind of thinking, "I will undoubtedly relieve these limitless worldly beings from suffering and will definitely join them to Buddhahood."

The mind generation described as the thought, "Having separated sentient beings from suffering, I will set them in the rank of Buddhahood" [63] is also not the complete mind generation taught in this context because, although it observes the welfare of others – an object of intent of an [altruistic] mind generation – it does not observe enlightenment – its object of attainment.

Our own system is that the [altruistic] mind generation taught in this context is a special mind that arises in association with its assister, the wish seeking to attain complete enlightenment for the sake of others.[58] Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (11.9–12), at the point of explaining the fourth stanza, "Homage to that compassion for migrators,..." states:

> [Bodhisattvas] wish to attain fully even Buddhahood, which is the cause of the arising of the excellent taste of the nectar of the excellent doctrine, which has the character of reversing all perverse conceptions, and which has the nature of complete friendship for migrators.

Also, Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation* says:

> That which has the nature of, within observing complete and perfect enlightenment, strongly seeking [that enlightenment] for the sake of the welfare of others is taught as the generation of an [altruistic] mind of enlightenment.

Also, D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 111) states:

> The complete definition of [altruistic] mind generation is asserted to be "the wish to attain highest enlightenment – the object of attainment – for the sake of all sentient beings – the object of intent." It is good that this appears in Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation*. There is also no differemce between what is said in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* and this system.[59]

INDICATION THAT THE THREE PRACTICES ARE CAUSES OF BODHISATTVAS [64]

It is the thought of the Superior Nāgārjuna that the three practices taught in this context are posited as causes of novice Bodhisattvas because his *Precious Garland* (*Ratnāvalī*) (174c–175) says:

> If you and the world wish to gain the highest
> enlightenment,
> Its roots are an altruistic aspiration
> To enlightenment that is as firm as the king of
> mountains,
> Compassion reaching in all directions,
> And a wisdom consciousness that does not rely upon
> duality.

DISPELLING QUALMS WITH RESPECT TO THE THREE PRACTICES

This section has three parts: (1) statements of qualms, (2) indications of answers to those qualms, and (3) ancillarily, a refutation of the wrong conceptions of others.

STATEMENTS OF QUALMS

Someone says:

> Is the lowest of the Bodhisattvas for whom the three practices are posited as causes of Bodhisattvas a novice Bodhisattva who has [just] entered the path, or not? If so, it is incorrect to posit a Mahāyāna mind generation as a cause of Bodhisattvas because [that lowest Bodhisattva] must be posited as a Bodhisattva who has just attained a Mahāyāna mind generation. If not, there is a contradiction with the explanation that Bodhisattva in this context refers to a Bodhisattva like a waxing crescent moon and a Bodhisattva like the shoot of a medical tree.

There is also a second qualm:

> It is incorrect to posit the exalted wisdom that does not depend upon the two extremes as a cause of Bodhisattvas because Bodhisattvas, having initially generated a conventional mind of enlightenment, subsequently train in the Bodhisattva deeds – that is, the six perfections – which are practice of the wisdom realizing emptiness, and so forth.

INDICATIONS OF ANSWERS TO THOSE QUALMS

Regarding the answer to the first objection, Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 112) says:

> The second position is not asserted because it would incur the fault explained; therefore, the first is asserted. However, [65] the fault stated above is not incurred....

Regarding the meaning of this: The lowest of those Bodhisattvas for whom the three practices are posited as causes is a novice Bodhisattva who has [just] entered the path. However, the fault presented by the consequence, "It follows that a Mahāyāna mind generation exists prior to entering the path" is not incurred because the mind generation taught in this context, being a prerequisite for novice Bodhisattvas, is not a fully qualified Mahāyāna mind generation. The reason is so because the mind generation taught in this context is a special mind that arises in association with its assister, the wish seeking to attain complete enlightenment for the sake of others, on the occasion of cultivating a Mahāyāna mind generation. The reason is so because it is suitable for the lowest of the Bodhisattvas for whom the three practices are posited as causes to refer to a novice Bodhisattva who has just entered the path. The reason is so because (1) Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* explains that the Bodhisattvas in this context are Bodhisattvas who are like a waxing crescent moon and Bodhisattvas who are like the shoots of medicinal trees, and (2) whoever is such a Bodhisattva must be a novice Bodhisattva.

The fault presented in the second qualm presented above is not

incurred because one of sharp faculties bearing the Mahāyāna lineage first seeks the view of suchness and then generates a mind directed to the Mahāyāna enlightenment, and even among Bodhisattvas of dull faculties who are definite in the Mahāyāna lineage [66] there are many cases of realizing emptiness before entering the path.

Question: Is the explanation of the three practices in this context as causes of Bodhisattvas made in terms of Bodhisattvas of both sharp and dull faculties, or is it made only in terms of Bodhisattvas of sharp faculties?

Answer: Since this is a difficult point, it will be explained in detail. Regarding this point, most scholars say that it is only in terms of Bodhisattvas of sharp faculties that the three practices in this context are posited as causes of Bodhisattvas. This is because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa, in response to the second qualm presented above, states (*Comp*. 113):

> A bearer of the Bodhisattva lineage with sharp faculties first seeks the view of suchness and then generates an [altruistic] mind of enlightenment. Therefore, as will be explained later, the second fault is also not incurred.

That is not the intention of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought*. The reason for this: the explanation of the three practices as causes of Bodhisattvas is stated in terms of Bodhisattvas of both sharp and dull faculties because [the second stanza in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*] "Mercy alone,..." states the way in which the [altruistic] mind of enlightenment and the wisdom realizing emptiness originate in great compassion in terms of Bodhisattvas of both sharp and dull faculties. The reason is so because in explaining how the root of these two originates in great compassion, Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (8.5–12) on this stanza states:

> Thus, one who possesses compassion, because he is pained by the suffering of others, seeks to thoroughly protect suffering sentient beings without exception. Hence, he definitely generates an [altruistic] mind

> thinking, "I will undoubtedly [67] relieve these limitless wordly beings from suffering and definitely set them in Buddhahood." Since one who forsakes the non-dual wisdom cannot fulfil this promise, he also definitely engages in the non-dual exalted wisdom.

Also, when D̄zong-ka-b̄a briefly explains the meaning of this, there is a purpose in his explaining in terms of those of dull faculties having the Mahāyāna lineage how the root of the wisdom realizing emptiness and the [altruistic] mind of enlightenment originates in great compassion. D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 115) says:

> Through Chandrakīrti's commentary on the meaning of the four lines "Since mercy alone..." you should gain firm conviction with respect to the teaching that it is necessary to train in these practices. You should think, "If I wish to become a Mahāyāna practitioner, my mind must first come under the influence of great compassion, and then in dependence upon this I must generate from the depths of my heart a fully qualified [altruistic] mind of enlightenment. Once I have done this, I must [practice] the Bodhisattva deeds in general and, in particular, I must penetrate the view."

Qualm: Since whoever is a Bodhisattva of dull faculties must be born from the three practices before entering the path, whoever is a Bodhisattva has to have realized emptiness. However, if this is so, it contradicts the meaning of the root text and commentary of Shāntirakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃ kārakārikā)*.

Answer: Although the explanation of the three practices in this context as causes of Bodhisattvas is made in terms of Bodhisattvas of both sharp and dull faculties, [68] every Bodhisattva of dull faculties need not have been born from the three practices before entering the path. For example, Shāntirakṣhita's *Ornament for the Middle Way* says:

> Followers of right faith,[60] having generated
> A mind directed toward perfect enlightenment,

> Assume the conduct of the Subduer;
> Then, they strive for knowledge of reality.

This statement of how, having first generated an [altruistic] mind, one subsequently trains one's mind in the view is made in terms of someone of dull faculties who has the Mahāyāna lineage. However, it is not the case that anyone of dull faculties who has the Mahāyāna lineage must first generate an [altruistic] mind and subsequently train his mind in the view. Accordingly, those of dull faculties who have the lineage of Bodhisattvas definite in the Mahāyāna are of two types: (1) those who, having first generated an [altruistic] mind directed toward enlightenment, subsequently train their minds in the view and (2) those who, having first generated in their continuums the view realizing emptiness, subsequently generate an [altruistic] mind directed to supreme enlightenment. This is so because Gyel-tsap's *Ornament of the Essence* says:

> From among the two types of trainees, those who *must* realize emptiness before generating an [altruistic] mind directed to the supreme enlightenment are those of sharp faculties; for those of dull [faculties] this is not a definite necessity.

Therefore, this explanation of the three practices as causes of Bodhisattvas is in terms of Bodhisattvas of both sharp and dull faculties because, although some Bodhisattvas of dull faculties do not realize emptiness before entering the path, the great majority of Bodhisattvas of dull faculties, before entering the path, train their minds in the Mahāyāna mind generation, [69] take the Bodhisattva vows, and realize emptiness through hearing and thinking about the vast and profound Mahāyāna scriptural collections.

ANCILLARY REFUTATION OF THE WRONG CONCEPTIONS OF OTHERS

First Debate

Incorrect position stated by someone outside Dzong-ka-ba's system: Your explanation that a Bodhisattva like a waxing crescent moon

and a Bodhisattva like the shoot of a medicinal tree refer only to beginning Bodhisattvas is incorrect because such an assertion contradicts a passage by Nāgārjuna, contradicts a passage by Maitreya, and contradicts your own assertions. The first reason is established because your explanation contradicts Nāgārjuna's explanation that a Bodhisattva like a waxing crescent moon refers to a first ground Bodhisattva. Nāgārjuna's *Praise for the Element of Reality* (*Dharmadhātustotra*) says:

> Just as the moon is slightly visible on the fourteenth day of waning, there is a slight appearance of the Truth Body for those who believe in the supreme vehicle. Just as one sees the waxing crescent moon increase periodically, those who have entered a ground see [the imputed Truth Body in their continuums] increase stage by stage. Just as the moon is complete on the fifteenth day of waxing, so on the final ground the Truth Body is complete and clear.[61]

The second reason [i.e., that your explanation contradicts a passage by Maitreya] is established because in the passage from his *Sublime Science* (*Mahāyānottaratantrashāstra*), "Just as a sprout and so forth, [70] growing gradually, break through the husk of the seed...." Maitreya treats sprout as the example and path of seeing as the meaning. This proves that Maitreya posits a Bodhisattva on the path of seeing as a Bodhisattva like the shoot of a medicinal tree.

Your explanation that a Bodhisattva like a waxing crescent moon and a Bodhisattva like the shoot of a medicinal tree refer only to beginning Bodhisattvas also contradicts your own assertions. For it [absurdly] follows that it is correct to take the Bodhisattva exemplified by a newborn son of a Universal Emperor and a Bodhisattva exemplified by a newborn eaglet, which are mentioned in the *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra* (*Maitreyavimokṣha*),[62] as referring to a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation because [according to you] a Bodhisattva like a waxing crescent moon and a Bodhisattva like the shoot of a medicinal tree refer to a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation. If you accept the con-

sequence, you contradict your own refutation of Jayānanda's *Commentarial Explanation.*[63] Therefore, since "Conqueror Child" in [Chandrakīrti's phrase] "the causes of Conqueror Children," "Bodhisattva" in the context of [the statement from Maitreya's *Sublime Science*], "The impure, pure and impure, and thoroughly pure are respectively called sentient being, Bodhisattva, and Tathāgata," and "Bodhisattva" in the context of [the statement in Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (14.4–5)], "From that point, due to having attained that [mind], one is called just by the term 'Bodhisattva' "[64] are synonymous, the three practices in this context refer to the three practices on the occasions of the [paths of] accumulation and preparation and "Conqueror Child" refers to a Bodhisattva Superior. [71]

Correct position: Although one could analyze these erroneous conceptions in detail, it seems that this would establish bad predispositions; therefore, I will explain just enough to make the terms understood. Your explanation of how I have contradicted Nāgārjuna's *Praise for the Element of Reality* is most amazing because that statement from Nāgārjuna's *Praise for the Element of Reality* does not treat a waxing crescent moon and a first ground [Bodhisattva] as example and exemplified, but treats a waxing crescent moon and a Truth Body as example and exemplified. The reason is so because at the end of that passage [Nāgārjuna] states that "Just as the moon is complete on the fifteenth day of waxing, so on the final ground the Truth Body is complete and clear," treating waxing crescent moon and Truth Body as example and exemplified. Through your continual repetition of slander about the eastern Dzong-ka-ba, the second Conqueror, without even understanding this coarse fact, you engage in activities that ruin yourself and others; all of your reasonings appear to be just like this.

The second reasoning [i.e., that our explanation contradicts a passage by Maitreya] is also incorrect. Following your interpretation, it would [absurdly] follow that a Bodhisattva abiding on the great path of accumulation is a Bodhisattva who is like a waxing crescent moon because the conventional mind generation in his continuum is a mind that is like a waxing crescent moon. If you

say that the reason does not entail its consequence, [72] that knocks out the necessity [upon which your argument relies] that since sprout and path of seeing are treated as example and exemplified in [Maitreya's statement], "Just as a sprout, and so forth, growing gradually...", a Bodhisattva on the path of seeing must therefore be a Bodhisattva who is like the shoot of a medicinal tree. If you accept [the consequence that a Bodhisattva on the great path of accumulation is a Bodhisattva who is like a waxing crescent moon], you contradict your own explanation that a Bodhisattva[65] who is like a waxing crescent moon is a first ground [Bodhisattva].

Since there is no sense whatsoever in your last consequence, [i.e. that our explanation contradicts our own assertion], it is not necessary to give an answer.

Second Debate

Incorrect position asserted by someone from an earlier time: The three practices in this context refer to the three practices on the occasions of the [path of] accumulation and preparation and Conqueror Child in this context refers to a Conqueror Child Superior.

Correct position: These explanations are incorrect. For it would [absurdly] follow that Chandrakīrti's explanation in the *Auto-Commentary* (6.6–9) – "Of what are these Bodhisattvas the effect? The mind of compassion, non-dual awareness, and ..." – is incorrect because this passage does not indicate an actual answer to the question, "If Subduer Kings are born from Bodhisattvas, from what are Bodhisattvas born?" This is because [according to you] this passage does not explain the three causes from which Bodhisattvas are initially born. The reason is so because [according to you] the three practices in this context refer to the three practices in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the [paths of] accumulation or preparation and Conqueror Child in this context refers to a Conqueror Child Superior. You have asserted the reason.

Now, the following should be analyzed:

Third Debate

Incorrect position: It follows that the Mahāyāna mind generation

taught in this context is not a [mere] imputed Mahāyāna mind generation because there is a common locus of the mind generation taught in this context and mind generation in the continuum of a Bodhisattva. The reason is so because there is a common locus of compassion taught in this context and compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva. This reason is so because (1) it is correct for the compassion taught in this context to refer to the compassion that will be explained [in the third stanza of the *Supplement*] and (2) there is a common locus of compassion that serves as the main teaching of the third stanza of [Chandrakīrti's *Supplement*], "Initially adhering to a self, an 'I'..." and compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva. [73] This is because Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (10.9–11), at the point of "Initially adhering to a self, an 'I',..." [states] "This is the compassion of a Bodhisattva observing sentient beings" and D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 123) states:

> The compassion to which Chandrakīrti offers worship is mainly compassion at the beginning, but it is also the other compassions of Bodhisattvas. Therefore, there is no contradiction in Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* at this point describing those who generate compassion as Bodhisattvas.

Correct position: The original reason [that there is a common locus of the mind generation taught in this context and mind generation in the continuum of a Bodhisattva] does not entail its consequence [that the Mahāyāna mind generation taught in this context is not an imputed mind generation].

Fourth Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that there is a common locus of compassion in this context and compassion at the time of the effect because [according to you] there is a common locus of [compassion in this context] and compassion in the continuum of a Bodhisattva. You have asserted the reason. If you accept the consequence, you contradict your earlier assertion[66] that such does not exist.

Correct position: The original reason does not entail its consequence.

4 *Compassion is Important at the Beginning, Middle, and End*

The second stanza of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to the Middle Way* (7.17–20) states:

> Mercy alone is seen as the seed
> Of a Conqueror's rich harvest,
> As water for development, and as
> Fruition in a state of long enjoyment.
> Therefore at the start I praise compassion.

This chapter has two parts: (1) a statement of the passage to be explained and (2) an explanation of the meaning of the passage.

STATEMENT OF THE PASSAGE TO BE EXPLAINED

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (8.5–9.4) says:

> Thus, one who possesses compassion, because he is pained by the suffering of others, [74] [seeks] to thoroughly protect suffering sentient beings without exception. [Hence he] definitely generates an [altruistic] mind thinking, "I will undoubtedly relieve all these worldly beings from suffering and definitely set them

in Buddhahood." Since one who forsakes the non-dual wisdom cannot fulfil this promise, he also definitely engages in the non-dual wisdom. Therefore, the seed of all the Buddha's doctrines is just compassion. In this regard Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* (378) says:

> Who with intelligence would deride
> The Mahāyāna, that in which
> All the deeds proceeding from compassion
> And the stainless wisdom are explained?

Even though one has generated an [altruistic] mind of enlightenment, if one does not later irrigate it again and again with the water of compassion, one will not amass the vast collections of the fruit [of Buddhahood], but will escape suffering through the complete nirvana of a Hearer or Solitary Realizer. [Also] even if one attained the state of the limitless fruit, if one were devoid of the complete fruition of compassion one would not enjoy this [state] for a long time, nor would the great collection of Superior fruits, in succession from one stage to another, increase uninterruptedly for a long period of time.[67]

EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF THE PASSAGE

At the outset of his composition Chandrakīrti [75] praises great compassion because mercy, which is great compassion, is important for the generation of a Conqueror's rich harvest in the beginning, middle, and end. It is important at the beginning because the root of the [altruistic] mind of enlightenment and the wisdom realizing emptiness through limitless reasonings depends upon great compassion. How is the root of these two based in great compassion? The discussion of this is in two parts: the actual [explanation] and a statement of the scriptural source.

ACTUAL EXPLANATION

This section has two parts: (1) an explanation of how the root of a

dull Bodhisattva's [altruistic mind of enlightenment and wisdom realizing emptiness] is based in great compassion presented in terms of the explicitly indicated meaning of the above passage from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary*, and (2) an explanation of how the root of a sharp Bodhisattva's [altruistic mind of enlightenment and wisdom realizing emptiness] is based in great compassion presented from the viewpoint of the implicitly indicated meaning [of the above passage from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary*].

Explanation of How Compassion is the Root of the Other Two Practices for Dull Bodhisattvas

For Bodhisattvas of dull faculties, the root of the [altruistic] mind of enlightenment and the wisdom realizing emptiness originates in great compassion. This is because one of dull faculties who possesses the Mahāyāna lineage initially generates great compassion wishing that all sentient beings be free from suffering, and, in dependence upon that, generates an [altruistic] mind directed toward supreme enlightenment, thinking "I will attain complete enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings"; and, seeing that it is necessary to train in the deeds of the six perfections in order to attain complete enlightenment, [76] he engages in the practice of the perfection of wisdom, the main of the deeds.

Explanation of How Compassion is the Root of the Other Two Practices for Sharp Bodhisattvas

For Bodhisattvas of sharp faculties, the root of the [altruistic] mind of enlightenment and the wisdom realizing emptiness originates in great compassion. This is because one of sharp faculties who possesses the Mahāyāna lineage, having cultivated well the seven instructions of cause and effect, from recognition [of all sentient beings] as mothers up to great compassion, realizes that he must attain Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. He then analyzes whether or not it is possible to attain the rank of complete Buddhahood, which is an abandonment of the two ob-

structions together with their predispositions. He does this by establishing through valid cognition that it is possible to abandon the conception of true existence by demonstrating damage to the referent object of the conception of true existence from the viewpoint of innumerable reasonings. He then generates an [altruistic] mind directed toward supreme enlightenment, thinking, "I will attain complete Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings."

In this way, Gyel-tsap's *Commentry on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Science"* states:

> Those of sharp faculties who possess the Mahāyāna lineage initially establish well with valid cognition that it is both necessary and possible to attain complete and perfect Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. Thereafter, they make the promise of one who generates an [altruistic] mind thinking, "I will attain Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings." [77] However, promising without seeing a correct reason is the way of those of dull faculties. Also, while it is through internalizing well the mode of generating compassion together with the unusual attitude that one realizes that it is necessary to attain Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings, it is through realizing emptiness together with its related topics that one realizes that one can attain Buddhahood. Inferring from this fact, one can know that for those of sharp faculties realization of emptiness is a prerequisite even for generating a mind seeking liberation.

There are many qualms which must be eliminated regarding these points. Furthermore, although the good explanations of the instructions in Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Science"* and of the instructions of the Foremost Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's word are stated in this way, it appears that most have not seen them.

STATEMENT OF THE SCRIPTURAL SOURCE

[The scriptural source of compassion's importance at the begin-

ning as the root of the other two causes of the Children of Conqueror] is explained by [the passage from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (8.13–15)]:

In this regard Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland* says:

> Who with intelligence would deride
> The Mahāyāna, that in which
> All the deeds proceeding from compassion
> And the stainless wisdom are explained?

The importance [of compassion] in the middle is explained by [the passage from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (8.16–20)]:

> Even though one has generated an [altruistic] mind of enlightenment, if one does not irrigate it again and again with the water of compassion, one will not amass the vast collections of the fruit [of Buddhahood], but will escape suffering through the complete nirvana of a Hearer or Solitary Realizer.

The importance [of compassion] at the end is explained by [the passage from Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (8.20–9.4)],

> [Also], even if one attained the state of the limitless fruit, if one were devoid of the complete fruition of compassion one would not enjoy this [state] for a long time, nor would the great collection of Superior fruits, in succession from one stage to another, increase uninterruptedly for a long period of time.

5 *The Three Compassions*

The third and fourth stanzas of Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to the Middle Way* (9.7–10, 10.12–13) state:

> Homage to that compassion for migrators
> Who are powerless, like a bucket travelling in a well,
> Initially adhering to a self, an "I,"
> And then generating attachment to things, "This is mine."
>
> [Homage to those compassions for] migrators,
> Seen as evanescent and empty of inherent existence,
> Like a moon in rippling water.

The explanation of this has three parts: (1) a refutation of other systems, (2) a presentation of our own system, and (3) a dispelling of objections.

REFUTATION OF OTHER SYSTEMS

An earlier Tibetan said:

> Whatever is the first compassion [78] is necessarily an awareness that, observing sentient beings who are permanent, unitary, and independent, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering.[68] Whatever is

> the second compassion necessarily realizes sentient beings to be impermanent. Whatever is the third compassion necessarily realizes sentient beings to be without true existence.

In order to refute the first statement D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 123) states:

> Therefore, it is wrong to assert that the first compassion must observe permanent, unitary, and independent sentient beings. This is because compassion in the continuums of those who have not found the view of selflessness is often produced observing mere sentient beings. Also, in the continuums of those who have found the view of the common [that is, coarse] selflessness or the view of suchness there are many instances of compassions observing sentient beings without qualifying them with either of the two features mentioned above [i.e., common selflessness and suchness]. For example, even one who understands that pot is impermanent, having rooted out the referent object of the conception of pot as permanent, may often observe a pot without observing a pot as qualified by impermanence. Also, even one who has not understood impermanence does not observe pot as qualified by permanence every time he observes a pot.

The meaning of this: It [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion observing mere sentient beings in the continuum of a person who has not established by valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent [79] is necessarily an awareness that, observing sentient beings as qualified by permanence, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering because (1) whatever is that must be a first compassion and (2) [according to you] whatever is a first compassion is necessarily an awareness that, observing permanent, unitary, and independent sentient beings, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. [Objections to] the first reason can be dismissed. You [a proponent of the earlier Tibetan's position] explicitly [asserted] the second [reason]. If you accept the

consequence, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion observing sentient beings in the continuum of a person who has not established by valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent must be explicitly affected by a manifest awareness apprehending sentient beings as permanent. If you accept this consequence, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is an awareness that observes a pot in the continuum of a person who has not ascertained by valid cognition that pot is impermanent must be explicitly affected by a manifest awareness apprehending pot as permanent. You cannot accept this consequence because experience demonstrates that a person who has not established by valid cognition that pot is impermanent does not, whenever he sees a pot, apprehend it thinking, "This pot is permanent."[69]

[D̄zong-ka-b̄a's passage, quoted above, also indicates] a second reasoning: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a compassion observing mere sentient beings in the continuum of a person who has realized the person to be empty of a self that is permanent, unitary, and independent, is an awareness that, observing sentient beings who are permanent, unitary and independent, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. This is because it is a compassion that observes mere sentient beings. You have accepted that the reason entails the predicate in that consequence. The reason [80] is established because compassion observing mere sentient beings does exist in the continuum of a person who has established by valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent. If [you say that] the reason is not established, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion in the continuum of a person who has established by valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent is necessarily an awareness that, observing sentient beings as qualified by impermanence, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering because [according to you] the reason [that compassion observing mere sentient beings exists in the continuum of a person who has establlished by valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent] is not established. If you accept the consequence, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is an awareness observing a pot in the continuum of a person who has realized by valid cognition that a pot is impermanent is necessarily explicitly affected by a wisdom

that realizes a pot to be impermanent. You cannot accept the consequence because experience demonstrates that a person who has established by valid cognition that a pot is impermanent does not, whenever he sees a pot, have to apprehend it thinking, "This pot is impermanent."

Similarly, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a compassion observing mere sentient beings in the continuum of a person who has established by valid cognition that sentient beings are empty of true existence, is an awareness that, observing sentient beings who are permanent, unitary and independent, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering because of being a compassion observing mere sentient beings in the continuum of that person. If you say that the reason is not established, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion in the continuum of that person is necessarily an awareness that, observing sentient beings as qualified by truthlessness, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering [81] because [according to you] that reason is not established. If you accept the consequence, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion in the continuum of that person [who established by valid cognition that sentient beings are empty of true existence] must be explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing sentient beings to be without true existence. If you accept this consequence, you are refuted, as before, [by the analogy with seeing a pot].

[In order to refute the latter two positions of those Tibetans – "Whatever is the second compassion necessarily realizes sentient beings to be impermanent" and "Whatever is the third compassion necessarily realizes sentient beings as lacking true existence" –] Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 122) says:

> Many Tibetan commentators say that the second compassion observes momentary disintegration and the third compassion observes non-inherent existence. These are explanations of those who have not understood well the subjective aspects and objects of observation of these two compassions.

With regard to the meaning of this: It [absurdly] follows with regard to the subject, a compassion observing phenomena in the continuum of a learner [i.e., a person who has not achieved Buddha-

hood], that it possesses two discordant modes of apprehension because it is an awareness that has the aspect of [realizing] impermanent sentient beings and it is also an awareness that possesses the aspect of wishing that sentient beings be free from suffering. You cannot accept the consequence because [the subject] is a compassion in the continuum of a learner.

This reasoning is applied to the third compassion [compassion observing the unapprehendable] in a similar way.

First Debate

Incorrect position: It [absurdly] follows that a compassion observing the unapprehendable in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on the path of accumulation realizes truthlessness because it observes truthlessness. The reason is so because it observes the unapprehendable. The reason is so because it is a compassion observing the unapprehendable.

Correct position: That something is a compassion observing the unapprehendable does not entail that it observes the unapprehendable because calling the observation of sentient beings who are qualified by truthlessness [82] "compassion observing the unapprehendable" is a case in which intermediate words are not manifest – [that is, a contraction].

What are the differences between the three compassions according to Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought*? With regard to this Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp*. 122) says:

> Sentient beings qualified by two features [momentariness and truthlessness] are posited as the objects of observation of [the latter two] compassions. Thus, before a person can have these two [compassions] in his continuum he must ascertain that sentient beings are momentary and do not inherently exist. Then, in dependence upon his previous ascertainment, the aspects of these two qualities appear [to his mind]. However, it is not necessary that these compassions [themselves] apprehend [sentient beings] as those two [impermanent or not inherently existent].

Someone says that the meaning of this [passage is as follows]:

> The meaning of the first compassion is mercy that is arisen from its direct substantial cause, an awareness that realizes sentient beings only as tormented by suffering, and that, having observed mere sentient beings who are tormented by suffering, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. The meaning of the second compassion is mercy that arises in dependence upon its direct substantial cause, an awareness that realizes sentient beings as impermanent, and that, observing its objects of observation, sentient beings who are qualified by impermanence and who are imputed in dependence upon mere phenomena – the aggregates and so forth – has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. The meaning of the third compassion is mercy that arises in dependence upon its direct substantial cause, an awareness that realizes sentient beings as without inherent existence, and that, observing suffering sentient beings qualified by truthlessness, [83] has the aspect of wishing that they be free from the suffering in their continuums. The three compassions are mutually exclusive in the continuums of sentient beings, but not mutually exclusive on the Buddha Ground. This is because the three – an awareness that explicitly realizes that suffering sentient beings are tormented by suffering, an awareness that explicitly realizes sentient beings as impermanent, and an awareness that explicitly realizes sentient beings as without inherent existence – cannot be produced simultaneously in the continuum of a sentient being, but a Buddha Superior can generate those three in his continuum simultaneously.

To propound that such is the thought of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* is very non-analytical. For it [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, that which is to be known [on this occasion], that the three awarenesses explained above can be generated simul-

taneously in the continuum of a sentient being because [according to you] the two, an awareness realizing sentient beings to be impermanent and an awareness that wishes sentient beings to be free from suffering, can be produced simultaneously in the continuum of a sentient being. The reason is so because [according to you] two such awarenesses exist simultaneously in the continuum of a sentient being abiding in the first moment of a compassion observing phenomena. The reason is so because [according to you] the second moment of a compassion observing phenomena arises from its direct substantial cause, an awareness realizing sentient beings to be impermanent and also arises from its direct substantial cause, an awareness that wishes that sentient beings be free from suffering. If you say that the first [part of this] reason is not established, [84] it [absurdly] follows that the subject [the second moment of a compassion observing phenomena] arises from [its direct substantial cause, an awareness realizing sentient beings to be impermanent] because of being a compassion observing phenomena. The three spheres [for self-contradiction] exist.

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior is necessarily all three compassions because [according to you] it is correct to make the distinction that the three compassions are mutually exclusive in the continuum of a sentient being, but are not mutually exclusive on the Buddha Ground. If you accept that consequence, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, great compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior who is abiding in the first moment of an omniscient consciousness, is [all three compassions] because of being [a compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior]. If you accept that consequence, it [absurdly] follows that the subject is arisen from its direct substantial cause, an awareness realizing sentient beings to be impermanent, because of being a compassion observing phenomena. If you accept this consequence, it follows that the subject is arisen from its direct substantial cause, an awareness realizing sentient beings only as tormented by suffering because of being a compassion observing mere sentient beings. You have asserted the reason and that the reason entails that point. If you accept the consequence, it [absurdly] follows

that the subject is arisen from its direct substantial cause, an awareness realizing that sentient beings lack inherent existence, because of being the third compassion. If you accept this consequence, it [absurdly] follows that the three, an awareness realizing sentient beings only as tormented by suffering, an awareness realizing sentient beings to be impermanent, and an awareness realizing sentient beings as lacking inherent existence, exist simultaneously in the [mental] continuum of a Bodhisattva at the end of the continuum [of being a sentient being] because [you have] accepted those three [consequences]. The three spheres [of self-contradiction] exist.

The assertion that the first compassion exists on the Buddha Ground is also [85] not the thought of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought*. This will be explained below.

It [absurdly] follows that there are cases of the three awarenesses [mentioned] above existing simultaneously in the continuum of a sentient being because [according to you] there are cases of the two, an awareness wishing that sentient beings be free from suffering and an awareness having the aspect of impermanent sentient beings, existing simultaneously in the continuum of a sentient being. [This cannot be accepted] because Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 122) states:

> [Thus,] before a person can have these two compassions [compassion observing sentient beings qualified by momentariness and compassion observing sentient beings qualified by emptiness of inherent existence] in his continuum, he must ascertain that sentient beings are momentary and do not inherently exist. Then, in dependence upon his previous ascertainment, the aspects of these two qualities must appear [to his mind]. However, it is not necessary that these compassions [themselves] apprehend [sentient beings] as those two [impermanent or not inherently existent].

Keep these statements well in mind and henceforth know how to posit tenets. This reasoning also eliminates the existence of a conventional mind generation in the continuum of a Bodhisattva on an uninterrupted path.

A great scholar says:

> The first compassion exists on the Buddha Ground because Chandrakīrti does not say that the object of observation of the first compassion must be qualified by the two attributes, but states that mere sentient beings who are tormented by suffering are the objects of observation of the [first compassion].

One of my lamas, a king among scholars, says that this is good. However, I do not think that this is the intention of Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought*, for it [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a first compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior, that it [86] observes mere sentient beings tormented by suffering, its object of observation, without qualifying them with either impermanence or truthlessness because of being a first compassion. The reason entails the consequence because Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* [122] states:

> In both the root text and commentary, Chandrakīrti explains that the latter two compassions observe sentient beings qualified by the qualities explained above and says that mere sentient beings – who are not so qualified – are the objects of observation of the first compassion. Therefore, thinking this, [Chandrakīrti] used the contraction "compassion observing sentient beings" because it is a convenient expression.

You cannot accept the above consequence [that a first compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior observes mere sentient beings tormented by suffering, its object of observation, without qualifying them with either impermanence or truthlessness] because [if there were a first compassion in the continuum of a Buddha] it would directly realize sentient beings as impermanent and also directly realize sentient beings as lacking true existence. If you say that the reason is not established, the existence of that subject [the first compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] is eliminated.

To this another scholar replies:

> Your original reason does not entail its point [that is to

> say, whatever is a first compassion does not necessarily observe mere sentient beings tormented by suffering, its object of observation, without qualifying them with either impermanence or truthlessness] because that statement from Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* means that the first compassion does not *have* to observe sentient beings, its object of observation, having qualified them with impermanence or truthlessness; it does *not* mean that [a first compassion] must observe sentient beings without having qualified them with those two.

However, it [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, that which is to be known [on this occasion], that the statement from Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 121) – "Since compassion observing phenomena does not observe mere sentient beings, [87] but observes sentient beings who disintegrate moment by moment, it observes sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence" – is not correct because [according to you] there is a common locus of compassion observing phenomena and compassion observing mere sentient beings.

Second Debate

Incorrect position: It follows that the first compassion exists in the mental continuum of a Buddha Superior because compassion which observes mere sentient beings exists in his continuum. The reason is so because compassion observing sentient beings exists in his mental continuum. The reason entails the probandum because whatever is a compassion observing sentient beings must be a compassion observing mere sentient beings. The reason is so because Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 122) states:

> Chandrakīrti says that mere sentient beings, who are not qualified by those two qualities [momentary impermanence and lack of inherent existence], are the objects of observation of the first compassion. Therefore, thinking this, [Chandrakīrti] used the contraction "compassion observing sentient beings" because it is a convenient expression.

Correct position: It is not correct to answer to this, as one follower of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa does, that the original reason [that is, that compassion observing sentient beings exists in the continuum of a Buddha Superior] is not established, because it would be laughable to propound that there is no compassion observing sentient beings in the mental continuum of a Buddha Superior.[70] Our own position is that compassion observing sentient beings exists in the mental continuum of a Buddha Superior, but a first compassion [which is sometimes called "compassion observing sentient beings" in contraction] does not. The meaning of that passage from Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* [88] is that within the threefold division of compassion whatever is a compassion observing sentient beings is necessarily a first compassion.

Third Debate

Incorrect position: It follows that compassion observing mere sentient beings exists in the continuum of a Buddha Superior because in the continuum of a Buddha Superior there is mercy that, having observed the mere general category of sentient beings tormented by suffering, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering.

Correct position: That reason does not entail its consequence because the intention of Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* is that the word "mere" in the phrase "compassion observing mere sentient beings" eliminates that which, having observed sentient beings qualified by impermanence or truthlessness, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. This is because the passage from Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* just cited [p. 134 above] clearly teaches that:

> Since a compassion observing phenomena does not observe mere sentient beings, but observes sentient beings who disintegrate moment by moment, it observes sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence.

Regarding the boundaries [of the three compassions] one scholar says:

Only the first compassion can exist in the continuum of a person who has realized neither the coarse nor the subtle selflessness. The second compassion can exist in the continuum of a person who has realized [only] the coarse selflessness; the third cannot. For those who have realized the subtle selflessness, any of the three compassions can exist from before entering the path through the state subsequent to meditative equipoise on the seventh ground. On the eighth ground and above only the third compassion can exist; neither of the first two can. The first compassion can exist up through the state subsequent to meditative equipoise on the seventh ground [89] because, when a Bodhisattva Superior who has in his continuum a manifest awareness that apprehends persons as self-sufficient in the sense of being substantially existent observes sentient beings, he observes sentient beings without qualifying them with either coarse or subtle selflessness. This is the meaning of the passage in D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 123) that begins:

> [For example,] even one who understands that pot is impermanent, having rooted out the referent object of the conception of pot as permanent, may often observe a pot without observing a pot as qualified by impermanence. When one posits the differences between the three compassions one [should] use a participial construction,[71] as in the phrases, "that which has the aspect of wishing that sentient beings, who, *having been qualified*[72] by impermanence, are its objects of observation, be free from suffering" and "that which has the aspect of wishing that sentient beings, who, *having been qualified* by truthlessness, are its object of observation, be free from suffering." However, it is incorrect to use the genitive case [translated here as]: "having observed sentient beings *qualified*[73] by impermanence" and "having observed sentient beings *qualified* by truthlessness."

[Some of this scholar's statements] are incorrect, for it follows with regard to the subject, great compassion in the continuum of a Buddha Superior, that it is a compassion observing phenomena because (1) it is a compassion in the continuum of a person who has established by valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent [90] and (2) it is an awareness that has the aspect of wishing that sentient beings, having been qualified by impermanence, be free from suffering. If you say that the reasons do not entail their consequence, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion observing phenomena must be an awareness that has the aspect of wishing that sentient beings who, having been qualified *only* by impermanence, are its object of observation, be free from suffering because [according to you] those two reasons did not entail that consequence. If you accept the consequence [that whatever is a compassion observing phenomena must be an awareness that has the aspect of wishing that the sentient beings who, having been qualified only by impermanence, are its objects of observation be free from suffering, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion observing the unapprehendable must be an awareness that has the aspect of wishing that sentient beings who, having been qualified only by truthlessness, are its objects of observation, be free from suffering because you accepted that consequence. If you accept this consequence, then it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the compassion observing the unapprehendable in the continuum of a Buddha Superior, is an awareness that has the aspect of wishing that the sentient beings who, having been qualified only by truthlessness, are its objects of observation be free from suffering because of being a compassion observing the unapprehendable. The three spheres [of self-contradiction] exist.

Furthermore, [the assertion] that a manifest awareness apprehending persons as self-sufficient in the sense of substantial existence operates through the seventh ground will be analyzed below [in a section not translated here].

Also, those boundaries of the three compassions are incorrect because that great compassion does not exist in the [mental] continuum of one on the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum [as a sentient being] would not be feasible due to contradicting reasoning; and since great compassion does exist in the [mental] continuum of one on the uninterrupted path at the end of the con-

tinuum [as a sentient being], nothing other than compassion observing mere sentient beings is suitable [to be that great compassion].

[That scholar's] propounding that, when positing the differences between the three compassions, one should not use the genitive case, as in the phrase "who are qualified by impermanence" (*khyad par du byas pa'i*), but should use [instead] a participal construction, "having been [qualified]" (*khyad par du byas nas*) is a case of overlooking a profound point: there is no fault in using the genitive case. Without valuing the speech of the Foremost Omniscient Ḏzoṇg-ka-ḇa [who uses the genitive], [91] he follows his own whim.

PRESENTATION OF OUR OWN SYSTEM

This section has three parts: (1) an identification of the individual entities of the three compassions, (2) an explanation of the meaning of the terms, and (3) an explanation of the boundaries.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL ENTITIES OF THE THREE COMPASSIONS

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (9.4–10) says:

> Now, a person wishing to compose an [expression of] homage to compassion, clarifying the differences between the compassions from the viewpoint of their engagement of particular objects of observation, says:
>
> Homage to that compassion for migrators,
> Who are powerless, like a bucket travelling in a
> well,
> Initially adhering to a self, an "I,"
> And then generating attachment to things, "This
> is mine."

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (10.10–11) also says, "In order to clarify compassion observing phenomena and compassion observing the unapprehendable by way of object of observation...."

This means that the distinctions between the three compassions are made by way of object of observation; they are not made by way of mode of apprehension because all three have in common the aspect of wishing that sentient beings, who are their object of observation, be free from suffering. Although the three compassions are individually posited by way of object of observation, they do not differ in the matter of observing sentient beings, their object of observation. For Chandrakīrti says of the first compassion: "Homage to that compassion for migrators" and also uses the word "migrators" *('gro ba)* in connection with the latter two compassions.

How are these three distinguished by way of object of observation? The definition of compassion observing mere sentient beings is:

> that which (1) is a compassion and (2) is distinguished by the wish, observing mere sentient beings tormented by suffering, who are its object of observation, that [sentient beings] be free from suffering.

There is a purpose in stating the word "mere" [in that definition]: It is for the sake of eliminating those [compassions] that, observing sentient beings who are qualified by impermanence or truthlessness, have the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. In this regard Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 121) states:

> Since compassion observing phenomena does not observe mere sentient beings, but observes sentient beings who disintegrate moment by moment, it observes sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence.

Also (*Comp.* 122):

> Compassion observing the unapprehendable also does not observe mere sentient beings. It observes a special object: sentient beings empty of inherent existence.

The definition of compassion observing phenomena is:

> that which (1) is a compassion in the continuum of a person who has already established by valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent and (2) is an awareness that, observing sentient beings qualified by impermanence, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering.

The definition of compassion observing the unapprehendable is:

> that which (1) is a compassion in the continuum of a person who has already established by valid cognition that sentient beings are empty of true existence and (2) is an awareness that, observing sentient beings qualified by truthlessness, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering.

When the meanings of all these [definitions] are condensed, [93] the definition of the first compassion is:

> that which (1) is a compassion and (2) is observed as a consciousness that is explicitly affected by neither a wisdom realizing sentient beings as impermanent nor a wisdom realizing sentient beings as lacking true existence.

The definition of the second compassion is:

> that which (1) is a compassion and (2) is explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing sentient beings to be impermanent.

The definition of the third compassion is:

> that which (1) is a compassion and (2) is explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing sentient beings as lacking true existence.

With regard to this, as previously cited [p. 132], Ḏzong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 122) states:

> [Thus,] before a person can have these two [latter compassions] in his continuum, he must ascertain that sentient beings are momentary and do not inherently exist. Then, in dependence upon his previous ascer-

tainment, the aspects of these two qualities must appear [to his mind].

EXPLANATION OF THE MEANING OF THE TERMS

With regard to the subject, the first compassion, there is a reason for calling it "compassion observing sentient beings": it is so called through forming a contraction from [the phrase] "that which observes mere suffering sentient beings who are its object of observation, without qualifying them with either impermanence or truthlessness" without explicitly using the term "mere." In this way Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 122) says, "[Therefore,] thinking this, [Chandrakīrti] used the contraction 'compassion observing sentient beings' because it is a convenient expression."

With regard to the subject, the second compassion, there is a reason for calling it "compassion observing phenomena" [94]: It is so called because the aggregates that are the basis of imputation of the person, form and so forth, are called "phenomena," and [a contraction] is formed by omitting intervening words such as "imputed" from the phrase "*observing* sentient beings who are imputed in dependence upon mere *phenomena* such as the aggregates." In this way Ḏzong-ka-ḇa's *Illumination of the Thought* (*Comp.* 121) says, "Giving the name 'observation of phenomena' to observation of sentient beings who are imputed to mere phenomena is a [contraction] omitting intervening words."

Question: How is it that a person who possesses the second compassion in his continuum can ascertain sentient beings as imputations to mere phenomena such as the aggregates?

Answer: A person who possesses the second compassion in his continuum can do this because he ascertains with valid cognition that sentient beings are impermanent; when he has ascertained that sentient beings are impermanent, he can ascertain that there are no permanent, unitary and independent sentient beings;[79] he can then, in dependence upon that ascertainment, ascertain that there are no sentient beings who are different entities from [their respective] aggregates, and thereby understand that sentient beings are imputed in dependence upon mere phenomena such as the aggregates.

imputed in dependence upon mere phenomena such as the aggregates.

With regard to the subject, the third compassion, there is a reson for calling it compassion observing the unapprehendable: Since in this context "apprehendable" means "truly existent" and "unapprehendable" means "not truly existent," the third compassion is called compassion observing the unapprehendable by forming [a contraction], omitting the words "sentient beings" from the phrase "observing sentient beings who are not truly existent." [95] With regard to this Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (122) says:

> "Unapprehendable" means "not truly existent" and refers to the referent object's not existing in the way that it is conceived to exist by a consciousness grasping at signs [of inherent existence]. Giving the name "observing the unapprehendable" to the observation of sentient beings who are qualified by non-true existence is a [contraction] omitting intervening words.

EXPLANATION OF THE BOUNDARIES

Only the first compassion can exist in the continuum of a person who has realized neither subtle nor coarse selflessness;[75] the latter two cannot. The first two compassions can exist in the continuum of a person who has realized coarse selflessness but has not realized subtle selflessness; however, the third cannot. For those who have realized the subtle selflessness all three compassions can exist from before entering the path through the tenth ground. The latter two can exist from before entering the path up through the Buddha Ground.

DISPELLING OBJECTIONS

First objection: In that definition [of the third compassion] it is incorrect to use the genitive case in the phrase "observing sentient beings who are qualified by truthlessness" because whatever is a compassion must be an awareness that, observing its object of observation, sentient beings qualified by truthlessness, has the aspect of wishing that they be free from suffering. The reason is

so because whatever observes sentient beings [96] must observe sentient beings who are not truly existent.

Reply: This objection does not damage [our assertions] because it is the error of one who has overlooked a profound essential point.[76] This is because compassion can exist in the continuum of a proponent of inherent existence, but compassion that, observing sentient beings who ae qualified by truthlessness, wishes that they be free from suffering cannot. The reason is so because in order for a compassion thinking, "I will free from suffering these sentient beings who adhere to [true existence] despite the fact that [persons and phenomena] are empty of true existence!" to arise manifestly, it must be explicitly affected by an awareness thinking that sentient beings lack true existence.

Second objection: It follows that on the eighth ground and above compassion observing mere sentient beings does not exist because whatever is a compassion on the eighth ground or above is necessarily a compassion observing the unapprehendable. The reason is so because on the eighth ground and above any realization of a phenomenon is necessarily a realization of it as being empty of true existence, like an illusion. The reason is so because Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* (107.4) says, "Things that are fabrications [exist] conventionally."

Reply: This is incorrect. It [absurdly] follows that whatever is a compassion in the continuum of an eighth grounder is necessarily explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing emptiness because [according to you] whatever is a compassion in the continuum of an eighth grounder is necessarily a compassion observing the unapprehendable. If you accept the consequence, it [absurdly] follows that whoever is an eighth grounder must possess in his continuum a manifest wisdom that realizes truthlessness and that whatever is a compassion in the continuum of an eighth grounder must exist in his continuum manifestly because [you] asserted that [whatever is a compassion in the continuum of an eighth grounder is necessarily explicitly affected by a wisdom realizing emptiness and you also have asserted that any realization of a phenomenon is necessarily a realization of it as being empty of true existence].

This should be known in detail. [96.6]

Concordance of the New Delhi Reprint with the Current Ser Byes Block-Print Edition of the Text

Prepared by Martin Willson

New Delhi	*Ser Byes*	*New Delhi*	*Ser Byes*
Start of section translated:	12a3	45	18a2
30	12a7	46	18a7
31	12b5	47	18b5
32	13a4	48	19a3
33	13b2	49	19b2
34	13b7	50	19b7
35	14a5	51	20a5
36	14b3	52	20b4
37	15a2	53	21a2
38	15a7	54	21a7
39	15b6	55	21b6
40	16a4	56	22a4
41	16b2	57	22b2
42	17a1	58	23a1
43	17a6	59	23a6
44	17b3	60	23b4

61	24a3
62	24b1
63	24b7
64	25a5
65	25b3
66	26a1
67	26a7
68	26b5
69	27a3
70	27b1
71	27b7
72	28a4
73	28b3
74	29a2
75	29a7
76	29b5
77	30a3
78	30b1
79	30b7
80	31a4
81	31b3
82	32a1
83	32a6
84	32b4
85	33a3
86	33b1
87	33b6
88	34a5
89	35b3
90	35a1
91	35a7
92	35b5
93	36a3
94	36b2
95	36b7
96	37a5
End of section translated:	
96.6	37b3
End of text:	162a

(Since this was compiled via the translation, it is subject to a possible error of one line in some cases.)

Glossary

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
abandon	prahāṇa	spang pa
action the effect of which is definite to mature	niyatakarma	
aeon	kalpa	bskal pa
adherence	adhyavasāya	zhen pa
aggregate	skandha	phung po
apprehended	grāhya	gzung ba
apprehender	grāhaka	'dzin pa
ascertainment	nishchaya	nges pa
aspect	ākāra	rnam pa
attachment	rāga	chags pa
to attain	prāp	thob pa
awareness	buddhi	blo
basis of imputation		btags zhi
Bodhisattva	bodhisattva	byang chub sems dpa'
Buddha	buddha	sangs rgyas
Buddha Superior	āryabuddha	sangs rgyas 'phags pa

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
cause	hetu	rgyu
Child of a Conqueror	jinaputra	rgyal sras
coarse	sthūla	rags pa
collection		tshogs
common being	pṛthagjana	so so'i skye bo
common locus	samānādhibaraṇa	gzhi mthun
compassion	karuṇā	snying rje
compassion at the time of the effect		'bras dus kyi snying rje
compassion observing phenomena	dharmālambanā karuṇā	chos la dmigs pa'i snying rje
compassion observing sentient beings	sattvālambanā karuṇā	sems can la dmigs pa'i snying rje
compassion observing the unapprehendable	anālambanā karuṇā	dmigs med la dmigs pa'i snying rje
compassion which is important at the beginning		thog mar gal che ba'i snying rje
compassion which is important at the end		tha mar gal che ba'i snying rje
Conqueror	jina	rgyal ba
conduct	vrata	brtul zhugs
Congregating [Solitary Realizer]	vargachārin	tshogs spyod
consciousness	jñāna	shes pa
consequence	prasaṅga	thal 'gyur
continuum	saṃtāna	rgyud
conventional mind generation	saṃvṛtichittotpāda	kun rdzob sems bskyed
cooperative condition	sahakāripratyaya	lhan cig byed rkyen
cyclic existence	saṃsāra	'khor ba

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
deeds	charya	spyod pa
dependent arising	pratītyasamutpāda	rten 'byung
desire	rāga	'dod chags
disintegration		'jig pa
divine eye	divyachakṣhu	lha'i mig
doctrine	dharma	chos
dull faculties	mṛdvindriya	dbang rtul
effect	phala	'bras bu
effect which is a state of separation	visaṃyogaphala	bral ba'i 'bras bu
empowering condition	adhipatipratyaya	bdag rkyen
emptiness	shūnyatā	stong pa nyid
enlightenment	bodhi	byang chub
entity	bhāva	ngo bo
exalted knower of all aspects	sarvākārajñāna	rnam mkhyen
exalted wisdom	jñāna	ye shes
exalted wisdom subsequent to meditative equipoise	pṛṣhṭhalabdhajñāna	rjes thob ye shes
expression of worship		mchod brjod
extreme of annihilation	uchchhedānta	chad mtha'
extreme of permanence	shāshvatānta	rtag mtha'
fabrication	kṛtrima	bcos ma
faith	shraddhā	dad pa
Foe Destroyer	arhan	dgra bcom pa
followers of right faith		yang dag dad pa'i rjes 'brang ba
Form Body	rūpakāya	sprul sku
fruit	phala	'bras bu

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
fully qualified		mtshan nyid pa
general category	sāmānya	spyi
genitive case		'brel sgra/drug sgra
Gone-Afar	dūraṃgama	ring tu song ba
great compassion	mahākaruṇā	snying rje chen po
ground	bhūmi	sa
hatred	dveṣha	zhe sdang
Hīnayāna	hīnayāna	theg dman
Hearer	shrāvaka	nyan thos
Hearer Proclaimer		thos sgrogs
independent		rang dbang can
instructions	upadesha	man ngag
impermanent (phenomenon)	anitya	mi rtag pa
impure	ashuddha	mi dag pa
inherently existent	svabhāvasiddha	rang bzhin gyis grub pa
King of Subduers	munīndra	thub dbang
knower of bases	vastujñāna	gzhi shes
learner	shaikṣha	slob pa
liberation	mokṣha	thar pa
lineage	gotra	rigs
Mādhyamika	mādhyamika	dbu ma pa
Mahāyāna	mahāyāna	theg chen

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
manifest awareness		blo mngon gyur pa
Mantra	mantra	sngags
meditative equipoise	samāhita	mnyam bzhag
mercy		rtse ba
merit	puṇya	bsod nams
Middling Realizer		sangs rgyas 'bring
migrator	gati	'gro ba
mind	chitta	sems
mind generation	chittotpāda	sems bskyed
mind of enlightenment	bodhichitta	byang chub kyi sems
mode of apprehension	mushtibandha	'dzin stangs
moment	kṣhaṇa	skad cig
momentary	kṣhaṇika	skad cig ma
mutually exclusive	*anyonyaparihāra, *paraspara-parihāra-viruddha	phan tshun spang 'gal
nirvana	nirvāṇa	myang 'das/mya ngan las 'das pa
non-associated compositional factor	viprayuktasaṃskāra	ldan min 'du byed
non-dual awareness		gnyis med kyi blo
novice	ādikarmika	las dang po ba
object of attainment		thob bya
object of intent		ched du bya ba
object of observation	ālambana	dmigs yul
omniscient consciousness	sarvākārajñāna	kun mkhyen
participial construction	akshayasamāsa	mi zad pa'i tshig sdud
path	mārga	lam

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
path of accumulation	sambhāramārga	tshogs lam
path of meditation	bhāvanāmārga	sgom lam
path of no more learning	ashaikṣhamārga	mi slob lam
path of preparation	prayogamārga	sbyor lam
path of seeing	darshanamārga	mthong lam
perfection	paramitā	pha rol tu phyin pa, phar phyin
Perfection Vehicle	paramitā(yāna)	phar phyin gyi theg pa
permanent (phenomenon)	nitya	rtag pa
person	pudgala	gang zag
perverse conception		log rtog
phenomenon	dharma	chos
Prāsaṅgika	prāsaṅgika	thal gyur pa
predicate	sādhyadharma	bsgrub bya'i chos
prerequisite	pūrvaṃgama	sngon 'gro
promise	pratijñā	dam bca'
reality	dharmatā	chos nyid
realize	adigam	rtogs pa
reasoning	yukti	rigs pa
referent object	*adhyavasāya-viṣhaya	zhen yul
Rhinoceros-like [Solitary Realizer]	khaḍgaviṣhāṇakalpa	bse ru lta bu
root	mūla	rtsa ba
sage	ṛṣhi	drang srong
scholar	paṇḍita	mkhas pa
scripture	āgama	lung
scriptural collection	piṭaka	sde snod
self	ātman	bdag
selflessness	nairātmya	bdag med pa
self-sufficient		rang skya thub pa

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
sentient being	sattva	sems can
sharp faculties	tīkṣhṇendriya	dbang rnon
sign	nimitta	mtshan ma
simultaneous		cig car ba
Solitary Realizer	pratyekajina/ pratyekabuddha	rang rgyal/rang sangs rgyas
Stream Enterer	shrotāpanna	rgyun zhugs
substantial cause	upādāna	nyer len
substantial entity	dravya	rdzas
substantially existent	dravyasat	rdzas su yod pa
subtle	sūkṣhma	phra ba
suchness	tattva	de kho na nyid
suffering	duḥkha	sdug bsngal
Superior	ārya	'phags pa
Supramundane Victor	bhagavan	bcom ldan 'das
sutra	sūtra	mdo
Svātantrika	svātantrika	rang rgyud pa
syllogism	prayoga	sbyor ba
three practices		chos gsum
three spheres		'khor gsum
truth	satya	bden pa
ultimate	paramārtha	don dam
ultimate mind generation	paramārthabodhi-chittotpāda	don dam byang chub kyi sems bskyed
uninterrupted path	ānantaryamārga	bar chad med lam
unitary	eka	gcig pa
Universal Emperor	chakravartin	'khor los bsgyur ba'i rgyal po
unusual attitude	adhyāshaya	lhag bsam

English	*Sanskrit*	*Tibetan*
valid cognition	pramāṇa	tshad ma
vehicle	yāna	theg pa
victorious	bhagavan, bhagavatī	bcom ldan 'das
view	dṛṣhṭi	lta ba
vow	saṃvara	sdom pa
welfare	artha	don
wheel of doctrine	dharmachakra	chos kyi 'khor lo
wisdom	prajñā	shes rab
wish		'dod pa

*Indicates a reconstruction of the Sanskrit.

Notes

1 Leo Rosten, *Religions in America*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), p. 290.

2 Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*. (New York: Gabriel/Snow Lion, 1980), p. 119. Hereafter, this work – which contains a translation of the portions of D̄zong-ka-b̄a's *Illumination of the Thought* bearing on Chandrakīrti's expression of worship – will be referred to as *"Comp."*

3 Turrel Wylie, "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 22 (1959): p. 261–7.

4 As translated in Sopa and Hopkins's *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Grove Press, 1976), Ḡön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-b̄o's *Precious Garland of Tenets* (*Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba*) quotes Vajragarbha's *Commentary on the Condensation of the Hevajra Tantra* (*Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā*) as the source for this fourfold division: "It is not the Subduer's thought that a fourth [vehicle] or a fifth [school of tenets] exists for Buddhists." See also *The Hevajra Tantra*, II.viii. 9–10.

5 See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*. (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), p. 404.

6 Bhāvaviveka offers this etymology in his *Lamp for Wisdom* (*Prajñāpradīpa*). D̄zong-ka-b̄a, Jam-ȳang-shay-b̄a, and Jay-d̄zun-b̄a rely upon this etymology. See *Comp.* 83, 96–97.

7 *Comp.* 83–84, 97–98.

8 Louis de la Vallée Poussin (ed.), *Madhyamakāvatāra par Chandrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX, 1.12–15, 7.17–20, 9.7–10, and 10.13–14. All references to Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* and *Auto-Commentary* list the page and line numbers in La Vallée Poussin's edition of the Tibetan.

9 Hopkins writes (*Comp*. 249–250):

> Kensur Lekden reported that during the rule (813–38) of the Tibetan king Tri-ral-wa-jen (Khri-ral-pa-can), it was decided to salute Mañjushrī at the beginning of presentations of wisdom – mainly found in the knowledge (*abhidharma*) division – because Mañjushrī is the physical manifestation of the wisdom of all Buddhas. It was also decided to salute Buddha and the Bodhisattvas at the beginning of presentations of meditative stabilization – mainly found in the sets of discourses (*sūtrānta*) – because these were set forth by both Buddha and Bodhisattvas. The Omniscient One is saluted as the beginning of presentations of ethics – mainly found in the discipline (*vinaya*) – because these were set forth only by Buddha since he made the rulings. Despite this formulation, it was not always followed, many translators choosing to pay homage to their protective deity.

In accordance with this formula, the translators of the *Supplement* pay homage to Mañjushrī. However, Chandrakīrti introduces his expression of worship by indicating that he is going to praise great compassion "instead of complete and perfect Buddhas and Bodhisattvas."

10 Previously translated by Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rinbochay in *The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 42.

11 Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* opens with an expression of worship:

> Homage to the mother of the Buddha
> And the surrounding Hearers and Bodhisattvas
> Which through the knowledge of all
> Leads Hearers seeking pacification to peace;
> Which through the knowledge of paths
> Causes those helping migrators to achieve the aims of the

world;
And through possession of which the Subduers
Set forth these variables having all aspects.

(See Hopkins, "The Seventy Topics," p. 2). "Knowledge of all" here refers to a Hīnayāna knower of bases (*vastujñāna, gzhi shes*) which directly realizes all phenomena as lacking a self of persons.

12 See trans. p. 78. This obeisance has not been identified.

13 Although *Comp.* page numbers are given for all quotations from *Illumination of the Thought*, my translations are often slightly different from those found there.

14 See trans. p. 81–82.

15 Chandrakīrti later (17.17–19, 19.1) explains that while first ground Bodhisattvas surpass Hearers and Solitary Realizers by way of lineage, it is not until the seventh ground that a Bodhisattva's intelligence surpasses that of Hearer and Solitary Realizers Foe Destroyers. See *Comp.* 145–149.

16 The enumeration and discussion of these six is based on: Denma Lochö Rinbochay, "Transcripts of Lectures on Gön-chok-jik-may-w̄ang-bo's *A Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, an Ornament Beautifying the Three Vehicles*," 1978, pp. 130–132. See also: *Comp.* 250–251.

17 This sūtra has not been identified.

18 Gyel-tsap's *Ornament of the Essence* is a commentary on Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization.* Since the *Ornament for Clear Realization* is a Yogāchāra Svātantrika Mādhyamika work, Gyel-tsap's comment is presumably from the viewpoint of that tenet system.

19 See Trans. p. 87 and note 47 for discussion of this.

20 This discussion of the seven instructions of cause and effect is based on *Comp.* 36–49 ("Meditations of a Tantric Abbot"), *Comp.* 86–88, and Sopa and Hopkins's *Practice and Theory*, pp. 27–37.

21 See p. 116 and note 61.

22 Impermanent phenomena comprise three non-overlapping groups: form, consciousness, and compositional factors. See Hopkins's *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 220.

23 Oral Commentary of Gyu-may Kensur Rinbochay. See also: Hopkins's "The Topics of Enlightenment," 1978, p. 10; and

Ornament for Clear Realization I.19.

24 According to La Vallée Poussin ("Madhyamakāvatāra," *Muséon* 8, 1907: p. 263 n2) the *Chos kun 'gro ba'i mdo* may be the *Āryadharmasaṃgitisūtra* (*Recitation of Doctrine Sutra*).

25 What may appear to be an indirect contradiction of the position that the object of attainment is one of the objects of intent occurs in Hopkins's translation of the corresponding section from Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought* (110):

> This [Chandrakīrti's description of a mind generation] does not indicate all the characteristics of an altruistic mind generation because it takes cognizance of only one part – its objects of intent.

The same passage, as translated here (p. 132) reads:

> Since this [mind generation as described by Chandrakīrti] observes only a portion of the objects of intent of a mind generation, it does not fulfil the definition.

If the genitive between "one part" (*phyogs gcig*) and "objects of intent" (*ched du bya ba*) does in fact indicate an appositional relationship – as Hopkins has taken it to do – then there is a strong implication that what has been omitted from the description – the object of attainment, one's own enlightenment – is something other than an object of intent. However, the genitive is ambiguous. Both Jay-dzun-ba and the scholar whose interpretation of this passage Jay-dzun-ba refutes read the genitive as I have translated it: "a portion of the objects of intent." According to Jay-dzun-ba's understanding, "a portion of the objects of intent" indicates that only one of the two objects of intent, the welfare of sentient beings, is observed; the other, one's own enlightenment, is not mentioned.

26 This and much of what follows through p. 48, as well as pp. 50–52, is based on the oral commentary of Gyu-may Kensur Rinbochay.

27 Following the expression of worship, Chandrakīrti begins a discussion of the first Bodhisattva ground. Dzong-ka-ba writes (*Comp.* 120):

> *Question*: This text presents both the vast and profound paths

of Bodhisattvas as well as the fruit attained through them. Therefore, the stages of paths on the level of a common being – which are extremely important for a Bodhisattva – should have been taught here after the expression of worship, but they were not. How could it be right for Chandrakīrti to begin his explanation with the grounds of a Superior?

Answer: Since Chandrakīrti explained those paths on the occasion of the expression of worship, he did not explain them after it. His purpose was to indicate that one who wishes to enter the Mahāyāna must first practise these paths by teaching the three main causes which, when cultivated in meditation, cause one to become a Bodhisattva.

28 *Comp*. 85, 117–118.

29 Although the words "Homage to those compassion for" do not occur in the stanza, Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* 10.14–15 specifically states that they should be added.

30 La Valleé Poussin does not exhibit awareness of this interpretation of the names of the three compassions as abbreviations. He writes:

> Aussi longtemps qu'on croit au "moi" et à l'existence individuelle des créatures, la compassion a pour objet les créatures (*sattvālambanā*); quand on reconnait que les individus (*ātman*, *pudgala*) ne sont que des groupes de *skandhas*, la compassion a pour objet les principles (*dharma*) ou éléments; quand on reconnait le neant des *skandhas*, elle n'a plus d'objet (*ānalambanā*).

Chandrakīrti's *Auto-Commentary* (10.10–11 and 9.4–6) does state that the three types of compassion are distinguished by way of their objects of observation. Taken literally, the names of the three compassions – compassion observing sentient beings, compassion observing phenomena, and compassion observing the unapprehendable – suggest what La Vallée Poussin writes.

31 This paragraph is based on Gyu-may Kensur's oral commentary.

32 Despite this initial indication that the chapter will have two main sections, Jay-dzun-ba's entire discussion of "Hearers and Middling Realizers/Are born from the Kings of Subduers" is under

the heading "General Meaning"; at the end of the chapter (p. 92) one sentence indicates that the "meaning of the text" is to be found within the foregoing explanation.

33 In this translation I have added the names of the authors of cited texts without using brackets. Although *rang 'grel* (*Auto-Commentary*) is a description, not a translation, of *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣhya*, I have chosen to treat it as a title because it seems that Jay-dzun-ba cites the work only with this epithet.

34 The beginning of each new page of the Tibetan original is marked with the number of that page in brackets.

35 The Sanskrit *bhagavatī* is feminine so as to agree with *karuṇā*, the noun being modified.

36 Jay-dzun-ba introduces positions he intends to dispute with the words, "If someone says." The Tibetan does not contain direct equivalents for the words "First Debate," "Incorrect Position," or "Correct Position." This format has been introduced in order to clarify the logical structure of the debate. Debates are numbered consecutively within *each section* of a chapter – thus there may be more than one "First Debate" within each chapter.

37 The three spheres (*'khor gsum*) are: (1) having accepted the reason, (2) having accepted that the reason entails the consequence, and (3) having accepted the opposite of the consequence. In this case the opponent has explicitly accepted the reason – that an expression of worship to the causes, Bodhisattvas, serves as an expression of worship to the effects, Buddhas. He has explicitly accepted the opposite of the consequence in his opening statement that Chandrakīrti makes no expression of worship to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. He has implicitly accepted that the reason entails that an expression of worship to the cause, great compassion, serves as an expression of worship to the effects, Buddhas, through his explicit acceptance of the principle that worship to the cause serves as worship to the effect.

38 The source of this quotation has not been identified.

39 The word "absurdly" indicates the viewpoint of the speaker – in this case, Jay-dzun-ba's hypothetical opponent. Jay-dzun-ba does assert that great compassion is a cause of Buddhas.

40 Both parties agree that an effect which is a state of separation – such as a true cessation – is existent (the opposite of the consequ-

ence) and permanent (the reason). By arguing that it is impossible to speak of a permanent phenomenon having a cause the opponent has implicitly accepted that one cannot speak of a permanent phenomenon being an effect. Thus Jay-dzun-ba feels that the opponent has implicitly accepted an incorrect entailment: "If a state of separation is a permanent phenomenon, then an effect which is a state of separation does not exist."

41 The last line reads: *de bas bdag cag nyan thos mi zad 'dra*. The stanza is spoken by Bodhisattvas who, through comparing themselves to Hearers, provide a description of Hearer behavior.

42 According to the Prāsaṅgika system, Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas all directly realize emptiness on their respective paths of seeing. It is not until he reaches the seventh ground that a Bodhisattva surpasses Hearers and Solitary Realizers through his intelligence. See *Comp.* 145–149.

43 Hīnayāna collections lack the qualification of being "means of unmistakenly achieving highest enlightenment" (*Comp.* 105).

44 Stanza 39, lines cd. See *Comp.* 221.

45 "...Solitary Realizers surpass Hearers through their superior feature of practicing merit and wisdom for a hundred aeons ... Solitary Realizers are intent on cultivating merit and wisdom over a hundred aeons ..."(*Comp.* 104).

46 P5550, Vol 112. p. 268, leaf 3, line 8.

47 See *Comp.* p. 199. Jay-dzun-ba's point is that since Chandrakīrti has singled out Solitary Realizers as "those whose nature is definite," all Solitary Realizers must be definite in that lineage through Foe Destroyership. However, an alternative interpretation, suggested privately by Martin Willson, opposes Jay-dzun-ba's position. According to this view, Chandrakīrti is dividing persons into ordinary beings, Hearer Superiors, Solitary Realizer Superiors, and Mahāyāna Superiors; the implication is that Solitary Realizers do not become "definite in self-enlightenment" until the path of seeing. Another possible contradiction of Jay-dzun-ba's position arises later. See translation pp. 100–101 and exposition p. 34.

48 *Comp.* 106. On such actions, called *niyatakarma*, see *Abhidharmakosha* IV 48–51, Chaudhuri's *Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakosha*, pp. 156–157, and *Comp.*, p. 40.

49 Read *gong* for *gang*.

50 Jay-dzun-ba does not mention this third section as a sub-division of any topic here or elsewhere; it begins on p. 101 of this translation, p. 55 of the Tibetan.

51 These two passages use the term "Child of a Conqueror in reference to a Bodhisattva on the first ground (the Very Joyful). As translated by Hopkins (*Comp*. 137, 191) they read:

> The mind of a Child of a Conqueror overpowered
> With compassion to liberate migrators,
> Dedicated with Samantabhadra's aspirations,
> And abiding in joy is called the first.
>
> Abiding thus in the mind of a Child of a Conqueror
> Beautifying with light this excellent base,
> The Joyful [Ground] like a water crystal jewel
> Destroys and overcomes all heavy darkness.

52 A Bodhisattva's empowering condition (*bdag rkyen*) is that which directly produces a Bodhisattva mainly by its own power. See Lo-sel-ling *Collected Topics, Middling Path of Reasoning* 20A5.

53 The definition of substantial cause (*nyer len*) is: that which produces its substantial effect mainly as its own substantial continuum. *Ibid* 19A2. The definition of cooperative condition (*lhan cig byed rkyen*) is: that which produces its cooperative effect mainly without [that effect] being its substantial continuum. *Ibid* 19A3.

54 Read *rgyud* for *rgyur*, 53.5.

55 Read *dang po'i* for *dang pos*, 58.2.

56 Read *rgyu mtshan gyis* for *rgyu mtshan gyi*, 58.6.

57 In brief, a conventional mind generation is an altruistic mind aspiring to highest enlightenment; an ultimate mind generation is a Bodhisattva's direct realization of emptiness.

58 According to Gyu-may Kensur Rinbochay, the wish seeking to attain complete enlightenment for the sake of others is an instance of the mental factor (*chaitta, sems byung*) aspiration (*chhanda, 'dun pa*). The main mind (*chitta, gtso sems*) with which this mental factor is associated is, in this particular case, a conventional mind of enlightenment.

59 Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* (I.18) says:

> Mind generation is the wish for complete
> Perfect enlightenment for the sake of others.

60 Read *dad pa'i* for *dpa'i*, 68.1

61 My text of the last two sentences (69.4–6) reads:

> *ji ltar tshes pa'i zla ba la*
> *skad cig skad cig 'phel bar mthong*
> *de bzhin sa la zhugs rnams kyi*
> *rim gyis rim gyis 'phel bar mthong*
> *ji ltar yar ngo'i bco lnga na*
> *zla ba'i dkyil 'khor rdzogs par gsal*
> *de bzhin sa yi mthar thug na*
> *chos kyi sku yang rdzogs par gsal*

I have translated the slightly different version in P2010, vol. 46, p. 32, leaf 5, lines 3–5, which gives *kyang* for *gyi* in the third line, *rgyas* for *'phel* in the second and fourth lines, gives merely *zla rdzogs par gyor ltar* as the sixth line, and concludes *rdzogs shing gsal*.

62 *Comp*. 144.

63 *Comp*. 144–145.

64 Chandrakīrti makes this statement in the context of his discussion of a first ground Bodhisattva. "That mind" is an ultimate mind generation. Dzong-ka-ba (*Comp*. 140) explains: "From the time of entering the first ground, the Bodhisattva – because of having attained that ultimate mind – is called an ultimate Bodhisattva."

65 Read *byang sems* for *byang sem*, 72.1.

66 Read *glangs* for *blangs*, 73.5.

67 *'phags pa'i 'bras bu'i tshogs chen por rim pa gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa rnams bar ma chad pa yun ring por mngon par 'phel bar yang mi 'gyur ro*. The Superior fruits are the states of Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva Superiors. See the comparable passage, *Comp*. 115.

68 I have translated *gcig*, which usually means "one," as "unitary." Table is one (*gcig*) because it is not many. Table is one with table because it exists and is not different (*tha dad*) from table. Howev-

er, as it is used in the phrase *rtag gcig rang dbang can* (permanent, unitary, and independent), *gcig* means *cha med* (partless).

69 A manifest awareness of pot as permanent thinks, "This pot is permanent." When such a manifest awareness does not occur, consciousness explicitly affected by it also will not occur.

70 Although Jay-d̄zun-b̄a uses the phrase "original reason", it is clear from the context that he is not referring to "compassion which observes mere sentient beings exists in his continuum", the actual original reason. Instead, he is referring to the *second* reason stated in the incorrect position.

71 *mi zad pa'i tshig sdud, akshayasamāsa.*

72 *khyad par du byas nas.*

73 *khyad par du byas pa'i.*

74 According to Gyu-may Kensur Rinbochay, if one has realized that sentient beings are impermanent, then one has necessarily realized that there are no permanent, unitary, and independent sentient beings.

75 Although in Prāsaṅgika "coarse selflessness" usually refers to the non-existence of a self-sufficient substantially existent self, in this context coarse selflessness also includes the non-existence of a permanent, unitary, and independent person. This latter form of coarse selflessness is coarser and easier to realize than the former. Sources: Gyu-may Kensur Rinbochay, *Comp.* 121 and this trans. p. 126.

76 According to Gyu-may Kensur Rinbochay, Jay-d̄zun-b̄a's position is that the last reason is not established. Although all sentient beings lack true existence, whatever observes sentient beings does not necessarily take "sentient beings who lack true existence" as its object of observation.

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[?]

Recitation of Doctrine Sutra
Āryadharmasaṃgitisūtra [?]
Chos kun 'gro ba
P904, vol. 36

Pile of Jewels Sutra
Mahāratnakūṭadharmaparyāyashatasāhasrikagrantha
dKon mchog brtsegs pa chen po'i chos kyi rnam grang le'u stong phrag brgya ba
P760, vol. 22

Repaying the Kindness Sutra
[?]
Drin lan bsab pa

[?]
White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine Sutra
Saddharmapuṇḍarīkạ
Dam pa'i chos pad ma dkar po
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2 *Other Works*

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